


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Implementation of Referendum Mechanism Urged
90UN1027A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 8, 24 Feb 90-2 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by A. Meshcherskiy, deputy editor in chief, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY: "Rally or Referendum?"]

[Text] 30,000 signatures are sufficient to conduct a referendum in Switzerland.

Many countries make broad use of such a democratic instrument as the referendum—a nationwide poll or vote on the most important state problems.

I recall how, while the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies was conducting its work, Academician A. Sakharov, calling for the abolition of Article 6 in the USSR Constitution, handed over to the presidium two folders containing letters and telegrams from voters in support of that step. In response to which the person presiding at the session stated that the presidium had ten folders containing opinions against abolishing that article.

How, then, does one give a reliable evaluation of the true moods of the people, not only those 10,000-20,000 persons who took part in the so-called "nationwide discussion" of the legislative drafts in the press? Especially since there is not yet a complete understanding of the mechanism for taking those recommendations into consideration: some (which ones?) are rejected, and others are accepted (by whom and for what reasons?).

It is obvious that a critical question that is appearing on the agenda of the democratization of our life is the question of using the referendum mechanism that has been reliably tested by the practice of many civilized countries. It is a mechanism that makes it possible to take into consideration the opinion of the majority of the population, rather than only its politically active members who write to newspapers and higher agencies of authority. We all know divided that society is with respect to question of private property, the transfer of land to the peasantry in perpetuity, national self-determination, etc. Heated arguments are taking place before our eyes in USSR Supreme Soviet, with many deputies, as justification for their positions, frequently appealing for the opinion of their constituents, and at times expressing opposing points of view.

People might object that in recent years the mass media, including the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, have been broadly publishing the results of sociological polls, which make it possible to one degree or another, to judge people's moods. But that is just the point—it is "to one degree or another," inasmuch as, as a rule, 2000-3000 persons take part in the polls. And is it permissible, on the basis of their reactions, to judge the opinion of millions and millions of people? Because this is why it frequently happens that the authorities (rayon, city, etc.) make decisions and then come up against the negative reaction of people who justifiably complain that their

opinion was not taken into consideration. One could give an infinite number of examples of this.

For a period of several years I had the opportunity to observe the way in which the referendum mechanism operates in a country with democratic traditions going back for many centuries—Switzerland, a country where the "social world" has been reigning for many decades and where acute political problems are resolved not at rallies or with the aid of strikes, but by means of referendums.

Switzerland uses several types of referendums, which allow the citizens to exert a direct influence on the legislative process.

First, the referendum is mandatory. All amendments to the country's constitution are put to a vote on a mandatory basis.

Secondly, any law (other than extraordinary ones) to be accepted by the Swiss Federal Assembly (parliament) can be put to a so-called optional (or nonmandatory) referendum. For this purpose it is necessary, within 90 days after the confirmation of the law by parliament, to gather 30,000 signatures from citizens who oppose that law.

For example, from 1944 through 1963 there were 20 optional referendums, with eight laws being adopted and 12 being rejected. It would seem that this is a high percentage of a negative attitude toward laws. But during the same period the Federal Assembly adopted more than 400 laws and decrees, that is, the overwhelming majority of them were not disputed by the citizens. On the average, approximately 3 percent of the legislative bills go through the procedure of the optional referendum.

Thirdly, the citizens of Switzerland have been given the right to "legislative initiative," that is, 50,000 persons who have signed a petition can propose their own amendment to the country's constitution, which amendment is presented for a nationwide referendum.

On the average, every year three or four federal laws and a much greater number of cantonal (republic-level) laws are presented for nationwide vote. Thus the voters work in close contact with the legislators and have a profound awareness of their responsibility to the state. Here is one example: even the establishment of federal or cantonal taxes becomes the subject of a referendum. It would seem that the population ought to oppose any increase in taxes, but that does not occur, since the citizens are aware that the government cannot administer effectively if it does not have the appropriate resources. Thus the nation monitors the activities of the state, with a reduction in the traditional antagonism in the relations between the nation and the "servants of the nation."

The impression might arise that referendums are used in Switzerland to resolve only the global, strictly political questions. But that is definitely not so. It is interesting to observe the citizens of the canton of Geneva going

practically every month to the ballot boxes that are set up for purposes of convenient in local school buildings, in order to resolve the most everyday questions: should funds be allocated to build a new and expensive exhibition center in the city; should hunting be banned on the territory of the canton; should a school (or a church) be built in a certain housing area?

Obviously, the conducting of referendums is an expensive measure. But the Swiss are convinced that the expenses more than pay for themselves. The social tension is diminished; and the residents no longer complain about unpopular steps being taken by the authorities, because the residents themselves took part in the decision-making. True, it must be admitting that, as a rule, 20-30 percent of the voters take part in the local referendums. But that does not mean that the decisions are invalid. It is simply that the residents who have ignored the voting apparently are not concerned about what decision will be made, and they agree to support any decision. But if the result is something that you are indeed interested in, then, please, participate in the referendum.

Switzerland's experience indicates that a referendum can be an effective means also of resolving the acute national problems that our country is currently facing.

In the 1960's the French-speaking population of the canton of Berne raised the question of creating its own state formation the canton of Jura. Passions came to the boiling point, and the situation went so far as the commission of terroristic acts. In 1974 the canton of Berne held a referendum that provided an affirmative answer, and after the 1978 nationwide referendum the independent canton of Jura was formed. The referendum had "worked."

I can foresee the objection that it is difficult for our voters to formulate a correct judgment concerning the sometimes complicated questions that are being brought to a referendum, especially in such a vast country as ours. This thought was heard in a statement made at a Supreme Soviet session by USSR People's Deputy A. Denisov. But it is precisely here that the parties and the public movements should play their role: go out and agitate, explain, and convince people about a particular decision. Because the principle is important. In Switzerland each referendum is preceded by an active political campaign: the voters send out leaflets and pamphlets, roundtables and discussions are conducted in the press and on television, etc.

I am convinced that the high politicalization of our society makes it possible at this stage of perestroika to raise the question of the broad application of the referendum mechanism in resolving nationwide, republic-level, city, and rayon problems. It think that there is a need for a law governing referendums in the USSR, in the RSFSR, and in the other union republics.

Democracy is the power of the people, and nationwide voting makes it possible to hear the people's voice. Then

our government will act no "in the name of the people," but under its immediate monitoring.

Role of Marxists, Ideologs in Restructuring Process Examined

90UN1019A Moscow DIALOG in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 9 Jan 90) pp 14-19

[Article by Yu Solomonov: "Who Is a Bolshevik Today?: Notes Concerning the Party's Intellectual Opportunities"]

[Text] *Unlike material life, our spiritual life has become almost shortage-free in recent years. We have absolutely everyone at the current feast of the spirit that threatens to turn into a bacchanalia! We have socialists and anarcho-syndicalists, monarchists and ecologists, leftist radicals and defenders of the ideology of the "Black Hundred," ... And there has been an entire company of mysterious healers who have seized the television screens and the footlights. In a few places there are groups of enthusiasts who are agonizingly waiting in expectation of the next meeting with the newcomers—groups that have come to believe that it is only aliens from another planet who are capable of helping perestroika. In front of the subway station, people trade in horoscopes, and greater and greater numbers of minors are discovering that spoons and plates are sticking to their hands. Exposés concerning what has "stuck" to the naughty hands of the representatives of the older generation are incessantly presented by "exposé experts" who believe that the world can be saved only by official investigation measures, including those carried out at the upper echelons of power. Others seek the causes of all our present woes in the machinations being carried out by the Masons, who, for the time being, have been encountered less frequently than aliens from other planets.*

Pluralism and glasnost, like cordial hosts, have offered a place at the common table to everyone who wants to speak, who has something to say, and even those whom our Constitution does not accept can also be heard and seen here. But it seems to me that only one place at the feast of pluralism is empty. Where are the Marxists?

This is not a rhetorical or ironic question. I have in mind right now not the Central Committee leadership, whose position can be seen in the newspapers, or even the party and Soviet workers in the outlying areas who are being constantly and justifiably criticized for not having participated in the heated public disputes. We shall return later to that last-mentioned group.

Let us talk about our brilliant social scientists, about those who for decades stood on firm philosophical positions, who defended socialist values, and who called them nontransitory. Where have all these people suddenly gone—these people who, if we are to believe their books, dissertations, and lectures, had had convincing victories in the struggle against the ideological opponent as they smashed to smithereens all kinds of pseudotheories and falsifications of Marxism that put in doubt the

truth of that theory. Let us leave to one side today our reproach that none of us simple mortals ever read all those "pseudotheories." It is obvious why we didn't: They were not printed, they were not translated, and every attempt by people to establish contact with social sciences with a non-Marxist trend was quashed. Let us leave at rest those who became tempered in the battles with external opponents. What we are interested today is our internal struggle.

The research study "What Were You and Your Relatives Doing Prior to April 1985?" seems to me to be, in general, not very productive. This is just Stalinism turned inside-out. Repressive awareness does not become more humanitarian because we replace a "minus" but a "plus." History knows progressive-minded individuals who, in their aggressiveness, will give odds to many conservatives.

I am saying this in order to remind the reader, to paraphrase Lenin, that we are carrying out the *perestroika* with the help of that human material that was left to us as inheritance by previous times. And in this sense we are all equal, with the exception of the generation that is entering conscious life in our time.

And can we make any serious claims against a person who has written that **POLITICAL CULTURE** "represents the unity of the political views, convictions, *values*, standards, and *traditions* that formed in organic unity with the citizens' participation in sociopolitical life, in the activities of state agencies and public organizations."¹

Of course, "in organic unity with the citizens' participation" is not completely Russian, but we are talking about the essence of the matter. And the essence would appear to be true. And as for the fact that political culture plays an "ever-growing role," that was stated accurately, as though it had been guessed ahead of time.

But right next to it is an article about legal culture, about economic culture, and about ecological culture, finally. This too contains a large number of correct, or even too correct, words. You read it and you want to shout, "Author! author!"

No, it is not to the Day of Judgment or even to penitential confession that I invite the authors of these articles, but to rallies and discussions, to the pages of magazines and newspapers, to which that very political life that never existed previously in this form is flowing today.

A skeptically-minded opponent might ask me to read these articles more attentively. Don't you really see, he might ask, how many different kinds of things had been written in the most varied publications up to and including last year? Both concerning the developed socialism that had arrived, and concerning the way in which all the educational processes had occurred healthily in our country in 1984? I can see that excellently, and also many other things. But I am not so much

talking about what was written, as I am talking about **WHO** is standing behind these lines. And, I would suggest, they are people who still have Marxist convictions. During those years they were able, with varying degrees of prettification, to write their books on the social sciences, to give lectures, and to describe the spiritual processes that were occurring at that time. However, whereas those people had absorbed even the slightest bit from Marxism-Leninism, today, so to speak, the cards are in the hands of the individuals with those convictions.

Where have they disappeared to, those hosts of lecturers who used to teach young people the principles of dialectical and historical materialism, when public consciousness was being attacked by a swarm of all kinds of mystics, sorcerers, fortune-tellers, and faith healers, who, it appears, are capable of replacing by their appearance on the screen the entire system of the ministry of public health? Where, then, is the corps of our polemics-spouting social scientists when, all of a sudden, moods of speculating on the ideas of *perestroika* are flourishing?

If one speaks about a bacchanalia of all kinds of mystics, does that mean that what was treated for decades as a materialistic view of the world has proven itself to be only an illusion? All right, I can still understand somehow the instability of the materialistic convictions in the mind of a young engineer receiving 150 rubles and in the mind of an old woman who has been tortured by sores and who has become tired of looking for scarce medicine, which, even if she did find them, she would still not have enough money to buy. I can understand the reasons why many socially insecure people are led to mysticism. But I am not considering those who simply have a weak, disordered mind.

The ones who are of extreme interest to me are the others—our scientists, propagandists, ideologists, those very stable materialists whose convictions have been defended by candidate's and doctor's dissertations and who, incidentally, are still receiving salaries for their convictions. And rather good ones.

So how did it happen that all our materialistically-minded army has proven to be weaponless in the face of insignificant groups of all kinds of overthowers of materialism? The ones who explain the situation best of all are the intellectual snobs. In such complicated, critical times there has always appeared this kind of scum, made up of sorcerers and ventriloquists, who always waited for and greeted the newcomers and who evoked the spirits. In a word, *Rasputinism*...

It is, of course, easy to get away from something by using just a word. Or, as Gorkiy said, "This is just, but it does not comfort us."

All right, then, let us assume that a Marxist scientist, looking at this entire pandemonium with sticking plates and flying saucers, think: what we will finally end up with is pluralism, when any point of view has the right to live... Let us assume that.

But how many good words I find in the dictionary concerning the international education of the workers! Of course, the words are so beautiful and true that they are like incantations. And I assume completely that neither those words nor other numerous passages are capable of having any beneficial effect whatsoever on a person who considers his nation to be the best, to be ahead of all the other nations that are unworthy of comparison with his own. But, once again, I am not talking about those who are being educated, but about the educators.

Where have they gone to, those people who devoted their lives to internationalism as a phenomenon, as a theory, as the principle of our society? Why has that word become, in our time, practically a swear-word? At one time Stalinism turned into an insult the word "cosmopolitan," although the original meaning of the word is simple, clear, and by no means derogatory—"a citizen of the world."

Where, then, are our social scientists and ideologists when arguments concerning interethnic matters are springing up everywhere? Alas, many intellectuals, when the very first serious conflict situations developed, took to their national apartments, began to write about the language, culture, and history of their own—and only their own—nation and began to view the disputed situations only from those positions. Obviously, I shall not raise my hand to censure those who write about a national renaissance or about the right of every nation to self-determination, to its own path. So long as this is not written to the detriment of any other nation. But why is it that we read less and less frequently about internationalism? Why is it that, in our society, it is always one thing at the expense of another?

I realize that, in the eyes of any "Pamyat" extremist, every person who adheres to internationalistic views is, at the minimum, a Jew and, at a maximum, a Mason. But I am not talking about extremists, but about many Marxist scientists who are practically nonexistent at that discussion table dealing with the national question that has been set up today throughout the country.

But if we speak in general, we are struck first of all by a kind of paradox. Perestroyka is nothing else but the application of the Marxist method of analysis to our own reality. And, as everyone knows, that method is rigid, or even cruel. Since it operates by no means with slogans, appeals, and declarations about the all-conquering theory, but about the objective reality that it is.

So could this be the property of Marxism that has intimidated certain of our Marxist scientists who had become accustomed to lacquering over that reality?

Of course, one can hear people everywhere saying: we are engaged in perestroyka, we are beginning new plans. Some talk at such time about eliminating the "unexplored areas" in our history; others talk about new

textbooks; and still others, about various scientific programs. All this is praiseworthy. But there is no less a need for the social scientists to participate in today's real political life.

Maybe people will tell me that I am poorly informed. Maybe they will give me dozens of examples of organized roundtables and other forms of discussions. But I feel that these objections only demonstrate the old approach. We are not talking about the number of persons participating in the measures, but about the tendencies. And, to use the language of scientific treatises, the tendency of the active participation of Marxist social scientists in today's political life is, as yet, revealing itself weakly.

If this were otherwise, then that tendency would evoke public interest. And if people in the morning, after arriving at work, begin to discuss Kashpirovskiy, Chumak, and the newcomers who have appeared in Voronezh, to hum to themselves the lyrical White Guard songs that they had heard the previous day on television, then one would scarcely think that the time has come to take off our hat to our social scientists' polemic participation.

There is one more stipulation: no one is appealing avidly for the protection of that which has already outlived its day, for the defense of that perverted version of the great theory that is so beloved by the champions of convenient quotations.

"Marxism does not answer for the vulgarization of its ideas, just as Christianity does not answer for the vacuousness of theologian disputes, or just as the Enlightenment in the person of Diderot or Chernyshevskiy does not answer for the trivial speeches given by Mrs. Kukshina, the emancipated lady in Turgenev's 'Fathers and Sons.' All great ideas have been subjected to vulgarization, and this fact, in and of itself, can serve as indirect proof of their social importance".²

That was rather well written, but is it the truth? One has only to regret that recently we have not got more polemicists like that on the side of Marxism.

But, on the other hand, we have been getting more and more people sighing sadly over the topic "Oh dear, if only there were no Bolsheviks..." These include certain leftist radicals who pine for the Constituent Assembly, and thinkers of the patriarchal-monarchist persuasion. Incidentally, both the rightists and the leftists are sometimes united not only by the extreme measures which, as everyone knows, come together in their interests. Many critics of Marxism-Leninism have in their pockets documents that confirm that they belong to that very party whose ideas they like so much to criticize with absolutely no thought being given to the further successes of that party. As I write these lines, I take the risk of becoming famous either as a backslider, or as someone having a poor memory of the "personalki" [personal cases], but believe me when I say that this kind of hypocrisy seems to me to be a very unworthy quality. If you consider Marxism and the revolution in Russia to be historic

absurdities, why don't you tell your party comrades honestly, "Guys, I don't belong with you"! I assume completely that a person's views can be antiparty, and that the person who adheres to such views must not be subjected to repressions for this. But, I repeat, he does not have the right to present himself as an example of dual morality.

Therefore a very important condition for the qualitative perestroika in the party must be the free, painless withdrawal from it. And I am pleased that this is currently being discussed.

And the discussion is not only about this. Finally we are having a broad discussion of the need for perestroika in the party itself. Unfortunately, it must be noted that a rather large number of party leaders lost several years of perestroika by lagging considerably behind the other public institutions. The obvious fact that it was precisely the party that had been the initiator of perestroika and of its beginning suddenly was turned into a bombastic slogan, a kind of incantation of the type "Don't touch our own!" People would say that if we have begun it, then we do not have any reason for restructuring ourselves. But life has shown that that opinion about ourselves was overexaggerated. If the perestroika had begun first of all in the party, then many mistakes would not have occurred. A graphic example of this is the election of the USSR people's deputies, and the defeat suffered in that election by many people who had been nominated from the party apparatus. Here, when speaking about practice, it is necessary to return to our social scientists and to note that they could have given the party today a very great deal from the point of view of practical research, evaluations, and forecasts of the processes and phenomena that are occurring in society.

I will not be discovering America if I say that today the party apparatus, especially in the outlying areas, has mastered the principles of social psychology and social forecasting. And failing to master those tools means being unable to see tomorrow and the day after tomorrow for the decisions being made.

Take a recent example—the election in Voroshilovgrad, where the person who became a USSR people's deputy after winning 80 percent of the votes, was LITERATURNAYA GAZETA commentator Yuriy Shchekochikhin.

I shall attempt to imagine that I am a resident of Voroshilovgrad. I probably would have voted for Shchekochikhin, if only because I know him well. We used to work together, and I know his shortcomings better than I know the other candidate's merits. But, when I imagine myself as a resident of that city, I see that all the actions taken by the authorities to support their local candidate were aimed at assuring that the person who would become the deputy was... Shchekochikhin. And he indeed did become the deputy, despite the fact that leaflets were disseminated all across the city, accusing the journalist of all the mortal sins, and despite the fact that the local party press left the Muscovite's

program in an absolute shambles. He had so much mud slung at him that even the voters who were doubtful or wavering decided, simply out of an elementary sense of protest, to cast their votes for Shchekochikhin.

Alas, we have at our disposal today a tremendous number of examples of the clumsy, crude, short-sighted policy of the party agencies that do not know how to see the consequences of their actions or the decisions being made. But dialectics, as I think it was Gertsen who said, is not the sum of examples.

One can, for example, argue as much as one wants about Article 6 in our Constitution, that states that the party must participate in the sovereignty of the people... But the fact of the matter is not only and not so much in the constitutional definition as it is a matter of what place the CPSU itself defines for itself in the system of social relations. In my opinion, many party workers have not yet understood how serious the political struggle in society is—the struggle to which many of them proved to be simply unready. Their weakness manifests itself in those qualities that seem even to themselves to be their strength. It seems to such leaders that all that is necessary is to "use the power," to exert pressure, to take the situation in hand, and to revile people, as used to be in previous years, and then everything will immediately get better and things will return to their proper places. But when those measures do not work, they go all to pieces because they do not have in their arsenal any other measures, means, or methods.

Fortunately, in our society there is no room today for a spy, an overseer over all other organizations or movements, or over individuals. Currently not even the KGB lays claim to that role. In a law-governed state, it is the Law that oversees everyone. And that includes the party workers.

People say that during the time of the Watergate scandal our representatives reported from the United States that Nixon would apparently soon be replaced. When he was told this, one of our highly placed leaders pontificated, "Why him? Can't those overzealous journalists be put in their place? He ought to call the editor in chief..."

Well, it turns out that he cannot. It turns out that there can also exist in society certain other interrelationships between power and the press, between power and glasnost.

Much has changed in the world that currently surrounds the ideologist, the party worker, and the propagandist. And it is the spiritual environment that has changed first of all. Here is only one quotation: "...the country that will read 'Gulag Archipelago,' and then all of Solzhenitsyn's works—his novels, his writings on social and political topics, his 'Red Wheel'—will be, when measured by the spiritual gauge, a substantially different country than it was before that".³ That is what critic Igor Vinogradov writes and what he feels, and it is impossible not to agree with that conclusion.

But the appearance of Solzhenitsyn's books is only a small part of those tremendous reforms that have occurred and are occurring in society and that are exerting an influence upon the individual's political philosophy. The censuring of Stalinism, the destruction of the system of governing by administrative fiat, the development of the pluralism of opinions, the re-evaluation of historical events—all these have come crashing down on the mass awareness. Because, as everyone knows, a sacred place that remains empty does not exist.

The awareness of a person who finds himself today, essentially speaking, in a new system of social and spiritual coordinates, is influenced by a large number of factors.

Economic problems and the shortages of commodities and products that are linked with those problems; the lack of social protection against a background of growing crime; the lack of any clear prospects on the job as a result of the economic reforms... These and many other things influence the way that people today feel about the world. Against the background of this "tearing apart" in people's minds, we see the appearance of all kinds of preachers, faith healers, oracles and traders in horoscopes, and populists, if not agents-provocateurs. The most dangerous ones among them are those who call upon people to seek the individuals who are guilty of all their woes, who see the reasons for today's situation in machinations carried out by mythical enemies. In one instance it is the "non-Russians" who are listed among the enemies; in another it is the intelligentsia; in a third, the party...

And it is necessary for the party to work in this complicated situation, and in such a way as to regain the influence among the broad masses and to become truly the political vanguard.

Yes, it is true that the leadership has provided precise, reliable orientation guides, the perestroika program has been defined, and the laws of the law-governed state are being developed. But we, having failed to rid ourselves of the cult-oriented, monarchist way of thinking, are continuing to look upward. But the most important decisions today are being made at the bottom, in the situation that is developing in the primary organizations, the cities, the villages, the plants, the mines, and the institutions.

It seems to me that at the present time the most important thing for any party organization is to activate its entire intellectual potential. Over the decades it turned out that the persons who became the leaders in the party organization were by no means always the most educated, the most intelligent, or, if you will, the most respected. At the present time, when a political struggle is being waged, devoted willingness to execute orders is, in itself, not enough, and may even be detrimental. We

need people who can think, who know how to take a risk, who are capable of arguing, and, most important, being victorious in the argument.

After writing this extremely general principle, I began to think about it. Could it be that we have spent too much time making appeals: to know how to argue, to know how to defend, to be unafraid of direct discussions? Without belittling the importance and pertinency of all these abilities, I might add that the most important thing today is probably something else: knowing how to work.

Just go out on any Saturday in Moscow to the Arbat or Pushkin Square. Yes, there are a lot of people arguing there and making a lot of noise. But there are just as many people working. There they are with their bundles of newspapers that they sell at a ruble or 50 kopecks a copy. No, the newspaper is not PRAVDA or KOMSOMOLKA. These are all semilegal or illegal publications of various informal organizations. The militia has its own way of looking at these sales: it detains the vendors for violating the trade rules. The militia is unconcerned about the content. But are we?

No, I am definitely not in favor of imposing a ban, of bringing a person to responsibility in accordance with Article such-and-such. I am in favor of finding out exactly what is written in these publications that makes it possible to sell them at a price 25 times higher than the price of PRAVDA. What have we failed to think about? What have we failed to notice? Why is there such a demand for our opponents, if not our political enemies?

Well, it is because we continue to talk enough in our own party publications. We make tentative efforts to mention a particular fact, and then we say no more about it, or sometimes we completely miss the event or the new phenomenon.

So it turns out that we simply are not working as well—that's all there is to it.

Some of us have begun to understand this. For example, an interesting newspaper, KARETNYY RYAD, appeared in the capital's Sverdlovskiy Rayon. It was so interesting that the higher party agencies discerned in it a certain amount of sedition. Although it is completely obvious that the people who publish the newspaper pursued one goal: they wanted the publication to compete with those that are disseminated so breezily on Pushkin Square a few hundred meters from the CPSU Raykom, and to enable the rayon's public organizations, by way of this newspaper, to convey their own—or, rather, our—general line.

However, the bugaboo of dissidence still frightens people. It is for good reason that the poet said at one time: the most frightening prison is the one that is built in your head.

I assume that people who think freely and in an interesting way—and we do have people like that—are frightened away from contact with party committees and from

active cooperation for precisely this reason: today I will come to see you, but tomorrow you will be told, "That's enough!" and I will find myself looking like a fool.

A second circumstance is no less grievous. There is a persistent stereotype: frequently the people working in the parkoms are limited and not very cultured, and the people who have gone there for our entire life are those who felt that the authority automatically gives a person a mind and a broad mental horizon. Actually they have gone there, and actually they have felt that, but at the present time it is no longer possible to hide one's lack of education or the stagnation of one's thoughts behind the domineering expression on one's face. Today it is necessary to discuss things! And in a proper manner.

Certainly the movement ahead will prove to be discernible when the party becomes a kind of test ground for democracy and glasnost. Today these "test grounds" that spring up spontaneously are located practically everywhere, but within the party they are still rare and do not evoke a significant response.

When frank, direct discussion, criticism and self-criticism, respect for the minority's opinion, and pluralism become the standard in every party organization, the discussions about the multiparty system will recede into the background. A few people do not like these discussions today, but there are still a few who can look at the root of things—they arise largely because of the fact that the nation does not see and does not hear any real discussion within the confines of the existing party. And its unfolding, its profound theoretical interpretation ("Where are we going to sail now?") largely depends upon the Marxist scientists.

Of course, it is impossible to make up for time that has been lost. Therefore it is all the more important to take the initiative in our hands, and to use now as an argument not the size of an office that an official is supposed to have, but the level of constructiveness of the idea with which you, the social scientist or the party propagandist, enter into a discussions among completely equal party members and other opponents.

Incidentally, our rights have been clearly stated in the Rules. But when was the last time we looked at them? Despite all our party equality, I shall take it upon myself to assert that the people among us who must speak first of all are those whom the party has trained for the ideological struggle. And primarily for open dialogue—both with other party members and with all the leftist-rightist-radical-conservatives. Without being afraid that a shout will emanate from an office one story higher and without looking around oneself after every statement made into the telephone.

Will this result in an exodus from the party or in natural selection? Of course.

But those who remain will certainly be continuers of the revolution. They will be Bolsheviks not in the demagogic sense of that word, but in its original sense.

Is victory guaranteed for them? We shall answer laconically: It is not guaranteed for those who will live and act today the way they did yesterday...

Or what other newcomers await us in the political arena?

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Footnotes

1. "Kommunisticheskoye vospitaniye. Slovar" [Communist Education. Dictionary], Moscow, 1984, p 113."
2. Lifshits, M., "Mifologiya drevnyaya i sovremenaya" [Ancient and Modern Mythology], Moscow, Iskusstvo, 1980, p 556.
3. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 5 November 1989.

Kolbin Views Restructuring of People's Control System

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[Interview with G.V. Kolbin, chairman of the USSR Committee for People's Control, by Vladimir Patsiya: "Perestroyka in the Mirror in People's Control"]

[Text] [Patsiya] We live in a difficult time. Economic crisis, social tensions and interethnic conflicts have unfortunately become realities of our life. They are often caused by the so-called negative phenomena, mismanagement, falsifications of records and abuses. Combating them is the main task of people's control bodies. Judging by reports in newspapers, on radio and on television, the style of USSR KNK [Committee for People's Control] work has recently changed. Meetings have become more polemical and up-to-date and facts that in the past would have been hidden under seven seals are now in the open. Gennadiy Vasilyevich, was it enough to impact the processes under way in the country and to stabilize the situation? What do we need to expand the influence of people's control?

[Kolbin] It is my opinion that the USSR KNK must be independent of all other agencies. Its work must be based only on the law and it must be under the control of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Chairman. Secondly, no place should be off limits to control. The right to inspect the work of any state or cooperative enterprise and those who function on contract with foreign partners, as well as the financial and business activity of all public entities, must be a natural one.

It should become a rule for us to provide information and our own opinion to proper political bodies on those who protect persons committing abuses, allow mismanagement and deceive the state. Complaints against people's control bodies are acceptable, of course, but only competent legal authorities should have the right to defend those who were penalized by them.

[Patsiya] Is it not so? Or does the so-called telephone right still manifest itself here?

[Kolbin] It happens even now, in the fifth year of perestroyka, that some managers see themselves, and not the law, as the final authority.

For instance, the meeting of the USSR KNK reviewed gross violations in the financial and business activity of the Moscow branch of the All-Union Research Institute of Plant Life Studies imeni Vavilov. People's deputies of the USSR and RSFSR, a member of the CPSU Central Committee's KNK and two members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium—serious men all—took part in the meeting.

Those guilty of mismanagement and falsification of records were severely punished. It was decided to dismiss A. Chovzhik, director of the branch. Information about falsification of records and mismanagement was sent to the procurator's office. Everyone who was found guilty was personally asked at the meeting whether or not they agreed with the outcome of the inspection and the opinion of KNK members. All agreed that the decision of the committee was fair.

The director of the parent institute signed the dismissal order for A. Chovzhik. After that, a struggle ensued. His protectors, led by A. Ratkin, first secretary of the Stupino party gorkom, mounted what can be called an offensive.

KNK employees were subjected to a flood of threats: that the inspector in charge would soon be removed from the KNK because she was too zealous, that the collective of the institute had submitted a complaint to the USSR Supreme Soviet, etc. But no one denied the fact of falsification of records and mismanagement.

At this point, matters stand as follows: time is passing rapidly, the dismissal order has been signed, but Chovzhik is still on the job since he is on sick leave. Yet, his disease does not keep him from coming to work almost every day or going to other people's offices.

I could cite plenty of similar examples in Moscow Oblasts. The only hope is that in our conversation with V. Mesyats, first secretary of the party obkom, we agreed on the course of uncompromising struggle against all forms of abuse.

Such cases can be stopped and the authority of people's control expanded only by seeking support in the masses, establishing broad-ranging ties with the people and using glasnost as a basis for our work. The word "people's" will become meaningful only if the necessary principle in the work of any committee will be to involve citizens in the struggle against all forms of abuse and mismanagement, when workers, peasants, those who work on the intellectual front and journalists get involved not only in organizing inspections but in discussing their findings both in the collectives and at committee meetings.

Broad publicity for negative cases uncovered by inspections and the participation in them by independent witnesses on a voluntary basis is a guarantee that people's control is independent of anyone and anything. We have not rid ourselves yet of the well-known practice of seeing some people as untouchable. Cases violating the principles of morality and ethics are often concealed from the people.

The case of "palace type" vacation home being built for generals near the town of Arkhangelskoye got much play. Collective complaints from citizens on this issue were sent to the USSR KNK, the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies and other official bodies. The case was criticized in the press. The USSR Ministry of Defense appointed General A. Shirinkin to investigate the situation and present objective conclusions. He concluded that everything was being done properly, since permission had been requested and duly granted. But if it is a legitimate affair, why not say so to Arkhangelskoye peasants? No general dares do it. It is not surprising, since it is impossible to persuade the people that that decision, made by other people God knows when, is proper. We must be bolder not only in recognizing mistakes of the past but also in taking steps to correct them and put things in order, instead of making them worse.

To rebuild one of the dachas in Arkhangelskoye, which initially cost R53,000, marble, granite, expensive varieties of wood and other deficit materials were used. After such rebuilding the dacha cost R343,000. A swimming pool is being built for another dacha: it is a kind of country home with a pool and various other amenities.

They should have asked permission to redeploy those funds, using them not for building dachas but for solving pressing problems that face servicemen. I doubt anyone would object to it.

Glasnost and openness are the most powerful weapons of people's control. Unfortunately, this principle makes managers at all levels very unhappy. Hard-to-believe reasons are employed against it, ranging from allegations that we undermine respect for the party to claims that we may negatively affect the results of the upcoming elections in various regions.

Similar noises were heard after an inspection conducted at a number of hunting lodges with the participation of the plaintiff and independent members of the public. We found violations not so much of legal as moral norms by certain leaders, who liked to rest after a successful hunt for semi-domesticated boars in "huts" complete with fireplaces, saunas and swimming pools. Let me stress once again that those hunting and recreation expeditions were legal from the point of view of certain office instructions and regulations. For some reason, however, those leaders keep silent about their legal pastimes at meetings with voters, for they know that, after they had seen a television program on hunting by their representatives, the people may not choose them again.

Practice has shown that the more expeditiously, energetically and uncompromisingly people's control bodies react to appeals, complaints and requests from citizens, the more signals they get. This means that people start to trust them more. This in turn means that there are more assistants and supporters and that the ranks of fighters for truth and justice swell.

[Patsiya] But in this country, one in every 30 inhabitants (including old people and children) is a people's inspector. Is it not enough? Maybe it would be better to have fewer of them, but of better quality?

[Kolbin] I am speaking of fighters and allies who work conscientiously, out of conviction, about those who on principle can not tolerate injustice, lawlessness, mismanagement and irresponsibility—all that keeps back and delays perestroika processes. Unfortunately, such people are not plentiful among people's inspectors who number in the millions.

That was the attitude that emerged here under the command-administrative system: to do only what the bosses demand. The bosses demanded numbers. Numbers were viewed as the only justification for calling it "people's control". The goal was to make one out of ten employees a people's inspector. It was done by legitimate means, too, but more often by illegitimate ones. The principle for recruiting watchdogs was to have everyone hold a public office. Such reasons were often paramount when people's control committees were staffed at all levels: people's control committees had to include one or two workers or peasants, a woman and representatives from the trade unions, the Komsomol and the newspaper. But full-time employees are also part of the concept of the people, although they are, above all, civil servants and professional inspectors whose task is to fulfill an entire range of functions which in this country are assumed under the name of the USSR People's Control. It is staff employees of the system that, by coordinating the actions of all state control organs, must make sure that state control has an important place in the socio-political and economic life of the country.

We have already taken a number of steps in this direction. I already mentioned it. Let me just remind you that the USSR KNK coordinating committee has been established, comprised of deputy directors of the union Gosplan, Gossnab, State Committees on Standards, Labor, Prices and Statistics, MVD and Ministry of Finance—in all, representing almost two dozen ministries and agencies. The work of this committee allowed us to define the direction of control more precisely and encourage other control entities to engage in joint actions. We get better opportunities to involve experts in our work in order to raise responsibility for quality of materials, create favorable conditions for developing well-thought out proposals based on results of inspections and utilize the right to initiate legislative proposals granted to us by the Constitution.

As to the public component, here the application of the principle "it is better to have fewer but better" is related to rights of our grassroot links. People can and will work better if they see tangible results of their efforts. Today, unfortunately, given the existing Law on People's Control, there is no practical scope for it.

The public component has only the right to uncover shortcomings, but never to come up with a radical solution, such as fire the dishonest shop manager or lazy contractor, or to force the driver dropping a truckload of bricks or cement into the mud to pay damages. Their sole right is to issue public censure and make the appropriate report to management. On the one hand, this situation breeds the snitch mentality: "Look what kind of things go on here, but management is doing nothing to stop it." On the other hand, it gives rise to mountains of correspondence and complaints to higher authorities. It also creates the impression that efforts are fruitless and that people's control is weak.

All these issues must be decided within the framework of the new law on control and similar laws of the union republics.

[Patsiya] You have worked in many republics and regions of the country and know well local socio-economic and ethnic differences. How do they impact on the work of the USSR People's Control?

[Kolbin] If we talk about the knowledge that I have amassed in the years of working at union republics, it is, of course, a great help to me in my work. It permits me to see various problems not just from the administrative—in this case, people's control—point of view. I would name ethnic pride among those special features. It does not tolerate orders from above. Or at least people are very sensitive to them. Such orders are not the figment of somebody's imagination. Except it used to be called the principle of democratic centralism that was often distorted and understood in a skewed fashion, favoring the center. It was reflected in the cadres policy, when some candidates were literally forced upon the people while others rejected. On the pretext of protecting state interests, initiative was hampered, deeds discouraged and decisions which had nothing to do with the center rejected.

It is clear that this was—and at times still is—the work of apparatus employees, those whose responsibility was merely to carry out the will of collective bodies. Naturally, this offended people. But this went unnoticed by those who were trying to show their power not in the interests of the cause but to show everyone who was on top by means of severe intimidation.

Incidentally, this was typical of our system as well. Take, for instance, control over the implementation of the housing program. Until recently, no matter how we approached it, in the end it all came to square meters. That much was planned and this much not built. Meanwhile, there were firm instructions from above: at all levels, people's control committees must review this

issue on a monthly basis. Did we need such strict regimentation? Every region has its own special features and its own way to solve problems.

In the Transcaucasian republics, for instance, it is enough to give people a plot of land and they would built homes for themselves with their own savings. The same is true of Central Asia. In the Mountainous Altay region of Kazakhstan, the problem of housing is being solved by relying heavily on loans from enterprises. Russia, the Ukraine and other republics should have their own approach to solving the housing problem. Abuses also have their idiosyncrasies in different regions. Special approaches should be developed to fight them. Control entities must know better what button to press to achieve the needed rate of resolving various issues of general programs.

Strict regulation in this area not only violates the sense of independence and stifles initiative but in some cases causes ethnic insults, if not conflicts. Unfortunately, they often occur even now, even though after 1985 the situation in the country has changed drastically: republics, krays and oblasts have been given much freedom to act, aspire and risk in order to achieve results. I do not recall a single instance of being denied permission by party and state leaders when I asked them to approve solutions to various problems that were independent, original or relied on local resources.

This approach is triggering changes for the better in the food supply situation in Belgorod, Orel, Kokchetava and Tselinograd oblasts, Stavropol Kray and some other regions of the country. The people have noted and appreciated these changes.

We must not forget that our past lasted many a decade and fostered in some inability to take a single step without instructions from the center and made others allergic to any advice or directives from above. Incidentally, this can be seen at all levels of the people's control system.

[Patsiya] What solution do you propose for this problem?

[Kolbin] I personally think that no permission should be required for a good cause. Naturally, the committee should be guided by the interests of the people and the state and, of course, by the law. The current USSR Law on People's Control is, on the other hand, the child of the times of rigid centralization. It does not define the area of competence of control bodies and does not encourage republic and local bodies to act independently, taking into account their special features and actual problems that arise in the regions.

[Patsiya] The 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies decided to accelerate the passage of the new law on people's control. What do you consider a priority in drafting the law?

[Kolbin] The Supreme Soviet, of course, will decide on the actual content of the law. As to my own point of view, I think that even with the broadening independence of the republics and implementation of new federal principles we must preserve the integrity of the control system in the country. At the same time, detailed regulation of actual goals, responsibilities and rights of local people's control entities must be defined by appropriate laws of the union republics. As is well-known, no republic currently has such a law. This is the cause of excessive centralization and, if you will, diktat and discontent stemming from it, as well as lack of initiative. The old principle of doing what the superior entity orders must be expunged from the new law.

The work on the draft law on people's control requires active participation by all union and autonomous republics; every component in the system must define its own concrete role in the inspection work. We must define with utmost precision the links between union and republic committees as well as committees at all other levels. The new law must ensure that every committee acts independently.

[Patsiya] What will be the role of the union committee?

[Kolbin] First of all, to coordinate the work of all control organs and to oversee the implementation of union-level programs. Another task will be to build a system of methodological support for control bodies. Now, when we speak of variety in forms of property and management, this is a vital necessity. We have the resources to carry out this work, the union committee being made up of a highly trained cadres of inspectors. Training and retraining of specialists for the people's control network is another concern. In short, the system must be guided by the following principle: the upper echelon should not dictate, but create the situation when the upper echelon itself and its subordinate committees feel the constant need to contact one another and coordinate their efforts.

Of course, while working on the new law we must study as much as possible both our own and foreign experience of inspection work and adopt everything that is valuable in it. In Bulgaria, for instance, the public was recently offered a fundamentally new platform defining the place, the role and the structure of people's control bodies under perestroika. According to the authors of that plan, the main features of state and people's control should be independence, democratism, comprehensiveness and effectiveness. We too need all these qualities.

[Patsiya] What are the current concerns of the USSR KNK? What issues is it currently addressing?

[Kolbin] In the first place, of course, is the restructuring of the people's control system. We must abandon formalistic and bureaucratic methods and raise the effectiveness of our work. We allot a crucial role in this task to the new law on people's control. Currently we are reviewing new approaches to the area of control structure. At many enterprises, for instance, a single body has

been created—a committee or a group of people's control—which is elected by the meeting of the labor collective. That body unites all other control entities at the enterprise, especially public ones, including "Komsomol Spotlight", workers' trade union control, party control, women's councils control, veteran organizations, etc. Single control entities at enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes are a component of the general control network. We think this will raise its effectiveness and get rid of repeated checks by various bodies.

Another important concern of the union committee in the area of restructuring of its activities is the struggle against bureaucratism and delays. The thesis of the 19th party conference that a situation must be created in the country whereby the citizen must be certain to be able to rein in bureaucrats with the help of people's control must become not a wish but a norm of life. This is how we define our goal. Unfortunately, for many local people's control entities it remains nothing but a beautifully sounding slogan.

The increased effectiveness of the entire system of people's control and the development of new criteria to assess the work of committees is another timely issue. We must reject the Chichikov-like counting of dead souls which exist only on paper and are never active in control entities and put an end to assessment of the work of committees by number of inspections and days spent by their employees on business trips, number of referrals, reports or sanctions and other similar criteria. This leads to nothing but paper chase.

All these shortcomings, which are seen clearly today, stem from the Law on People's Control by which we live. Take the issue of economic effectiveness of control entities, for instance. We can compute it only by using the sum of fines. But how large is it? The law clearly states that in cases when damage is assessed the people's control committee can fine the guilty an amount of up to three monthly salaries toward partial restitution of damage. Why partial restitution and not full? We have never asked the question whether or not the expense on maintaining control entities is compensated.

In this respect we must look at experience abroad. In the U.S., for instance, there is a Presidential council for honesty and efficiency in government. Its purpose is to coordinate activities of all control and inspection entities combatting abuse of federal programs. It does not forget, however, to get fully compensated for its expenditures. The published annual report of that control entity states that last year's restitution amounted to over \$330 million. The Department of Defense alone accounted for \$116 million. What are these astronomical sums made up of? The same report cites an example. A company contracted by the U.S. Department of Defense to design and produce various military hardware overcharged the department for labor. The inspection uncovered this piece of false reporting, as we would say. The company not only had to repay the damage and was fined \$220,000, but also had to pay half a million dollars to

cover the cost of inspection. We could have used this experience very successfully in the Arkhangelskoye situation, for instance.

On the other hand, note the structure of the American control entity and its purpose. Yet, the Americans invented nothing new here. Let us recall V.I. Lenin. He entrusted workers' control with the task of evaluating and assessing orders and laws coming from above. They were to decide whether or not goals were defined correctly and their implementation could achieve the needed result; if not, corrections were required in one or another directive. They were also to see whether or not orders could be applied in practice and how useful they were for the cause. In short, the task of control was not to blindly carry out directives from the center but critically assess decisions from the point of view of the people.

[Patsiya] It would seem once again that this, too, harks back to the imperfection of the law.

[Kolbin] Of course. I personally think that the main characteristic of people's control entities should be their constitutional right to coordinate the activity of all other control and inspection entities of the state. Then the loophole of referring to various agency regulations and justifications, such as "we were allowed", would be closed. Proposals on empower people's control entities to safeguard the interests of the state and the people, principles of social justice and legitimate rights of citizens must be bolstered legislatively, so that people's control had authority over all organs of state administration, enterprises, offices and organizations.

The essence of the work of committees must be loss prevention, elimination of unjustified, ineffective expenditures and restitution, as full as possible, of financial and material damage. This latter must be done by the KNK itself and appropriate administrative bodies. We must learn to balance the cost of maintaining and compensating control employees and the unneeded expenditures they help prevent.

The main criteria in assessing the work of committees at all levels must be how actively they participate in governing the republic, the oblast or the region, how quickly they react to signals of abuses and how uncompromisingly and decisively they combat all shortcomings.

I think that it would be useful to bolster moral forms of influencing persons committing abuses and violating ethical standards. To do that, the practice should be introduced more broadly of discussing the crimes of the guilty at labor collectives, relying more on video technology. Very close attention should be paid to proposals to allow people's control committees to dismiss not only those who are found guilty of wrongdoing but those who cover up such malefactors, interfere with inspections and try to hide their results.

I do not think that anything but good would result if the status of censures issued by people's committees were upgraded. A censure should not be just another entry in

the transcript but carry definite consequences. The following approach should be discussed: until the committee removes its censure from the irresponsible worker, he should lose his right to get all bonuses and could not be nominated for office. The censure could be removed only after all the shortcomings were corrected. If this does not occur in a set time period, the employee would be subject to dismissal.

These are, of course, my personal, approximate suggestions for the draft law. Many people are now working on it. Let me repeat that only the Supreme Soviet can decide what proposals to adopt or to reject.

[Patsiya] Obviously, all these fundamental proposals must be studied by the Supreme Soviet. And what about the day-to-day relations between the KNK and committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet and the government of the country?

[Kolbin] I would call them active interaction. For instance, at the joint meeting with the Union Soviet Commission on the Issues of Labor, Prices and Social Policy, we discussed the situation in price setting for consumer goods and the work of price-setting entities in overseeing the state pricing discipline. This laid the foundation for the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On Additional Measures to Stabilize the Consumer Market and Strengthen State Control over Prices". The results of inspections on how well agriculture is being supplied with advanced technology and how reasonably it is priced were reviewed at the meeting of the USSR KNK, the Committee on Agricultural Issues and Food and the Commission on the Issues of Labor, Prices and Social Policy; they were also the basis of a resolution by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

In addition, jointly with the Committee on the Protection of the Health of the People, we discussed thoroughly the issue of supplying medicines to the population of the RSFSR Non-Black Soil region and with the Soviet of Nationalities' Commission on Consumer Goods, Retail Trade and Municipal, Consumer and Other Services to the Population, that of shortcomings in implementing measures to increase the production and broadening the selection of consumer goods at enterprises of the nonferrous metals industry. Our committee's report "On Organizing Control over the Work of Rail Transport" was taken into account when the appropriate decision was passed by the Soviet of the Union's Commission on the Issues of Transport, Communications and Information.

The USSR KNK report was behind the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Implementation of Decisions on the Construction of Housing and Social, Cultural and Consumer Facilities".

[Patsiya] And the final question, Gennadiy Vasilyevich. It concerns the upcoming elections to republic and local soviets and the staff of local people's control entities. What kind of connection should there be between them, in your opinion?

[Kolbin] The state of our economy and the need for radical perestroyka in control and inspection work require competent, professionally trained inspectors able not only to uncover shortcomings and punish the guilty but to propose ways to improve the situation to be attracted into control entities. To advise someone one must know a lot, too. Current resources allow us to select very competent and responsible employees for the people's control network. The goal of the new soviets in the republics and locally is to make sure that they are committed to the interests of the people.

I simply would like to remind you of the passionate debates that went on in the commissions of the Supreme Soviet on the makeup of the USSR KNK. Proposed candidates were rejected and changed around so many times. USSR people's deputies chose the staffs in a very selective way, for they were trusted with the great responsibility of implementing control in the name and in the interests of the people. The parliamentarians wanted each of us to have a fighting spirit. Newly elected republic and oblast soviets must show a similar selectivity in picking staffs to carry out people's control.

Glavpu: Military Communists 'Against Federalization of CPSU'

In the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy

90UM0201B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "So That Perestroyka May Unite Us"]

[Text] An expanded session of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Buro was held, at which practical measures were defined for getting CPSU Central Committee Plenum materials (M. S. Gorbachev's speech and Plenum resolutions) to all communists and Soviet Armed Forces personnel and for rallying servicemen, members of their families, and Army and Navy civilian workers and employees around the CPSU, its Central Committee, and the Soviet government in support of the concepts of perestroyka and revolutionary renewal of socialism.

The Buro noted that communists in the Soviet Army and Navy are vigorously opposed to the federalization of the CPSU. The federalization of the CPSU will inevitably undermine the organizational and ideological unity of its rank and file and its policy for consolidating society and strengthening the country's defense capability at a crucial stage of perestroyka.

Communists in the Army and Navy fully approve of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum resolutions dated 26 December 1989 and the appraisals and conclusions, which are contained in M. S. Gorbachev's address to the Plenum; and they urge the communists of Lithuania to wisely and comprehensively reassess the results of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress and to

renounce the resolutions adopted at it, which are leading to separatism in the CPSU rank and file.

In letters and telegrams, which give a principled appraisal of the situation in the Lithuanian Communist Party, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers expressed their attitudes toward the CPSU Central Committee Special Plenum resolutions. Party unity is the guarantor of perestroika and the revolutionary renewal of society. That is the position of the majority of the readers and the leitmotif of their letters to the editorial staff.

Preserve the Purity of the Springs

90UM0201B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec First Edition p 1

[Article by Mikola Upenik, member of the USSR Writers Union]

[Text] I support and approve of, and at the same time, am very worried about the fate of the CPSU Central Committee Special Plenum resolutions. I have a burning thought: do we not delay principled appraisals at times? Are we not mistaken, that we thereby grant freedom to the forces of nationalism and separatism, and afterwards, we adopt resolutions and attempt to rectify a situation in the Party and society that is anything but simple?

I would like to believe that the communists of Lithuania will correctly understand the concern of all of us over the fate of our multinational motherland.

I have been a member of the USSR Writers' Union since 1940. I have been a Party member for 57 years. Pavel Tychina, Konstantin Simonov, Arkadiy Kulyeshov, and Mirvarid Dilbazi were my teachers and friends...

On 22 June 1941, our company participated in the first attack encountering enemy fire and bayonets. And my comrades-in-arms—sons of fourteen fraternal nations—were with me.

I speak as a soldier and the Party organizer of a company in the Tarashcha Rifle Regiment, where I learned the power of brotherhood. And to this day I have a sacred belief in brotherhood. During the war years, the strength of our Union was tempered on the battlefields, in heated and bloody combat. Now it is peacetime. And the enemy did not penetrate our cordons. But, in my opinion, both brotherhood and friendship have been subjected to just as great a test of survival. One must clearly realize this, calling speculating on the most sacred feelings of ordinary people jobbery and calling hypocrisy—pharisaism.

I hope we do not muddy the pure springs.

Let the People Decide

90UM0201B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by I Savelyev, Chita]

[Text] I became a member of the Communist Party in 1943. I do not think it is necessary to explain what kind of time this was for the country. It was a very grave time, in the literal sense of the word—a fateful time, for the future existence of our Soviet State was at stake. One day, Private Revaz Gogishvili, a Georgian, Sergeant Ivan Panchenko, a Ukrainian, Private Gavriil Klyuchnikoy, a Yakut, and I received our Party membership cards...

A sense of responsibility for the fate of our motherland brought us into the Party ranks. In the Party we saw a rallying force, which was devoting all of its efforts to defeating the enemy and to victory.

Forty-six years have passed since that time. It is a different time now. But history loves parallels. It is peacetime, but the time, according to the responsibility it requires, is like wartime. Perestroika and the revolutionary renewal of society demand unity and purposeful actions from the Soviet people. And here the example of the Party, our political and moral leader, is important. Only the unity of its rank and file can ensure the success of perestroika. The news of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress's resolution to leave the CPSU caused much grief in my heart. I think it also grieved my sworn brothers in the Party from 1943. In the Ukraine and in Georgia, in Yakutiya and Russia...

I think they expected, as I did, that the CPSU Central Committee would react in some manner to this, that the Central Committee Special Plenum would reach some kind of decision.

I admit that I believed, as many other people did, that it was necessary to bang one's fist with a little more force and everything would fall into place. In my opinion, the Plenum acted much more wisely. The Congress did not include all the Party members in the republic. It is quite possible that the tone at the Congress was set by functionaries, who decided to use the country's temporary economic difficulties (I am sure that these difficulties are temporary) and the interethnic tension for the achievement of their own political ambitions. For this purpose, they have even resorted to splitting the Party. But what do Lithuania's communist rank and file and the people themselves think?

That is why the Plenum's decision to talk things over with the Lithuanian people and the communists and to send a number of Central Committee and Politburo members to the republic seems to be judicious, democratic, and the most reasonable in the present situation.

Moscow Gorkom Resolution on Draft Platform

90UN1180A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Resolution of Moscow CPSU Gorkom Plenum of 16 February 1990 "On the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress"]

[Text] After hearing and discussing the report "On the Results of the February (1990) Plenum of the Party Central Committee and the Draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress," the Moscow CPSU Gorkom plenum notes that the draft platform as a whole defines the main political guidelines for the transition period and will serve as the basis for the debates aimed at the democratic renewal of the party and society.

Several matters of fundamental importance in internal party affairs, however, are not reflected in the draft platform although their discussion is supported by the majority of Communists in Moscow.

The Moscow CPSU Gorkom plenum:

1. Proposes that the CPSU Republic Committee and primary party organizations arrange for the discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform at party meetings, by secretarial councils, and in discussion groups and party clubs from February to April this year.

Requests members of the CPSU Central Committee chosen as delegates by the Moscow city party organization and members of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom to report to labor collectives on the work they have done.

2. Believes that one of the main objectives of the period prior to the congress will consist in broad public dialogue, cooperation, and the consolidation of various sociopolitical movements taking a democratic stance and agreeing with the idea of the socialist choice.

3. Believes it will be necessary to form working groups in the Moscow CPSU Gorkom and rayon party committees to generalize the proposals and remarks of Communists and design the machinery of their implementation. The results of discussions are to be summarized at a party gorkom plenum after the materials have been published in the press and the Moscow CPSU Gorkom's news bulletin. The position of the city's Communists with regard to the 28th Party Congress should be finalized at a city party conference.

4. Believes it is fundamentally important to arrange for the election of delegates to rayon and city party conventions and delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress in direct, secret, and alternative elections in each party district, and that rayon party committees must begin devising the election machinery.

5. Requests rayon party committees, party organizations, the news media, and all Communists to resolutely repudiate the irresponsible appeals, expressions of extreme nationalism and chauvinism, and attacks on the

principle of internationalism that lead to deformities and dissension in the society and party and will sabotage the policy of perestroika.

Moscow Gorkom Appeal to CPSU Central Committee

90UN1180B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Appeal to CPSU Central Committee adopted at Moscow CPSU Gorkom Plenum on 15 February 1990]

[Text] We participants in the Moscow CPSU Gorkom plenum, expressing the opinions of the Communists of the capital, are seriously concerned about the CPSU Central Committee's delays in carrying out specific measures for the democratic reform of the party. We insist on direct, secret, and alternative elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress in each party district, reserving rayon party organizations the right to make the final decisions on the election mechanism.

It is our wish that the coming CPSU Central Committee plenum be held in an atmosphere of maximum glasnost, with television and radio coverage, the publication of records of the proceedings, and the invitation of party secretaries on various levels.

We feel it is necessary that the topics of discussion include immediate measures to stabilize the situation in the country and the party and heighten the responsibility of CPSU Central Committee secretaries and Politburo members for their personal contribution to the perestroika of the economy, ideology, and politics.

We also feel that the following decisions must be made at the plenum:

On granting primary party organizations and party committees the right to set their own report and election schedules;

On forming an organizing committee and preparatory commissions for the 28th CPSU Congress from among the elected congress delegates;

On enacting several provisions prior to the 28th CPSU Congress to expand the rights of primary party organizations and local party organs and democratize party election procedures;

On reserving up to 50 percent of the membership fees of primary party organizations for local needs;

On excluding provisions imposing financial and organizational restrictions on the activities of low-level party links from the current CPSU Central Committee regulations;

On allowing party committees to conduct autonomous economic activity for the purpose of supplementing the party budget and reinforcing the material base of party ideological and propaganda work;

On keeping Communists informed of party budget income and expenditures.

The Moscow CPSU Gorkom plenum expresses solidarity with the Lithuanian Communists supporting the CPSU.

Although we agree that a Russian republic party conference should be held prior to the 28th CPSU Congress, we feel that the Russian Buro of the CPSU Central Committee should hold a convention this March in Moscow for representatives of the okrug, oblast, and kray party organizations of the RSFSR to discuss the convening of the conference and the institutionalization of a Communist Party of Russia.

We feel that in the present atmosphere of low state, labor, and social discipline, widespread irresponsibility and nihilism, crime and speculation, inter-ethnic conflicts, and other negative phenomena, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the country should immediately employ all of the measures envisaged by law to establish order, stabilize the situation in the society, and prevent chaos, lawlessness, and anarchy, and that the institution of the national presidency should not be asserted prior to the broad-scale discussion of this proposal.

Prokofyev Report on Draft CPSU Platform

90UN1180C Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 pp 1, 2

[Speech by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, at gorkom plenum "On the Results of the February (1990) Plenum of the Party Central Committee and the Draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress"]

[Text] The gorkom plenum is meeting at a disturbing time for the country and party. Contradictions in all spheres of public life and the political struggle are constantly growing more severe and becoming potentially explosive. The socioeconomic situation has been complicated by a flawed legal base and by the inability of state organs to enforce existing laws in some cases. Inter-ethnic conflicts have taken on tragic dimensions and are already affecting much of the country. We in Moscow have experienced our first politically motivated strikes.

The situation within the party is equally disturbing. There are signs of dissension, separatist feelings are running high, the party charter is virtually invalid, and discipline is deteriorating.

All of this calls for the suitable resolute political action. Communists understandably expected this kind of action from the last CPSU Central Committee plenum, and although the assessments of the plenum have been positive on the whole, we must admit that the expectations were not completely justified.

After the authors of the party political platform were at least a year late in drafting this document, they were apparently in a rush and had to leave the wording of several major statements vague and indefinite. Communists have expressed serious concern about the failure to publish the document in advance and about the fact that the draft submitted to the Central Committee plenum for discussion did not reflect several fundamental proposals which had won the support of many party members and party organizations. We base this opinion on the results of the citywide party debates and on numerous meetings with the secretaries of primary party organizations and conversations with Communists.

This was also mentioned at the Central Committee plenum itself. The editing commission tried to take the main comments by participants into account. As a result, the published draft platform is acceptable for discussion in party organizations, although it still leaves many questions unanswered.

Obviously, a comprehensive assessment of the draft platform will be impossible until it has been discussed in the lowest party links. Even today, however, it is clear that some of its sections are merely declarative in nature and similar to a list of campaign promises.

While the party is criticizing the past, it must be more critical of itself in the analysis of its present practices. The progress of the economic reform must be judged more harshly, errors must be defined more specifically, and the party must not try to escape the responsibility for the disappointing results to date.

Nevertheless, when we look at the draft platform in the broader context, we must admit that it does define the main political guidelines for the party and society today.

The affirmation of adherence to the socialist course of development and the statement that the party will oppose social injustice and the exploitation of some people by others in any form are of fundamental importance. This is the ideological basis defining the communist nature of our party.

The CPSU Central Committee advocates—and we support this—the unwavering replacement of the already obsolete mechanism of economic and political interaction and the renunciation of the overly dogmatic ideology which has kept the state-authoritarian model of socialism alive for many years.

A perceptible step has finally been taken in the direction of radical and long-overdue reforms in the party itself and in the party's interrelations with the state. Under the influence of many comments by plenum speakers, a firm position was formulated on the 6th article of the Constitution of the USSR, the monopoly on power was renounced, and the willingness to operate within a real multiparty system was announced.

It will be necessary, however, to go even further. The ruling party's acknowledgement of the possibility of a

multiparty system is only the beginning. In virtually all of the civilized countries, the formation of parties is regulated by laws defining their sources of financing and the minimum membership needed for registration. Some people in our country, however, think that as soon as a few people have gathered together and have come up with one or two slogans, a new party has come into being.

For this reason, political logic demands that a law on parties and other sociopolitical organizations be drafted and passed after the 6th article of the Constitution of the USSR has been amended.

We believe that the Constitution of the USSR and other legislative acts should record the right of the CPSU and of any other party to conduct its policy through party organizations, the news media, and party members elected to democratic bodies and working in government establishments.

The move to a multiparty system will be a complicated and extremely difficult process. We must not allow the country to be engulfed by political chaos, so that the society will have to witness the replacement of the monopoly of one party with the monopoly of other political forces. Any kind of party diktat is impermissible. Decisive authority should definitely be exercised by the soviets.

Now that the CPSU has ceased to be the focal point of the authoritarian machinery of administration, it will give up its legislative and executive functions. It will certainly have to give up the right to control the administration's activity through party organizations. The colossal reorientation of party work lies ahead. This will immediately enhance the role of political dialogue between the party and the main social forces and social strata and will give rise to the need for an intense search for supporters and a struggle against ideological opponents.

These new objectives are not stipulated in the draft platform. The CPSU will have to reinforce these positions and thereby specifically reaffirm its determination to conduct policy through Communists and others who agree with the party line.

Another reason for our present dissatisfaction is the failure of the plenum to solve several urgent problems in internal party affairs and the omission of these issues from the platform. Above all, this applies to the entire mechanism for the direct inclusion of the party masses and each Communist in political affairs.

The decision on the procedure for the election of delegates to the party congress was postponed, although Communists have made their preference known. They insist on the direct, alternative, and secret election of delegates. The election procedures proposed to participants in the February Central Committee plenum are clearly inferior to the collectively drafted proposals of the convention of secretaries of primary party organizations in Moscow.

The Moscow CPSU Gorkom Buro believes that we should make a definite announcement at today's gorkom plenum that the principle of direct elections will be implemented in Moscow. It is time to begin forming party districts—naturally, with consideration for the distinctive features of each rayon.

The CPSU Central Committee platform must stipulate the machinery for the self-cleansing of the party. This topic warrants further discussion—for example, the suggestion that an exchange of party membership cards be organized after the congress to get rid of "dead weight" and those who disagree fundamentally with party policy.

As you know, the possibility of reducing the numerical composition of party administrative bodies was also discussed at the Central Committee plenum. This is not a new topic in party history. In the well-known "Letter to the Congress," Lenin was already insisting that the number of Central Committee members be increased to 100, and the party itself then consisted of only around half a million Communists. Today, now that there are 19 million Communists in the party, it is time to consider an increase, and not a decrease, in the number of Central Committee members. The Central Committee should not be reduced, but should be resolutely and regularly renewed, and this right should be granted to the party conferences convened between congresses.

The establishment of the offices of party chairman and deputy chairmen has not won unconditional support. There is a question as to whether this principle of collective leadership is consistent with the development of democratic principles in the party. Will this not lead to a wider gap between the Central Committee and its leadership? The benefits of renaming the Politburo the Presidium are not clear. Is this not simply a change of names or a process of "redecorating"?

I am certain that our plenum should also express our feelings about the scheduling of report and election campaigns in party organizations. This matter has not been settled.

The Central Committee's suggestion that this campaign be held before the congress is inconsistent with many of the speeches presented at the Central Committee plenum itself and will put the party committees and secretaries elected prior to the congress in an awkward position. Their powers could be questioned after the approval of a new charter.

The matter should be addressed at the next CPSU Central Committee plenum, with a thorough discussion of all of the "pros" and "cons." We feel that holding the report and election campaign after the party congress would be the best solution, but there is also another option: Each party committee could be granted the right to decide this autonomously. I think the gorkom plenum should be unyielding on this point.

Party funds are another pressing problem. Data on the budget of the CPSU as a whole and its republic, kray,

oblast, okrug, city, and rayon organizations must be published regularly. It is an inalienable right of Communists to know how and on what party funds are being spent. This will eliminate one of the excuses for the political speculation aimed at undermining the authority of the party.

Today it is already obvious that the question of party membership fees must be settled without delay. Primary party organizations should keep up to 50 percent of the funds they collect.

It would be wise to stipulate right away that the funds can be spent on political undertakings, agitation and propaganda, financial assistance to party veterans and low-income Communists, and the wages of departing party personnel of primary party organizations.

Furthermore, they should be granted this right without delay. We must not ignore the fact that it is essentially being exercised without express permission. Communists do not understand why this issue, which was brought up repeatedly at the Central Committee plenum, was never addressed, and it will be absolutely inexplicable if the next Central Committee plenum does not introduce any changes into the formation of the party budget either.

I think it is only right for the party gorkom plenum to take on the responsibility of solving another tenacious problem—the development of autonomous production and commercial activity. Party organizations clearly do not have the funds to cover the cost of their own political and ideological work. In view of the fact that the charter does not prohibit this kind of activity, it would clearly be permissible to encourage party raykoms to engage more actively in autonomous self-financed activity. The party gorkom has already taken several steps in this direction.

The CPSU Central Committee platform should also contain more precise statements about the party staff. Many people today are suggesting its reduction and even its elimination. It is necessary, however, because no party today could get along without functionaries. The exact type of staff needed for the work of elected party organs is a different matter.

In our opinion, the changes in the structure of the staff and its reduction in 1988 were formal procedures based on an arbitrary approach. It is clear that the structure of any administrative body and the size of its staff should be determined in line with its functions. This was not done. As a result, the staff does not work efficiently today and it frequently cannot cope with the new problems that arise.

This mistake must not be repeated. After the CPSU Central Committee platform has been approved by the 28th congress, the party's objectives during this stage of perestroika and its functions will be formulated in their entirety. The work of optimizing the structure of the party staff must begin on this basis. It is clear that the staff must be flexible, mobile, and highly professional.

The structure should include sociological, analytical-forecasting, and news service subdivisions along with others. Local party committees should have a completely free hand in determining the size and structure of their own staff.

There is another matter we must address today. This is the possibility of forming a Russian Communist Party. Quite frankly, this is an equivocal issue.

Feelings in support of this idea now prevail among Russian Communists, including those in Moscow, and there are solid grounds for these feelings. Above all, there is the need for the political protection of Russia's economic and social interests. Could the absence of this protection be the reason, for instance, for the delays in the granting of real economic autonomy to the RSFSR and the establishment of equitable relations between this republic and others? Furthermore, in spite of the center's efforts, separatist tendencies are still growing stronger in the state. Some republics are not concealing their wish to withdraw from the USSR. Under these conditions, the RSFSR would certainly also have the right to have its own party organization, especially in view of the fact that Russian republic structures have been established in trade unions, the Komsomol, the Academy of Sciences, and virtually all other social organizations.

There are also serious doubts, however, about the expediency of this move. Around 54 percent of all the Communists in the country are in Russia. The creation of a Russian Communist Party would immediately make CPSU congresses meaningless because their decisions would be predetermined by the decisions of Russian Communist congresses. This is the first argument. The second is that the party organizations of autonomous republics now "deal" directly with the party Central Committee in matters pertaining to them, and the creation of an intermediate link might motivate them to declare their own autonomy. In this way, we might end up with a federation of communist parties instead of a unified CPSU. While we support maximum autonomy for republics, we must always defend party unity as a guarantee of the preservation of the Soviet Federation.

In short, there are different points of view and different approaches. For this reason, it is no coincidence that the matter also aroused heated arguments at the last CPSU Central Committee plenum. As a result, the draft of the pre-congress platform now contains some comments about the expediency of submitting the matter for discussion by all Communists in Russia and then pursuing the discussion at a republic party conference before the 28th party congress.

We share this point of view, but we feel it is extremely important not to delay in convening an all-Russian party conference. The first step could be a working meeting of the secretaries of kray, okrug, and oblast committees and primary party organizations in the republic at the beginning of March in Moscow, the capital of the RSFSR.

This would be the place for the preliminary discussion of questions connected with the convening of the conference.

After giving up the functions of governmental and economic administration, the party will have to intensify its work in the soviets of people's deputies, relying on Communist deputies.

The forms and methods of pursuing CPSU policy in soviets of people's deputies must be planned without delay. There will be a need for fundamental changes in the activities of the party groups of soviets, which could elaborate a common line for Communist deputies on fundamental issues, exercising the right of legislative initiative. In this process, obviously, the possibility of diktat by party committees, attempts to pressure the deputies to impose the committees' own point of view on them, must be excluded.

The draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress made its appearance at the very height of the political struggle on the eve of the elections of people's deputies to republic and local soviets. We defined our position in this struggle and our political credo with you at our last plenum when we approved the political theses of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom with regard to elections.

They reflect the priorities the party gorkom hopes to establish through the soviets, through its representatives in them, and its plans for the future.

Today, however, the party gorkom is already working on a package of specific proposals to submit to the new deputies for discussion. I would like to address some of them.

It would be difficult to conceive of another part of the country as split up into different ministries and departments as Moscow. This can seriously restrict the social interests of the Muscovites themselves, and they must be defended.

Transportation and trade have already reached their limit, the line for better housing has reached a standstill, the renovation of the municipal infrastructure cannot keep up with demand, and the ecological situation is alarming. All of this is the result of the excessive exploitation of the capital by ministries and departments. This has taken the form of the unwarranted augmentation of capacities in labor-intensive production units, the creation of new scientific establishments, the extremely slow removal or re-specialization of production units not suitable for the capital, and the delays in incorporating ecologically clean technologies.

Besides this, with little concern for the opinions and capabilities of the city, ministries and departments are still establishing various administrative offices and associations, and the number of people working in them is increasing instead of decreasing, and sometimes through

the supplementation of the staff by specialists brought into Moscow from other cities.

The expediency of locating many executive bodies in Moscow is doubtful. What connection do the Asbest concerns have with the capital, for instance, when no asbestos is extracted in the city; or Rudprom, when there is not a single mine in the city; or Metallurgprom, when all of its 24 enterprises are not only outside Moscow, but also outside Moscow Oblast?

Now Moscow is being taken over by foreign executives as well as our own. More than half of all the joint ventures formed in the country with foreign partners, for example, have their offices in Moscow. The Moscow gorispolkom has had no chance to influence these decisions.

This naturally makes us wonder who is in charge of our city.

We feel that only the Moscow soviet should be in charge. The performance of various functions in the capital should be governed by a specific set of relations between the Moscow soviet and union, republic, and oblast bodies, based on legal and economic considerations. All of this should be recorded in the law on Moscow's status as a capital city, which is now being drafted at the request of the gorkom.

Only on this basis can we block the automatic flow of manpower from other cities and start work in earnest on the socioeconomic programs designed to elevate the standard of living of the Muscovites.

In this connection, I would like to say something about another of our specific proposals.

Everyone is worried about the declining standard of living of a large segment of the population, especially citizens with a fixed income. These are mainly retired and disabled citizens, students, and laborers with low-paying jobs. They are carrying most of the burden of inflationary processes.

It is time to consider raising the minimum income level and to do this within the capital by expanding regional autonomy. This will not be a single procedure, but a permanent mechanism to compensate for low income. Of course, all of this will have to be done primarily with funds from the municipal budget, and this possibility will naturally depend on the efficient operation of the Moscow economic complex.

When the city party organization restructures its relationship with the soviets, it must not shirk its responsibility for the state of affairs in key spheres of municipal life. In a sense, this would be impossible because there is the distinct habit of many years' standing of holding the gorkom responsible for everything—for the condition of streets and the organization of trade, for the enforcement of laws, for the housing problem, and for many other things. We feel that the influence we exert in the efforts to solve these everyday problems does not consist in

imposing certain techniques on administrators, but in employing the methods of party influence to eliminate indifference, laziness, bureaucratism, and self-interest wherever these conflict with the interests of Muscovites.

This was the reason for the resolutions of recent sessions of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom Buro with the principled and strict evaluations of the performance of the Communist administrators of the construction complex and transportation services. Two days ago the Communists in the RSFSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and several VUZ's, who had allowed the Dorogomilovo student village to deteriorate to such a pitiful state, were called to account by the party.

When we encounter incidents of this kind over and over again, we become convinced that our biggest problem is bureaucratism, the struggle against which has been going on unsuccessfully for probably the entire history of our state. This social phenomenon is still part of our daily life. Many resolutions remain nothing more than declarations. This was also the fate of the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference "On the Struggle Against Bureaucratism." The organizing work required for its implementation was never launched on a broad scale, not even in the party gorkom. The cases in which people have been called to account by the party for the formal and heartless treatment of others and for indifference or procrastination in the consideration of the requests people submit to party and government organs and the fulfillment of their legitimate demands are so few in number that they can be counted on the fingers of one hand even throughout the huge city party organization.

While we are declaring our adherence to humane and democratic socialism, making the individual the focal point of our policies, we must first deliver the society from bureaucratic tyranny. To date, the democratization of politics has simply produced a new parliamentary mutation of bureaucratism, in which urgent matters are drowned in endless debates, and the biased and unrefined laws which are passed are giving rise to numerous contradictions and paralyzing the activity of local authorities.

The elections to republic and local soviets will be held soon. The ability of the city soviet to get rid of all forms of bureaucratism will depend on the people who are elected and on their common sense and competence.

I want to stress the party gorkom's position once again: The important thing is the candidate, and not who nominates the candidate. Everyone—members and non-members of our party—has a vital interest in electing people who are truly capable of working for perestroika to democratic bodies. In this difficult time for the country and party, the consolidation of all progressive forces, a citizens' consensus, is essential.

The process of democratization is unlikely to be helped by the extremist appeals and excessive emotionalism that are hampering reasoning abilities and could have tragic consequences.

Today we must repeat, on behalf of the gorkom, that we condemn all forms of chauvinism, nationalism, and racism, regardless of their source.

At the same time, we must object vehemently to the appeals for violent action, the exertion of psychological pressure on law enforcement agencies and the army, the harassment of people working in them, anarchy, and lawlessness.

The discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform, which we are to conduct on a broad scale in the city's party organizations, and in which non-party members are certain to participate along with Communists, should help to finalize the document and to reach a public consensus.

We must realize that the platform for the 28th CPSU Congress is being elaborated at a time when the democratization of internal party affairs has given rise to new forms of Communist unification—clubs and horizontal structures—and the composition of various alternative party charters, theses, and platforms. We must admit that many of them have sprung up in our city, at least 20. They include the documents drawn up in the Moscow Higher Party School, Moscow State University, Moscow Institute of Architecture, and many raykoms in the city. The so-called "Democratic Platform" recently made its appearance. There are no fundamental differences between the draft CPSU Central Committee platform and other similar materials with regard to an entire group of issues—the party's place and role in society, the status of the sixth article of the Constitution of the USSR, the election procedure for executive bodies, the creation of their staff, and several other matters.

Of course, differences do exist, but we should ask ourselves whether the different approaches revealed in party debates are so irreconcilable and are separated by such a wide gulf that the formation of a separate party faction and its subsequent transformation into an autonomous party should be considered.

In our opinion, the CPSU Central Committee platform will advance the process of democratization in the party and create real opportunities for the display of autonomy by party organizations in the resolution of the main problems in our society.

Let us take another look to see whether or not the desire of individual politicians to realize their personal ambitions and goals, essentially differing from the essence of the platforms they propose, might lie behind the appeals for the quickest possible division of the CPSU into factions and the formation of new parties.

We are in favor of constructive dialogue. We are in favor of the ideological and organizational unity of the party

during the transition period. The statement about the multiparty system, however, is not simply a propaganda declaration. If someone feels uncomfortable in the CPSU, he can withdraw from it and stop associating his political future with the party.

As we agreed, the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform will be the second phase of the citywide party debates. It should also include the discussion of the new party charter, a draft of which will be published soon.

We must not allow these documents to be viewed as the latest set of circulars and to be forgotten as soon as they have been read.

We want gorkom members to offer their suggestions and comments so that these can be summarized by a gorkom commission. A working group will take charge of the citywide party debates. In view of the special importance of this undertaking, it would be wise to enlarge the group by adding professional political analysts and scholars to it.

I would like to devote a special gorkom plenum to the elaboration of our final proposals for the 28th party congress and then submit them to the city party conference for discussion.

We expect primary party organizations to take an active stance on these matters prior to the conference. Various party clubs and city councils of party organization secretaries could define their own opinions along with party committees.

We hope that the Communists in the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences will continue their activity. At this time it would probably be best for the social and humanitarian institutes of the Academy of Sciences to work on their own alternative proposals.

I am certain that the news media, which have accumulated considerable experience in the coverage of party affairs, will take an active and interested stance.

Rayon party committees should rely on the assistance of the most qualified social scientists and propagandists in the summarization of proposals and the elaboration of their point of view.

Everything of value in the debates should be taken into account. In other words, all of the intellectual potential of the Moscow city party organization must be involved in the preparations for the congress.

These, Comrades, are the ideas and considerations the party gorkom buro felt the need to announce prior to the discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress at today's plenum.

The rest of the materials of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom plenum and the statements of those who took part in the debates will be published in the next edition of our newspaper.

Armenian Authorities Direct Use of Unemployed in Post-Quake Reconstruction

90US0623C Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
9 Feb 90 p 1

[Armenpress report: "At the Armenian CP Central Committee and ArSSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Armenian CP Central Committee and ArSSR Council of Ministers have enacted a decree entitled "Involving the Unemployed Able-Bodied Population of Armenian SSR in Construction-and-Restoration Operations in the Earthquake Zone, and in the Work in Other Branches of the Republic's National Economy." That decree states that there have been serious shortcomings in the job of involving the republic's unemployed able-bodied population in socially beneficial labor, especially in the construction-and-restoration operations in the disaster area. Despite the existence of approximately 90,000 permanently unemployed—the mobile part of the unemployed resources, including more than 40,000 persons in the earthquake zone—the local and the brought-in organizations have been experiencing an acute shortage of construction workers, which shortage is being compensated for at the expense of attracting manpower from other regions of the country

The decree emphasizes that it is especially inadmissible that in 1989 a total of 12,700 skilled construction workers left the republic in an unorganized manner to engage in seasonal work, including approximately 5000 persons who left the cities and rayons that had suffered. The seasonal migration has begun to be of a permanent and mass nature in Kalininskiy Rayon (first secretary of the party's raykom, Kh. Dumikyan; chairman of the raysovet's ispolkom, Zh. Baroyan); Martuninskiy Rayon (first secretary of the party's raykom, A. Saakyan; chairman of the raysovet's ispolkom, L. Galstyan); Artikskiy Rayon (first secretary of the party's raykom, N. Saakyan; chairman of the raysovet's ispolkom, R. Movsesyan); and in a number of other rayons. The ispolkoms of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies have been engaging unsatisfactorily in matters of forming construction brigades from seasonal workers and sending them to construction-and-restoration operations in the earthquake area, as a result of which there has been failure to fulfill the 20 October 1989 ArSSR Council of Ministers order concerning the additional sending to the earthquake area of persons from Armenian SSR who have expressed the desire to participate in the construction-and-restoration operations.

When people leave the republic to engage in seasonal work, in most instances there are instances of crude violations of internal-passport procedures, which situation is explained by the weak monitoring by the internal-affairs agencies.

The Armenian CP Central Committee and ArSSR Council of Ministers, in the decree that was enacted, required the city and rayon committees of the Armenian Communist Party and the ispolkoms of the city and

rayon soviets of people's deputies to develop and carry out in every city, rayon, and village specific measures to involve the unemployed able-bodied population in work in the republic and to prevent the seasonal migration outside the confines of Armenian SSR.

For this purpose it was decided to create within one week worker commissions under the ispolkoms of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies, headed by the first deputy chairmen. It was decided to guarantee in 1990-1991 the additional involvement of the unemployed able-bodied population of Armenian SSR in construction-and-restoration operations in the earthquake area, and also in work in other branches of the republic's national economy, from the cities and rayons of Armenian SSR to the tune of 69,100 persons.

The decree states that, under conditions when, as a result of the earthquake, the national economy has been devastated on more than 40 percent of the republic's territory, and, taking into consideration the refugees, approximately 750,000 persons have been left without a roof over their head, the departure of the able-bodied population to seek wages outside the confines of Armenian SSR should be considered immoral and inadmissible.

It has been established that the chairmen of the ispolkoms of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies bear personal responsibility for preventing the seasonal migration of the labor resources outside the confines of the republic, for forming construction brigades from among those persons, and for sending them to construction-and-reconstruction operations in the earthquake area.

The ispolkoms of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies have been prohibited from issuing authorization statements to persons leaving the confines of the republic to engage in seasonal work. The right to issue such statements is enjoyed only by ArSSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions.

ArSSR Gosstroy (G. Oganesyan) and ArSSR Gosagroprom (R. Chiftalryan) have been instructed to intensify the work of involving the migratory seasonal workers in the construction-and-installation and reconstruction operations in the organizations subordinate to them.

The administrators of construction organizations and enterprises that have been brought in to engage in the construction-and-restoration operations in the earthquake area have been instructed to organize, from among the migratory seasonal workers, construction brigades for the purpose of carrying out operations on the basis of a lease contract or the brigade or collective contract, with the complete indication of the operations that are to be fulfilled, their estimated cost, the fulfillment deadlines, and the total amount of funds to pay for the labor.

This category of workers must be the first to be provided with building materials, machinery, and components.

ArSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (U. Arutyunyan) has been instructed to establish rigid monitoring on the observance of the internal-passport procedures, and to intensify the work of locating able-bodied persons who are not engaged in labor activity but instead are living a parasitical way of life.

ArSSR State Committee for Services to the Public (G. Kazakhetsyan) has been instructed to increase the volume of services rendered to assist the construction of individual homes, broadly involving in that work the brigades of construction workers from among the migratory seasonal workers.

An assignment with a total value of 18 million rubles has been established for the construction of individual housing in the republic's cities and rayons in the current year.

ArSSR Gosplan (M. Mkrtchyan) and ArSSR Gossnab (S. Stepanyan) have been instructed, within a short period of time, to allocate to ArSSR State Committee for Services to the Public building materials and the machines and machinery necessary to fulfill the assignments for the construction of individual housing.

An assignment has also been issued to ArSSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions (I. Semenov), which is required to intensify its coordinating role and the rendering of assistance to the ispolkoms of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies in locating the nonworking citizens and sending them to the construction-and-restoration operations.

The editorial offices of the local and republic newspapers, ArSSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and Armenpress have been instructed to illuminate broadly the questions linked with involving the citizens in socially beneficial labor in the republic, devoting special attention to the work in the earthquake area, doing everything to support the persons who have expressed the desire to participate in the construction-and-restoration operations, and subjecting to sharp criticism the workers who are failing to stop the migratory seasonal work, as well as the individual citizens who are living a parasitical way of life.

Kazakh Supreme Soviet Meets 22 February

Information Report

90US0616A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 1

[“Information Report on the Sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet”]

[Text] The 16th session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation took place in Alma-Ata on 22 February 1990.

Those who participated in the session's work were N.A. Nazarbayev, Kazakh CP first secretary; Kazakh CP Politburo Members B.G. Anufriev, Ye.M. Asanbayev,

Ye.F. Bashmakov, V.I. Dvurechenskiy, U.D. Dzhanibekov, U.K. Karamanov, V.A. Kuzmenko, V.M. Miroshnik, M.R. Sagdiyev, K.Kh. Tyulebekov; Kazakh CP Candidate Members K.A. Abdullayev, E.Kh. Gukasov; Sector Head, CPSU Central Committee Department of Party Building and Cadre Policy G.A. Shipilov; Kazakh CP obkom first secretaries-chairmen of oblast soviets of people's deputies, USSR people's deputies, and a group of lessees.

Deputy K.U. Medeubekov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, opened the session.

Confirmed agenda items were:

1. On the Kazakh CP draft laws "On leasing" and "On the peasant farm in the Kazakh SSR";
2. On the confirmation of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukases;
3. On the changes in the composition of the Central Election Commission for the elections and the recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies;
4. On the chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;
5. On the first deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

First Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers Deputy E.Kh. Gukasov gave a speech "On leasing" and "On the peasant farm in the Kazakh SSR" (the speech is published in today's issue of the paper).

The following deputies spoke during the debates on the speech at the morning and evening sessions: Ye.M. Zolotarev, Aktyubinsk party obkom first secretary; B.M. Tursumbayev, Kazakh SSR Gosagroprom chairman; U. Kazmagambetov, lessee of the "Karlygash" family sheep breeding brigade, "Guryevskiy" state breeding plant, Guryevsk Oblast; V.I. Kotelnikov, Moskovskiy Rayon party committee first secretary, city of Alma-Ata; S.U. Dzhandosov, chairman, Kazakh SSR State Committee on Labor and Social Issues; Zh.G. Iskakov, chairman, Pavlodar oblispolkom; S.I. Dulayeva, field team leader of the family vegetable growing echelon of the "Dzhanasharskoye" experimental farm, Alma-Ata Oblast; Sh. Sharafeddinov, manager of the agrarian department of the Uralskiy party obkom; A. Makhanov, brigadier assembler of the Dzhezkazganskij mining trust; G.N. Vasilyev, first deputy chairman, Chimkent oblispolkom, oblast agro-industrial committee chairman, also people's deputy; K.A. Shopanayev, brigadier, construction assembly administration 17 of the "Alma-Atabytstroy" trust; N.B. Stanin, director, "Krasnaya Polyana" kolkhoz, Dzhezkazgan Oblast; B.S. Kabylova, lessee, "Beloekomenskiy" field team sovkhoz, East Kazakhstan Oblast; S.T. Tursunov, chairman, Taldy-Kurgan oblispolkom; S. Baynazarov, director, Dzhambul gypsum combine.

Council of Ministers Chairman, Deputy U.K. Karamanov spoke at the session.

Deputy V.I. Yefimov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Legislative Proposals gave a report on the results of the examination of the amendments, proposals, and comments on the draft laws expressed in the course of the session.

The session adopted the Kazakh SSR "Law on leasing," as well as the resolution "On the procedure for making effective the Kazakh SSR 'Law on Leasing,' 'The Kazakh SSR Draft Law on the peasant farm in the Kazakh SSR'"

At the proposal of the Council of Ministers, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the decree "On supplemental measures to supply the republic national economy with material-technical resources."

The Ukases of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium were confirmed as presented by the speech of Deputy K.Z. Zhusupov, secretary of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The session introduced changes in the body of the the Central Election Commission for the elections and the recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies.

The deputies began the consideration of the the fourth agenda item. In accordance with the Kazakh SSR Constitution, adopted with changes and supplements 22 September 1989 at the extraordinary 14th session of the republic Supreme Soviet; the position of the chairman of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet was introduced. In connection with this, the current position of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who until now conducted its sessions, is vacated.

The floor is presented to Deputy M.P. Sagdiyev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. He requested his release from the responsibilities of chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium in light of his retirement. At the same time, M.R. Sagdiyev, at the recommendation of the 19th Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum introduced a proposal, supported by the party group and the Supreme Soviet Council of Seniors for the election of N.A. Nazarbayev, Kazakh CP Central Committee first secretary as chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution on releasing M.R. Sagdiyev from the responsibilities of chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The candidacy of N.A. Nazarbayev is introduced by secret ballot for election at Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet chairman. According to the voting results, he is elected Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet chairman. The appropriate decree is adopted on this subject.

N.A. Nazarbayev addressed the session.

The session then continued its work under the chairmanship of N.A. Nazarbayev.

The Supreme Soviet released V.V. Sidorov from the responsibilities of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium deputy chairman in light of his retirement.

The Supreme Soviet elected deputy S.A. Tereshchenko Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium deputy chairman.

With this, the 16th session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation completed its work.

Nazarbayev Speech

90US0616B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Text of speech: "The Speech of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman N.A. Nazarbayev"]

[Text] Comrades!

Allow me to express my gratitude for being elected chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. I consider this trust to be unanimous support by the deputies for the course of the republic party organization for the deepening of perestroika, the development of democratization and glasnost, for the creation of circumstances in our public life which promote fruitful, constructive labor.

I distinctly recognize that I take upon myself a lofty responsibility at a difficult time for the republic—in this current decisive period when the truly historical task of the new conquest of power stands full-scale before the Soviet of People's Deputies. Specifically a conquest, since the Leninist slogan "All power to the soviets!" can be filled once more with real content only if the soviets cease to wait for freedom given from "above," freedom of deeds, but seriously take for themselves the levers of state administration. I think that such a moment has now come. What is this conviction based upon? First and foremost upon the concrete political situation which has come into being in view of the deepening perestroika processes.

We are all witnesses to the fact that with persistence and consistence, starting with April, 1985, the party has struggled against the command administrative system, that same system which had managed to usurp power literally in all spheres of public life. It proved not so simple to shake off the principles of political, economic, and spiritual bureaucratism. However, the CPSU, itself a hostage of the anti-democratic, authoritarian past, found within itself the courage to take a decisive step, expressing a sharp turn in its history.

This step was the decision of the February (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the draft Platform for the 28th Party Congress developed by the plenum. The party has rejected political monopoly, its constitutionally appointed particular situation, and has thus dealt a serious blow to the party-state form of power which had existed here since the time of Stalin's reign.

Reserving for itself only political methods of leadership, the CPSU has thus opened a direct road for the soviets, which must fully utilize the favorable factors of the current moment, manifest activity, and help the party in the establishment of genuine people power. Thus the party organs, freed of the functions unusual for them, will get the opportunity to concentrate efforts on the development and deepening of Marxist-Leninst theory, the preparation of effective programs of social development, on the work of organizing and indoctrinating. The responsibility for concrete affairs in the economy, the tactics and methods of state and economic management lie completely with the soviets. Are they prepared for this?

We cannot but recognize that until now, the division of functions of the party and soviet organs in the republic is proceeding extremely slowly. It could seem that the soviets are not in any hurry to take power into their hands. Yet here it is not a matter of desire, or lack of desire, but primarily of a shortage of individuals capable of mastering the methods of modern state administration, of leading people, of planning a constructive program of action. That is why today's main task is to strengthen the soviet organs with cadres capable of acting and thinking on a large scale, in a timely, independent manner.

We are correct in expecting rapid change in the situation of the soviets at least because in practically all locations, party committee first secretaries have come to their leadership. Such a combination of functions is not a mechanical process. Since we are speaking about holding power, then it is necessary that the people included in this work already really be masterful and knowledgeable in the first-order tasks and development prospects of the regions. It is difficult to overestimate their responsibility for the organization of work in the new sector. It is necessary to inspire life in the activity of the soviet organs, to fill it with new perestroika content, and to transfer here the center of gravity of all the problems being solved. And to show themselves to the people from a new angle, as active champions of society's renewal.

With all inevitability, the question arises before the new sovietchairmen of the functioning of the apparatus of the party committees. After all, it is called upon not only to serve elected party organs, but the soviets. And this is very important indeed, whoever may be shocked by the word, "serve." Those ideas and innovations which are nurtured and inculcated in life by the party committees must be set up in service of the organs of people power. Then the phenomenon condemned by the people will be eliminated of its own accord, specifically, the party apparatus' servicing of itself.

I want to note with satisfaction this is exactly how the majority of the party committee first secretaries elected chairmen have understood the tasks facing them. Only the process of forming the activity of the soviet organs must not be dragged out; the matter must be undertaken decisively, without marking time.

What do I see as the priority trends of the work of the soviets, including that of the Supreme Soviet? First and foremost, I see it as the continuation and activation of the renewal of the republic's political, socioeconomic, and spiritual life which has already begun. All our activity must be penetrated by concern for people, for providing them with worthy living and working conditions, confirming the principles of social justice, expanding the opportunities for the comprehensive development of the individual.

The actions of all republic organs, including those for the achievement of Kazakhstan's economic sovereignty, will be set up for the service of these noble goals. As masters of the territories, the soviets are obliged to play a notable role in this cause. We speak of the necessity of a substantial expansion of the economic rights of regions, opening great growth prospects for the republic's economic might, and the successful realization of complex problems difficult to solve under the conditions of the dictatorship of the central departments.

Unfortunately, today we must become accustomed to the reaction of the union ministries, to reconcile ourselves to their "appetites," which at times know no bounds. As we know, the republic controls only 7.5 percent of the total volume of the industrial production located within its territory; the rest is controlled by the center. Therefore, we are faced with ending this injustice in the near future.

The problems of expanding Kazakhstan's foreign economic relations and adjusting contacts with foreign firms presents particular significance. It is necessary to resolve the issues of creating so-called free enterprise zones in the republic. All of this also falls within the competence of the soviets.

I am firmly convinced that the transition to the track of self-management and self-financing will serve not only the acceleration of the republic's socioeconomic development, but the interests of the entire country, the strengthening of the Soviet federation, outside the framework of which we cannot imagine our development. Economic independence will help strengthen the interrelations among the union republics on a reliable legal basis, businesslike partnership cooperation. Moreover, it will allow us to make an end of man's alienation from the results of his labor, and increase the creative potential of every sovereign state formation, of every region, of every labor collective, and, consequently, of every separate individual.

Today, when the discussion of most important draft laws is under way in the USSR Supreme Soviet, laws on property, on the land, on self-management, a great deal depends upon the position of our fellow countrymen, the USSR people's deputies. I express my confidence that they will support the republic's proposals, and take up a clear perestroika position in adopting responsible, and, I would say, fateful decisions for Kazakhstan.

First of all, unless there is property on the land, its bowels, forests, fauna, etc., then there is no sovereignty

of the republic, proclaimed by the USSR Constitution. Such a position is pleasing to the USSR Government, and its ministries do not want to release power.

Secondly, according to the 1922 Declaration on the Formation of the USSR, Kazakhstan did not transfer to anyone the right to territory on its property. It was stated there that the republic voluntarily delegates its individual rights to the center.

These statutes were replaced in practice by an administrative system, and we forgot them. Therefore, the republic Supreme Soviet must immediately begin to develop laws based upon the principle of being a property owner on its own territory. Local soviets and lawyers must develop the appropriate proposals and introduce them into the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

Thirdly, the republic must pose the question of reviewing the 1922 Treaty, and the adoption of a new Law on the USSR State Structure, with the aim of improving our federation in the interests of the republic and the country as a whole.

As previously, the issue of development of the social sphere will have priority in the work of the soviet organs. We are faced with substantially improving the dynamics of the production of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and housing construction. The plans developed for the 13th 5-year-plan are aimed at this. Suffice it to say that if a doubling of the production output of the entire national economy is envisaged, then the production of products for social use will increase four-fold. It is planned even in the current year to produce R13.5 billion worth of consumer goods, that is, 11 percent more than last year's level. And this volume is just the minimum stipulated for the balance of the population's income and expenses.

The republic's construction workers must already complete in the first quarter of this year the 5-year plan for the introduction of residential buildings. Thus, 41.7 million square meters of housing will be turned over, 7.5 million more than planned. Approximately 4 million people will improve their living conditions. The average housing provision for every Kazakhstaner is 14 square meters of total space. Particular attention has been directed toward the development of the construction industry. Capital investment of almost R2 billion will be directed toward these goals.

A serious discussion of immediate measures to increase foodstuffs production recently took place at the republic conference of agricultural workers. Perestroika of economic relations in the village, and the strengthening of the material-technical base of the agro-industrial complex must allow for a per capita consumption increase of 2 kilograms for meat, 31 kilograms for milk, and 13 kilograms for vegetables and melons in the current year. More than one-third of all capital investment (and that is R4 billion this year) will be directed toward the development of the social sphere of the village.

Such are the general contours of the republic social program. In many ways, its realization depends upon what position the local soviets will take in the transition from administrative to economic methods of management, what initiative they will show in the expansion of economic and financial independence. It must be said that they have now been granted much more opportunities in the search for sources of supplemental profit, primarily at the expense of the expansion of consumer goods production. The greater the attention the soviets turn toward increasing the efficiency of the rural economy, saturating the market with goods, developing tourism, and other profitable aspects of services, expanding foreign economic relations, the more genuine will be their status as masters. They will get up on their own feet, will be free in their actions, and people will see their support in them; they will stop turning to the center on every matter.

The soviets are also faced with taking an active position in the resolution of ecological problems. The goals and tasks here are well-known. The work continues to close the nuclear testing grounds which have been functioning in Semipalatinsk for over 40 years. At the same time, the grounds were in the center of a region inhabited by people, and our duty is to achieve at any cost the elimination of such a dangerous neighborhood. Encouraging results have already been achieved—testing near Semipalatinsk has not taken place over the course of 4 months now, not without our persistent dialogue with the military organs.

With all consistency, the soviets will also take part in the implementation of measures to save the Aral Sea and lake Balkhash, to improve the ecological situation in Alma-Ata, Karaganda, Dzhambul, Chimkent, Eastern Kazakhstan, and other regions. There is no need to count upon any force other than the local soviets in this process. There must be bolder reliance upon the initiative of concerned people; allies must be sought and found in the broadest masses, and there must be involved in joint work the informal associations who are doing more than a little for the recovery of the republic's ecological situation.

Soviet organs are called upon to react immediately to people's concerns and needs, to live out their hopes and expectations. There is no more vital need of our people today than to live in calm, peaceful surroundings, so that our children not be threatened by danger, and that affiliation with one or another nationality not become grounds for suspicion and enmity. It is no secret that the events in the Transcaucasus and the Central Asian region caused certain apprehensions among Kazakhsstaners. The republic party and soviet organs have made and will make all efforts to preserve good-neighborly, friendly relations in our common multi-national home. In realizing the particular danger of nationalism and chauvinism for the fates of perestroika and people's welfare, we must be steadfast in everything concerning our course toward strengthening the mutual understanding among Kazakhstaners of all nationalities

without exception, toward equality in attitudes toward language, culture, and the demands of every people. Unlike any other organ, the local soviets are obligated to be as mobilized as possible in this work, capable of decisively opposing any attempts to sow poisonous seeds of interethnic strife in people's souls.

The creation of stable circumstances in public life is also unthinkable without strengthening organization and discipline, strict law and order, and respect for the law. The soviets have a great deal to do in this sense in order to halt the growth of crime and increase the authority and possibilities of the law enforcement organs.

However, social defense should not be understood merely as reliable defense of the individual against any sort of criminal acts. Are not all possible bureaucratic distortions, loutish behavior in everyday life and the suchlike phenomena against which Soviet power is called upon to defend citizens? We have reconciled ourselves to many circumstances unsuited to our life, poisoning it to the point where we do not even notice the poverty of the human interrelations as they are here; we have ceased to understand that culture, unlike grain, cannot be exported from without.

It must also be said that people not infrequently run into manifestations of bureaucracy precisely in the soviet organs, that is, in those very structures which are called upon to conduct a merciless struggle against all manifestations of inertness, delays, and a disrespectful attitude toward human dignity. Until we change the very system of resolving issues of vital importance to people, until we make the welfare of soviet workers, from deputies to ispolkom employees, strictly dependent upon the degree of their satisfaction of the population's requirements, we will not manage to achieve much.

Today, in any sphere of our life we turn to, a businesslike attitude and constructiveness of plans, actions, and initiative is in enormous demand. In connection with this, I cannot but mention the upcoming elections of republic people's deputies. At the present time, the election campaign is in full swing; registration is being completed, meetings with candidates for deputy are taking place, people are familiarizing themselves with their programs. This is an extremely responsible moment.

I consider it my duty to appeal to the voters: In many ways, the republic's future depends upon your choice, the success of its advancement along the path of perestroika. What the body of deputies will be like, what sort of Supreme Soviet will be formed will determine the functional capability of the highest organ of power in Kazakhstan. A great deal, a very great deal depends upon the exact positions of the future deputies, their ability to think from state positions, independently, competently, responsibly. It is therefore very important that the voters be capable of understanding who among the candidates really feels for the popular needs with all his heart, and is able to organize practical work, and who, having

mounted his horse of demagoguery, hands out irresponsible promises right and left, doing it only to fall upon power.

Past elections to local soviets have shown that the voters had the correct choice in their foundation. There are in the body of the local soviets representatives of practically all nationalities living in the republic; more than one-half of the deputies are communists. And the main thing here is that resourceful, active people were selected. Relying upon them, it is possible to boldly start toward the realization of the most complex plans. It is to be desired that the voters hold the execution of their duty up to the very highest measure now as well.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about my understanding of work in a new capacity—that of chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet. I will be frank: The proposal on the compatibility of this position with the work of the Kazakh CP Central Committee first secretary provoked certain doubt for me, and serious reflection, and the decision was not made without inner struggle. What prompted me to accept this proposal?

First of all, for some time now, Makhtay Ramazanovich Sagdiyev has persistently appealed to the Central Committee Buro requesting his release from the position occupied by him. Everyone knows of the lofty business, party, and human qualities of Makhtay Ramazanovich. However, we did not consider it possible to refuse him his request, expressed to him by his own will, dictated by age and circumstances. Allow me to thank Makhtay Ramazanovich in your name for his many years of conscientious labor in all the posts you entrusted to him, and to wish him success and health.

A second reason is no less important. As you know, in the country and the republic, radical changes are underway; new structures have been formed in the local soviets. In this transitional period, it is extremely important not to dawdle, not to lose the moment for implementation of the principally important state decisions. Today, life itself is not allowing time for doing nothing in preparation. Tomorrow it will already be too late to do that which the current situation demands. And the process of transferring power to the soviets here has been somewhat drawn out. That is why, having weighed out all the "pros" and "cons," I accepted the proposal to head the republic Supreme Soviet without waiting for the election of its new body; I think that this is dictated by the logic of the development of events in sociopolitical life.

I want to assure you that in the new post, I will put all efforts into the realization of the policy of renewal and acceleration of the republic's socioeconomic development, increasing the role and authority of the soviets, and improving the life of Kazakhstaners. I hope to find mutual understanding in the Supreme Soviet, and to achieve real improvement in practical matters with its

help, together with you, comrade deputies, and with the support of the entire population of our multi-national republic.

Turkmen Supreme Soviet Decree on Draft Language Law

90US0551A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 1

[Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Decree: "On the Turkmen SSR Draft Law on Language and the Draft of the State Program for the Development and Expansion of the Sphere of the Functioning of the Turkmen Language and on Improvements in the Study of Russian and Other Languages"]

[Text] The Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To approve, on the first reading, the draft of the Turkmen SSR Language Law and the draft of the State Program for the Development and Expansion of the Sphere of the Functioning of the Turkmen Language and on Improvements in the Study of Russian and Other Languages and to send them for completion to the Turkmen SSR Science, Public Education and Culture and Upbringing Committee, to the International Affairs Committee and the Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee.

To publish the draft of the Turkmen SSR Language Law before 1 February 1990 in republic, oblast, rayon and city newspapers in order to have a general public discussion of them.

2. Oblast, rayon and city (rayons and cities of republic subordination) soviets of peoples deputies are to organize, in oblasts, rayons and cities, the summarization of suggestions and comments that citizens, labor collectives and public organization make about the Turkmen SSR Language Law.

3. Republic organs of the press, television and radio are to summarize the suggestions and comments they receive about the draft of the Turkmen SSR Language Law.

4. Materials summarizing suggestions and comments on the Turkmen SSR Language Law are to be presented to the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Science, Education, Culture and Upbringing Committee, the International Affairs Committee and to the Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee prior to 1 April 1990.

5. The Supreme Soviet Science, Education, Culture and Upbringing Committee, the International Affairs Committee, the Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee are to send these two drafts to the Second Session, Twelfth Convocation of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet for its examination.

Chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet S. Niyazov Ashkhabad, 25 April 1990

Turkmen SSR Draft Language Law

90US0551B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 31 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[“Draft Language Law of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic”]

[Text] Draft Language Law of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic

Section 1. General Provisions

Article 1. The Official Language of the Turkmen SSR is the Turkmen language.

The Turkmen SSR shall officially protect the Turkmen language and be concerned about its thorough development and active use in state organs and public organizations, in the economy, public education, culture, science, technology, service, mass media and other spheres of public life.

Granting the Turkmen language the status of official language does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of other nationalities living in the Turkmen SSR.

Article 2. Both Turkmen and Russian are the languages of international communication in the Turkmen SSR.

Legal equality is guaranteed to both Turkmen and Russian in all spheres of official and public life in the Turkmen SSR.

Article 3. The Turkmen SSR shall create conditions for the free use and development of the languages of peoples living in the republic, assure citizens of the Turkmen SSR the possibility of learning Turkmen and shall be concerned about the development of national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism and multilingualism.

The Turkmen SSR shall assist in satisfying the spiritual, cultural and language needs of Turkmen living outside the republic.

Section II. Rights and Guarantees to Citizens Concerning the Choice of Language

Article 4. In the Turkmen SSR each citizen has the right to direct questions, applications and complaints to organs of state power and management and public organizations, state and public institutions and organizations and courts and to obtain an answer in the official language, Russian or in another suitable language.

Article 5. Organs of state power and management and public organizations, legal, health care, public education, trade, service, transport, social security, housing-municipal and other organizations handling appeals and providing services to citizens are obligated to use the official language, Russian or another suitable language in responding to requests and appeals.

Section III. Language in the Activities of Organs of State Power and Management and Public Organizations and Enterprises

Article 6. Organs of state power and management and public organizations in the Turkmen SSR conduct business in the official language or in the official language and in Russian.

Congresses, sessions, conferences and meetings of active members of republic state organs and public organizations are conducted either in the official language or in a language accepted by the majority of meeting participants. The resulting documents and decisions of these organs are published in the official language and in Russian.

Local organs of state power and management and public organizations in which a majority of the population is of another nationality can use their own language in addition to the official language.

Article 7. Acts of higher organs of state power and administration in the Turkmen SSR are published in the official language and in Russian.

Acts of local organs of state power and management and public organizations are published in the official language and, if necessary, in Russian and in other languages.

Article 8. In enterprises, institutions and organizations located in the Turkmen SSR business is conducted in the official language or in Russian. If necessary it can be conducted in other languages.

Article 9. Organs of state power and management, institutions, enterprises and organizations in the Turkmen SSR publish official documents in the official language or in Russian or in both.

Official documents sent to citizens in their place of residence or work, verifying their membership in public organizations, or certifying civil acts and performing other purposes are written in the official language or in Russian.

Article 10. Upon the choice of the citizen or institution sending it, mail and telegraph correspondence in the Turkmen SSR is in the official language or in Russian.

Section IV. Language in the Activities of Courts, Law Enforcement, Arbitration and Notary Organs, Attorneys, and the Recording of Civil Acts

Article 11. In accordance with the Constitution of the Turkmen SSR, the activities of the courts are conducted in the official language or in the language of the majority in a specific locality.

Individuals who do not know the language in which court proceedings are being conducted have the legal right to make statements and testimony, to speak in court and to make solicitations in their native language, using the services of an interpreter in the manner established by law.

Investigative and court documents are, in the manner established by law, given to individuals participating in the proceedings and are in the language which these individuals know or can understand through an interpreter.

Article 12. In the Turkmen SSR actions involving violations of administrative law are conducted in the official language and, if necessary, in Russian. Defendants and other individuals in administrative cases have the right to use their native language and, if they do not know the language in which the administrative procedure is held, to use the services of an interpreter.

The protocol on examining a violation of administrative law and the decree on bringing an individual to administrative responsibility are filled out in the official language. If the defendant does not know the official language, then he is provided with copies of the protocol and the decree in Russian or another language.

Article 13. Organs of state arbitration examine economic disputes between institutions, enterprises, organizations and cooperatives in the official language or in Russian. Procedural documents are written in the same language in which they are examined.

Article 14. Notary activities in state notary offices and executive committees of rayon, city, settlement and rural soviets of peoples' deputies of the Turkmen SSR are conducted in the official language or in Russian and are written in a language suitable to the parties involved.

Article 15. Activities in organs of the Register's Office in the Turkmen SSR are conducted in the official language or in Russian.

Official documents issued by organs of the Register's Office and in the official language or in Russian.

Article 16. Citizens of the Turkmen SSR are given all types of legal assistance provided by legislation. It is in the official language or in Russian or, in localities where there is a concentration of national groups, in the native language of the local population.

Section V. Language in Education, Science and Culture

Article 17. The Turkmen SSR guarantees all citizens the right to select their language of education and assures the provision of preschool care and training, secondary and higher education in the official language and in Russian. In areas where there is a concentration of national groups, preschool care and training and secondary education are provided in their native language or, if they choose, in the official language or in Russian.

Article 18. The Turkmen SSR shall assure that citizens living in the republic will be educated in Turkmen and Russian in general educational schools, professional-technical academies, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions and through other forms of education.

Educators and managers of preschool institutions and educational institutions are obligated to know the language of education in that institution.

Article 19. Regardless of the agency to which they are subordinate, professional technical academies, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions in the Turkmen SSR conduct education in the official language and in Russian.

Article 20. Upon their arrival in secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, graduate students are given the choice of entrance examinations in either the official language or in Russian.

Article 21. The Turkmen language is to be studied in secondary general educational schools where Turkmen is not the language of instruction, in groups at professional-technical academies, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions where Russian is the language of instruction. This is independent of these institutions' agency subordination. Graduates of these Turkmen SSR educational institutions shall take a state examination in the Turkmen language.

The Russian language is to be studied in secondary general educational schools, professional-technical academies, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions where Turkmen is the language of instruction. This is independent of these institutions' agency subordination. Graduates of these Turkmen SSR educational institutions shall take a state examination in the Russian language.

Article 22. In the Turkmen SSR there shall be guaranteed equal functioning of the Turkmen and Russian languages in science. There shall be free choice of the language of scientific work, the writing, publication and defense of dissertations in Turkmen, Russian or any other language, taking into account the possibilities of specialized councils.

Documentation for the defense of dissertations, with the exception of the manuscript itself, are sent, in Russian, to the Higher Certification Commission at the USSR Council of Ministers.

Article 23. The Turkmen SSR shall show general concern about the protection, reproduction and use of the literature, history and culture of the Turkmen People.

Article 24. The Turkmen SSR shall support the publication of scientific works, literature, periodicals and other printed material, mass media information about the achievements of science, technology and culture in the official language, in Russian and in languages of national groups concentrated in areas in the republic.

Article 25. The Turkmen SSR shall support the production, in the Turkmen language, of film, television shows, video cassettes and other works, with their subsequent translation into Russian or other languages, and shall support the translation of such works from other languages into Turkmen.

Section VI. Language in Names and Information

Article 26. In the Turkmen SSR the names of oblasts, rayons, cities, villages, settlements, historical localities, streets, squares, monuments and other geographical entities have standardized names in the Turkmen language. Their names are written in Russian or other languages. They are not translated and retain their national transcriptions and sounds.

The names of streets or other entities that are in Russian or another language are, as a rule, given without translation into Turkmen and are written in the language in which they are named, using the spelling rules of the Turkmen language.

The Turkmen SSR shall retain the traditional historical names of geographical entities, control the public adaptation of new names and prohibit the renaming of cities and villages, historical or natural features without serious reason.

Article 27. The orthography of national literary language shall be observed in writing personal names and ethnonyms in that language. Their reproduction in other languages shall be in accordance with the literary norms of these languages.

Citizens of the Turkmen SSR have the right to select forms of names (family and patronymic) at their own discretion.

Article 28. The names of institutions, enterprises, organizations and their subdivisions are given in the official language and duplicated in Russian and, if necessary, in other languages.

Article 29. Texts of official presses, stamps of enterprises, institutions and organizations are in the official language and duplicated in Russian.

Texts of forms, signs, announcements, official advertisements, price lists and other visual information are in the official language and duplicated in Russian and in the national language in areas where such nationalities are concentrated.

Article 30. Products produced by enterprises in the republic are to have labels and instructions in the official language with a translation into Russian or another language.

Labels and trademarks of industrial goods and foodstuffs produced in the Turkmen SSR shall be written in the official language and in Russian and, if necessary, in the language of those using them.

Article 31. Texts of visual information are arranged as follows: On the left or top—the text in the official language; on the right or bottom—the text in Russian in the same sized characters. Spoken information, announcements or advertisements are first stated in the official language, then in Russian or another language.

Section VII. Legal Protection of Languages

Article 32. The legal recognition of the Turkmen language as the official language of the Turkmen SSR is in the state and national interest and obligates higher organs of state power and management in the republic to take the legal, social, economic and cultural measures necessary to protect and develop it. The legal protection of the official language shall be supported by Turkmen SSR legislation.

In all spheres of the functioning of the official language the norms of the Turkmen literary language shall be observed.

In the Turkmen SSR, in addition to the official language there shall be legal protection of the Russian language and the languages of other national groups living in the republic. The conditions necessary for the protection and development of these languages shall be created.

Article 33. The violation of citizens' rights in the selection of a language for education, for appealing to the state and public organs, courts and law enforcement organs, discrimination against citizens for reasons of language, establishing illegal privileges on the basis of language and any other violations of Turkmen SSR legislation on languages is forbidden and shall be punished by law.

Article 34. The Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers, local soviets of people's deputies, their presidia and executive organs, ministries, state committees and agencies, the managers of enterprises, institutions and organizations in the republic, independent of their subordination, shall support the observation of this law.

Niyazov On Turkmen SSR Economic Future

90US0691A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 9, 26 Feb - 4 Mar 90 p 11

[Interview with First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party's Central Committee and Chairman of the Turkmen Council of Ministers S.A. Niyazov, by Vladimir Kuleshov, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "Problems of the Federation: To Uncover People's Potential"]

[Text] [SOYUZ] Elections for people's deputies and deputies to the local Soviets were held. What did they show? What in your opinion, Saparmurad Atayevich, was the overall tone of these elections and how did they essentially differ from those of the past?

[NIYAZOV] They differed in that they were held under conditions of growing social and political tension and of the continuing process of the politicization of society. Our people are not the same as they were four years ago and they react sharply to shortcomings in the commercial, social and medical spheres. Their souls are slowly unbending and their hearts, which for so long were in social hibernation, are melting. We are convinced that by gaining confidence in itself, public opinion is capable of defending its choice and suppressing attempts to force

opinions upon the population for the election of one person or another to the organs of power. The times are past when party committees and higher organs proposed candidates to the collectives which had already been chosen in the silence of their offices...

[SOYUZ] I know that in the days before the election you met with voters from the rural okrug of Geok-Tepe. What kinds of appeals did people come to you with during the election campaign meetings and what kinds of questions concern rural inhabitants today?

[NIYAZOV] There are a lot of questions. They are like nails which have been pounded in all the way. You have to really work to pull them out. Industry in the republic has developed for decades but the individual, his life and interests were not taken into consideration. In Geok-Tepe they asked me when they finally were going to get gas for their villages? After all, we have tremendous reserves of natural gas, we send billions of cubic meters beyond the borders of the republic but we cannot supply our own villages. And here's another question. The time has arrived to create a national park without delay which will become a center for the study of rare types of plants and animals, a center for the reconstruction of the ecosystem of Kopetdag. The voters suggested that we create this park in the Geok-Tepinskiy rayon in the area of "Chash-Depe" which occupies 10 thousand hectares.

[SOYUZ] What prevents Turkmenistan, which is second in the country in natural gas production, from completely supplying its cities and towns? Isn't it absurd: more than 93 percent of rural settlements in the republic do not have natural gas...

[NIYAZOV] Each year we ship up to twelve thousand box cars of diesel fuel, kerosine, coal, firewood and other types of fuel for stoves into the republic. This is a huge stream of entering freight although we have enough box cars in the republic as it is. The entire matter hinges on pipes. The republic receives them only after the personal approval of the chairman of the union council of ministers and even then in miserly amounts. The problem of gasification is not the only critical problem. Less than one third of villages have running water. Tell me, how do you eliminate widely spread intestinal illnesses especially among children in this situation? We are at the threshold of the twenty first century and only seven out of sixteen cities in the republic have sewage systems and the rural areas don't have them at all...

That is to say, on the one hand we have a huge territory, the richest resources and unused economic potential. On the other hand, we have serious imbalances in the development of the economy, a slow pace of industrialization, a high percent of unemployment. What can we do? Following the example of some of the republics, perhaps we should begin talking about a regional economy independent from the Union and then about the status of a state language?

No, we won't go for that. The Turkmen people were wise when they struck up a permanent kinship with the

Russian people. We remember and appreciate the altruistic help which the different peoples of the Union gave to our republic in that difficult post-war year of 1948, the terrible year of the Ashkhabad earthquake. We understand. It is not easy for anyone; the most critical period of perestroyka has arrived. But it is perestroyka itself which is calling upon us to bring back into every day use such moral values as conscience and honor, charity and compassion, generosity and sympathy. Nationalist priorities are not worth much if they are defended in violation of the principles of kindness, collectivism and comradeship.

[SOYUZ] Yes, Turkmenistan surprises a lot of people. Wherever I go, to Moscow, to Siberia, to the Ukraine, they always ask, "What? You don't have strikes? No protest meetings? Strange..."

[NIYAZOV] How are strikes going to help the people? They will only add to the poverty. Isn't it better to turn one's energy to solving urgent problems and vital questions? We have more than enough of them. However, those who are not overjoyed at the positive changes occurring in the republic play skillfully on facts of economic incompetence, objective hardships in the development of the economic and social sphere. I'll say it directly; there are forces among us which are attempting to torpedo the practical steps of perestroyka. There are quite a few of them especially among the corrupted elements who are losing the sources of their unearned income, among those who consider themselves aggrieved after losing high posts and privileges. Longing for the period of stagnation, they dream about one thing; that once again they could have a free rein.

[SOYUZ] Once I compared the figures on per capita income in the republics. It is only 1,430 rubles in Turkmenistan. Probably no region has an income like that.

[NIYAZOV] How is it supposed to be more if the main portion of the turnover tax ends up in the places where our products are processed, in other republics and cities? After all, with the specialization of our republic in the production of cotton, astrakhan, wool, silk and the extraction of gas, the turnover tax is generated mainly outside of Turkmenistan. Of course, that has an effect on the budget of the republic, on the level of its social-economic development. The number of preschools provided to the population is two times lower than the national average. Paid services available for the population are three times less than called for by standards. Apparently, there simply aren't any categories in the development of the social sphere where we stand equal to the other republics. It's embarrassing. After all, you couldn't call Turkmenistan a dependent republic. The proportion of agricultural production and food products exported to other regions after primary processing up till now has been 65-68 percent. Compare: in Belorussia and Armeniya it's 15-25 percent and in the Baltic republics not more than 35 percent.

[SOYUZ] Does that take into consideration the concept of economic accountability within a republic which is being worked out right now?

[NIYAZOV] Yes, beginning with the current year up to 40 percent of the final value of goods which are produced from our raw material will go into the republic's budget. Enterprises which produce over 60 percent industrial goods will be transferred under the authority of the Turkmen Council of Ministers. I understand that it is not easy to express everything in numbers but it is vitally necessary to reexamine the system of wholesale prices, without which it is impossible to change the entire mechanism of elaborating the republic's budget. At the beginning of our conversation you mentioned the advantageous position of the republics which sell oil and gas at world prices. No, we do not demand the establishment of world prices for us. We understand perfectly. In Russia and other regions where people live a little better than we do, their social problems are not considered. There's no reason to pull the blanket to just one side of the bed.

But the question about a reexamination of our internal prices must be decided and decided irrevocably. After all, until recently the enterprises of the union ministries contributed only one percent of profits to the republic's budget. After the transfer to regional economic accountability, this figure could rise to 40 percent.

[SOYUZ] There is nothing surprising in the fact that a specialization in the chemical processing of raw materials stands out in the economy of Turkmenistan. Our deposits almost completely copy Mendeleev's periodic table. Something else is puzzling, though. Why isn't there a systems approach to the development of natural resources?

[NIYAZOV] Here we encounter the dictates of the union agencies in the development of industries which are subordinate to them. For example, of the natural gas produced each year in the republic more than a million tons of ethane, a raw material for the production of polyethylene, are not utilized. After production of its basic product the sulphate plant of the "Karabogazsulfat" association throws away salt water and along with that; bromine, boron, potassium and magnesium. Instead, the production of potassium fertilizers without chlorine, magnesium oxides and other products could be developed. For some reason this doesn't bother the USSR Minkhimprom [Ministry of Chemical Industry] at all. It gets what it needs anyway.

A tremendously rich raw material base lies idle and is not utilized completely while the shortage of raw materials grows. At the same time for each ruble increase in the national income more resources are expended in the republic than anywhere else. Why? The agencies which have disposal rights over the deposits are free from material responsibility for their exploitation. They receive resources for nothing and are free to do with them whatever they want. Or they can do nothing.

We need to give the union republics the rights to a single state fund of the natural resources in their territories. Of course, we also need to introduce a system of payment for natural resources. The region's riches have to have someone to look out for them or else it turns out just like in the story, "Everything around belongs to the collective farm and everything around belongs to me."

[SOYUZ] The effective utilization of raw material resources and a systems approach to the region's development is intimately connected with the problem of employment. This becomes even more critical with the transfer of enterprises to economic accountability. How should this be handled?

[NIYAZOV] In the republic today only 69 people out of every 1000 in the population work in industry compared to 130 in the country as a whole. The proportionate contribution of the working class is low. But there is a way out. We must create subsidiaries of those large enterprises which are subordinate at the union level. A lot in this direction already has been done. The republic actively collaborates with the USSR Minpribor [Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Making], Minaviaprom [Ministry of Aviation Industry] and Minavtosel'khozmash [Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building].

There is also something else in reserve. Right now in Turkmenistan the foundations are being laid at approximately thirty sites of future joint enterprises. I am sure that in the thirteenth five year plan we will begin developing the Turkmen subtropics in the south-west part of the republic. This region has unique potential; two million hectares of land of which 680 thousand are arable and highly fertile. And the climate! Everything grows there as fast as yeast. Olives, the size of large plums in groves. Pomegranates, almonds, figs, persimmons, oranges, dates and even coffee grows. Today we spend millions of rubles on the purchase of foreign fruits and sweets when we could be growing our own. Just add water in the dry subtropics.

Today there is one goal; to revitalize the creative forces of the people to a qualitatively new level in order to make progress in the economy and the social and domestic welfare of the people.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Composition, Election Violations Analyzed

*90US0519A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 11 Jan 90 p 1*

[Article by Andrey Semerkin, "We Elect, They Elect Us: Do It Yourself, or a Model of Parliament"]

[Text] In the future Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan there will be 500 places. According to preliminary data of the Central Election Commission, 1,445 candidates—on the average, 3 candidates per mandate—are aspiring for these 500 seats. Thus, one can answer the question which

our newspaper set at the very beginning of the pre-election marathon ("Are There Enough Mandates for All Candidates?"): "No, There Are Not Enough."

For the time being, no one can say with confidence, what the social and political image of the republic parliament will be. This will be known only after we, the voters, express our opinion in the secret ballots.

Those readers who in their childhood played with the "Do It Yourself" Erector Set agree: In the construction of complex models from three parts, it was very difficult for the child to select the necessary one. We now find ourselves in a similar position: From 1,445 persons we will have to select 500 and to from from them a complex political structure—the Supreme Soviet.

In a certain sense, the selection has already begun. Let us compare, in terms of a number of positions, the present candidate composition with the deputy body of the Supreme Soviet selected in 1985. In 1985: workers, 32 per cent; kolkhoz workers, 19 per cent; white collar workers, 33 per cent; and party officials, 16 per cent. In 1990: workers, 18 percent; kolkhoz workers, 8 percent; white collar workers, 56 percent; and party officials, 10 per cent.

As the Central Election Commission reported to the newspaper, the increase in the share of white collar workers is connected with the fact that among the candidates there was a sharp increase in the number of managers and specialists of enterprises and organizations. In and of itself, this fact does not indicate anything: There are no two managers alike, and the same may be said about specialists. The whole question is—what this or that candidate proposes to introduce in the parliament, what views and positions he holds. It is this which the voters need to investigate in the course of the pre-election meetings with the candidates for deputy. Investigate to make a choice.

Judging by the preliminary data, compared with the past there has been an appreciable reduction in the share of party officials and officials of the Soviet apparatus. In so doing, on the whole among those who will fight for the deputy mandate, the share of communists increased from 68 to 87 percent. Consequently, already in the course of the nomination there appeared a trend: People want to see in the Supreme Soviet, not functionaries, but rank-and-file communists.

Another noticeable trend. The proportion of women decreased from 36 to 14 percent. Does this mean that the inhabitants of the republic are turning away from women's problems? In our view, no. Not long ago, in an interview with ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, one of the French politicians reported: "A Frenchman sooner will yield his place to a woman on a bus than in the parliament."

In this witty remark there is a great deal of sense. Is it worthwhile to shoulder woman deputies with the political solution of women's problems? And does the presence of mothers with many children in the Supreme Soviet in and of itself guarantee the solution of their urgent problems?

As is well-known, neither the Komsomol, nor other public-political organizations of the republic have a quota for their members in the Supreme Soviet. Republic Komsomol members nominated candidates at plenums of raykoms, gorkoms, and obkoms of the Komsomol, in labor and educational collectives, and at Komsomol meetings and conferences. As result, 111 persons were nominated: workers, 29 percent; kolkhoz workers, 27 per cent; white collar workers, 20 per cent; officials of party and soviet organs, 8 per cent; and komsomol workers, 16 per cent.

I would like to comment on two figures. Among the 20 percent white collar workers, there are very few workers engaged in intellectual labor: One lawyer, one physician, one young scientist, and one graduate student; not a single student, not a single young artist, historian, sociologist, Does such a distribution correspond to reality?

Life shows how sharply the political activeness of the students is growing and how the importance of the artistic intelligentsia in society is increasing. However, in the formation of the composition of the candidates, these processes did not find reflection. Why? For the time being, we do not know the answer.

As far as the party and soviet officials are concerned. There is nothing strange in the fact that Komsomol members nominate communists as candidates for deputy. Only the geography is surprising: Of 9 party and soviet officials (which composed the figure of 8 percent), 8 were nominated in Syr-Darya Oblast alone! It must be recognized that in the course of the present pre-election campaign between party and Komsomol committees there is not only mutual understanding, but also opposition. About two such incidents the editors informed the readers in the material "Vzryv" [Outburst], where the question concerned the Tashkent Higher School for Militia, and in the rejoinder "Prokol" [Puncture], where the situation in the Akhangaranskiy Raykom of the Komsomol was discussed. The editors know about two more analogous incidents, but about how many do we not know up to now?

We cannot understand the position of the party committees where they strive to tie up and to cut short the initiative of Komsomol members. This position is completely hopeless; to see in the Komsomol the submissive, acquiescent assistant of the party, is to look to yesterday. To organize the political creativity of young people, including in questions of elections, can be done only by those who do not understand: This is fraught with the intensification of anti-social activeness.

If the youth milieu nominates its leader for candidate, this means that it has taken a step toward the parliamentarism of thinking, toward political culture. To oppose this means to consciously know the young people from the parliamentary path to the path of informal demagogic. Unfortunately, in a number of cases, the People's Court had to restore fairness in the question of nomination. Is it possible that people's judges and assessors have to explain to zealous functionaries the principles of work with young people?

However, the violations of the rights of the young people are not the only violations of pre-election practice. There were many violations. Especially many (according to the reports of the Central Election Commission) occurred in Sabir-Rakhimovskiy and Akmal-Ikramovskiy rayons of Tashkent, and in Syr-Darya and Fergana oblasts.

In conclusion, once more about the modelling of parliament. Thus, we will have to make a choice. For this it is necessary to investigate very carefully the "political images" of the candidates: Not to feel shy to put questions to them in the course of pre-election meetings, not to hesitate to criticize their programs, if the programs deserve this.

Commenting on the results of the elections of USSR people's deputies, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, citing sociological research data, wrote half a year ago:

"What induced people to cast their vote for this or that candidate for deputy? For the majority of those surveyed (54 percent), the conviction in the ability of the candidate to make competent decisions concerning state affairs played the decisive role. For 48 percent, the chief criterion of the elections is agreement with the candidate's program. 43 percent gave preference to those who, in their opinion, are able to defend their interests in the highest organ of power; for 29 percent, the authority of the candidate was decisive; and only 19 percent named as the reason for their choice acquaintance with the activity of the candidate for deputy.

Characteristic is also the following difference: For people of greater age, preferences were connected, above all, with the personality of the candidate, with stable authority. As far as younger people are concerned, especially people under 30, for this category of voters, the attractiveness of the deputy's program is of the greatest significance, that is the selection may be formed in the course of one television encounter, for example."

I would like to direct the attention of the Komsomol candidates for deputy to the last paragraph of the citation. You are risking your chance: Not a single candidate of the 111 has turned to the editors of KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA with the proposal to give an interview or to comment on his program. Meanwhile only 5 weeks remain before the elections. You may not have enough time, and thus—not enough mandates.

Representative Explains Uzbek SSR Permanent Moscow Mission Activities

90US0519B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with Sh. Z. Komalkhodzhayev, permanent representative of the UzSSR Council of Ministers at the USSR Council of Ministers, by L. Savyev, special PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent, in Moscow: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"; date not specified; first four paragraph are PRAVDA VOSTOKA introduction]

[Text] In the first issues of PRAVDA VOSTOKA, readers called attention to a number of new columns. Today we present yet another: "Not At All Secret." It was born on the wave of glasnost, when the doors with the inscription "No Admittance" are swinging open more widely and documents with the stamp "For Official Use Only" are being exhibited for general commentary.

Behind those doors and in those business papers, we can pick up information that is of public interest.

These, properly speaking, are the kinds of materials we will publish in this column. They will become answers to your letters and questions.

You, the reader, must be both the strict judge of our efforts, and our good adviser. Your question will help find the address of readers' interests. Moreover, almost, in the life of everyone there has been something "not for the press." We invite you to tell us.

"In the summer of last year, we went through practical work in Moscow. In the region of the Polyanka Metro Station, they saw an original building, on the facade of which it was written: Permanent representation of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers at the USSR Council of Ministers." What kind of an institution is this? What is it engaged in?

M. Akhunkhodzhayev Student of the Tashkent Institute of Foreign Languages imeni F. Engels."

This letter from our reader led me to House No 12 on Pogorelskiy Pereulok in Moscow to the office of the permanent representative of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, Sh. Z. Komalkhodzhayev.

[Question] Shukur Zaitovich, even if briefly, answer our reader.

[Answer] It will hardly turn out to be short. Our institution has to solve too many problems. Being an organ of the republic Council of Ministers, the permanent representative maintains daily practical communication and business contacts of the UzSSR government with the USSR Council of Ministers, its subdivisions, state committees, ministries and departments, and other organs of the country.

The direction of our activity is carried out directly by the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan.

The permanent representation coordinates the work of the subdivisions of the republic organizations located in Moscow and takes part in the development and review of draft decrees and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers in regard to social and economic development, and economic and cultural construction relating to Uzbekistan.

We inform the commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the country's Council of Ministers, its state commissions and bureau, state committees, ministries and other central organs about the state of economic, socio-cultural and financial affairs in the republic.

In carrying out permanent relations with the ministries, departments, and other central organs, we systematically and effectively inform the government of the republic about the situation with respect to the solution of questions being introduced in the USSR Council of Ministers, as well as the course of the review of remarks of our government in regard to draft documents being adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Question] Well, but now, as they say, about what the republic gains from this?

[Answer] This is a question of universal character. Let us narrow it through a small segment of time—for example, through the days of the work of the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies. The country, including the republic, followed the heated debates in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, where the leaders of Uzbekistan also found themselves. But before the beginning of the sessions and after the conclusion, they succeeded in being in 29 agencies, solving questions of vital importance for the republic.

[Question] For example, in which ones? And what did they solve?

[Answer] From the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, N. I. Ryzhkov, they received permission to use precious metals being extracted for the production of jewelry. He allotted 3,000 tons of meat to the republic for the first quarter of 1990. Moreover, not from the storehouse, but from the reserve of the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Question] For the simple consumer, this has some sort of significance?

[Answer] For the republic, it has. From the storehouse, they take loans, but nothing is returned to the reserve of the Council of Ministers.

Incidentally, still another source of the additional receipt of meat was found at the meeting with the chairman of the USSR Gosplan, Yu. D. Maslyukov. With him were decided questions of the supply of paper, lumber, and the material-technical supply of the Uzbekenergo Production Association.

With S. A. Sitaryan, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, possibilities were developed for deliveries of cotton fiber to the foreign market.

Four questions were resolved with the first chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, L. A. Voronin. The republic received above-norm allocations of general-use motor transport and additional material-technical means in connection with the expected shortage of water. The first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers extended assistance with cement and stainless steel.

The top officials of the Ministry of Trade treated with understanding our concerns about the adequate provision of goods for the commodity turnover plan and goods available for the nourishment of children.

From A. P. Biryukova, agreement about the construction of a sanatorium for mother and child in Feodosiya was obtained, and Minister of Health Ye. I. Chazov supported the idea of opening a branch of the Scientific-Technical Mikrokhirurgiya glaza [Microsurgery of the Eye] Complex in the republic.

[Question] And what is the role of the permanent representative in the solution of these problems?

[Answer] To monitor. If necessary, to remind. To inform the Tashkent and Moscow leadership. To do this in alliance with interested republic departments.

[Question] It turns out, you are frequently the first to hold some document that is very important for the republic in your hands? [Answer] Yes, it turns out that way. Here, incidentally, I just received a letter from the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, G. A. Yagodin, to the chairman of the UzSSR Council of Ministers, M. Mikrasymov: "The USSR State Committee for Public Education supports the proposal for the organization of the Institute of Languages, History and Culture of the Peoples of the East on the basis of the Faculty of Oriental Studies of Tashkent State University imeni V. I. Lenin.

[Question] Once you have started to talk about institutes, tell us, please, how many people from our region are studying in the VUZ's of other republics?

[Answer] About 10,000. In Moscow alone, 704 students were enrolled hors concours. All in all, Uzbek departments exist in 20 VUZ's of cities of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. Moreover, there are educational institutions which have been training cadres for Uzbekistan for dozens of years. For example, the Saratov State Pedagogical Institute imeni K. Fedin conducted the first admission of students from our region 25 years ago.

On the eve of the New Year, a student party was held in the permanent representation, where amateur artists of the Bakhor Folklore Ensemble and the Shark Vocal-Instrumental Ensemble of the Saratov Pedagogical Institute gave a big concert.

During the days before the New Year, still another moving meeting was held. To the permanent representation came representatives of the intelligentsia, emigrants from Samarkand, whom fate for various reasons brought to Moscow many years ago. After decades, our fellow-countrymen recognized each other.

[Question] Shukur Zaitovich, how large is the collective?

[Answer] The staff includes 24 employees, including the representative of Karakalpakstan, whose post not long ago appeared in the regular staff schedule. Cadre rotation is provided for by the statute on the Uzbek Permanent Representation.

[Question] And a few words about the material-technical possibilities. . . .

[Answer] The garage has 11 automobiles, including 7 light Volga automobiles.

The establishment is equipped with kinds of communications, including fax machines.

In the meantime we are experiencing difficulties with the accommodation of the people from Uzbekistan in our hotel on Bolshaya Polyanka, 41. It has a capacity of 136 places. But now 60-70 percent are permanently occupied by construction workers, who are helping Moscow workers to put up still another hotel of the permanent representation with a capacity of 150 places.

More on Uzbek SSR Organizations Functioning in Moscow

90US0623D Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 Feb 90 p 4

[Article under rubric "Not At All Secret: PRAVDA VOSTOKA's Information-Reference Bulletin": "At Moscow Addresses"]

[Text] On 14 January 1990 PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported: "Postpredstvo [Permanent Representation] coordinates the work performed by the subdivisions of the republic's organizations that are located in Moscow..." What kind of organizations are these?—S. Yefimova, Fergana.

The following organizations are located in the capital of the USSR:

- the cost-accountable Moscow Branch of UzSSR Gosnab;
- the representation of the Uzbekintorg Foreign-Trade Association;
- a consular agency of the republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- a comprehensive department of UzSSR Gosstroy;
- the Department for Technical-Economic Cooperation With Foreign Countries, of the republic-level

Uzvodzarubezhstroy cost-accountable association of UzSSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management.

In addition, the following are located in Moscow:

—the wine factory of UzSSR Goskoopkomselkhoz; a representation of the Uzbek Joint-Stock Innovation Bank; a representation of the Uzbekistan Writers Union; a correspondent of the Uzbek television and radio system; Uzbekbrlyashu stores—Fergana, Andizhan, Zarafshan, and Namangan; and the hotel for the republic's Academy of Sciences. The Uzbek Cultural and Information Center is being created.

Performance, Activity of Uzbek SSR People's Deputies Compared

90US0623A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
30 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent I. Khisamov, Moscow-Tashkent, under the rubric "Top Un-Secret: PRAVDA VOSTOKA's Information-Reference Bulletin": "Our Parliamentarians"]

[Text] The central press has provided information concerning the most active deputies to USSR Supreme Soviet and concerning the number of practical proposals made by them with regard to the questions being discussed. The deputies from our republic are not mentioned there. Would it be possible to publish detailed information about their participation in the work of the parliament?—A. Dudetskiy, physician.

At the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies, a computerized reference service of the Main Administration of Information, under USSR Sovmin, was in operation. In response to our request, that service issued data concerning all the 29 Uzbek members of USSR Supreme Soviet.

The persons who are recognized as being the most active Uzbek deputies are Karakalpak writer Tulepbergen Kaipbergenov and aviation association worker Aleksandr Korshunov. They have made statements frequently both at congresses and at sessions, and each has made eight proposals that have been registered by the presidium as being constructive ones. Similar practical proposals have been made by deputies Erkin Yusupov, Akhmedzhan Mukhtarov, Vasilii Tso, and others.

During the first seven months of the parliament's work, 11 members of USSR Supreme Soviet who are representatives of Uzbekistan did not take the rostrum of the congresses or sessions even once. This constitutes more than 35 percent of our deputation's "personnel."

Let us, however, take into consideration their large amount of unnoticeable work in the committees and commissions. Forty deputies from our republic are members of these formations. They are not only Supreme Soviet members, but also "simply" people's

deputies. Nevertheless we must recall that the word "parliament" is derived from the French "parler—to speak."

While justly criticizing certain deputies for their unabashed attempt to show off on the rostrum, PRAVDA VOSTOKA readers also comment in their letters that most of the representatives of our republic have been conducting themselves in a constrained manner, failing to use all the parliamentary opportunities for attracting the legislator's attention to the very acute problems in the region and the republic.

Here is some additional information. Out of 29 members of USSR Supreme Soviet in our deputation, 25 are CPSU members, six are women, and 20 are persons with higher education. With regard to age: six are 40 years old or younger; nine are aged from 41 to 50; 11 are from 51 to 60; and three are older than 60.

There was only one question, but a very interesting one, that the computer refused to answer—the question of the deputies' record of attendance at the sessions and congresses. The screen at the video terminal displayed the statement, "Information provided by authorization of the Congress secretariat." But the secretariat did not provide that authorization...

Uzbek CNP Reviews Tashkent Public Order Maintenance, Other Issues

*90US0623B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
25 Jan 90 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "At the Buro of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee"]

[Text] A regular session of the Buro of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee was held on 24 January. The Buro considered the question of shortcomings in the work of the law-enforcement agencies of the city of Tashkent in fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The Status of the Fight Against Crime in the Country and Additional Measures to Prevent Violations of the Law" and the resolution on that question by Uzbekistan CP Central Committee.

It was noted at the session that, despite the buildup of the negative tendencies in the condition of law and order, the administrators of the city's law-enforcement agencies have been operating without any show of initiative and in a disorganized manner, and have reconciled themselves to shortcomings in organizing the fight against crime. The subordinate rayon subdivisions have not been providing a thorough analysis of the processes occurring within the sphere of law and order, legality, and the carrying out of justice.

In the course of the discussion it was emphasized that the city's workers have been expressing their justified dissatisfaction with the relatively ineffective actions taken by the procuracy, the militia, and the courts. One out of every four crimes registered in the republic is committed

in Tashkent. Their number has been growing from year to year, and rose especially sharply in 1988-1989. At the same time, last year alone the persons who had committed more than 11,000 crimes remained unidentified and unpunished. There has been an easing of the fight against infringements upon citizens' private property, against violent crimes, against abuses in the sphere of services and the cooperative system, speculation, thefts of socialist property, and group crime.

The administrators of the subdivisions and services of the procuracy and internal-affairs agencies, and especially the investigative apparatuses, the criminal investigation departments, the protection of public law and order, BKhSS [Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation], GAI [State Motor-Vehicles Inspectorate], and the district inspectors, have been interacting poorly with one another and failing to use the available opportunities to reinforce law and order. Their efforts have not been coordinated toward preventing criminal manifestations, toward locating and bringing to responsibility the organizers of and participants in group crimes, persons involved in the theft of socialist property, and bribe-takers, or toward stopping the actions of speculators, thieves, and robbers. The actions of the city people's court and the rayon people's courts and of the justice institutions do not conform to the increased requirements. Legal education is being conducted in a haphazard manner, and the public is rarely informed about the most vitally important trials. When criminal cases are being considered in the courts, red-tape methods are used and errors are committed, thus giving several of the guilty individuals a long period of time to evade well-deserved punishment and the compensation of the damage that they have caused.

The Tashkent Gorkom, the party's raykoms, and the ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies have been taking a formal approach to the development of preventive measures, have been isolating these measures from the plans for the socioeconomic development of the rayons, and have been showing no real concern for improving the working and everyday living conditions for the employees of the law-enforcement agencies.

The city's provisional committee to fight crime began its operation after a long delay. The republic's law-enforcement agencies have not been providing the city or its own subdivisions any effective assistance in organizing the fight against crime.

The Central Committee Buro has directed the attention of the Tashkent Gorkom, the party's rayon committees, and the Communist administrators of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies and the city's and republic's law-enforcement agencies to the inadmissibility of any further delay in suppressing the increase in crime or in guaranteeing the irreversibility of the punishment of those persons who have infringed upon the life, dignity, and property of the citizens and upon the interests of the

state. The administrators of the law-enforcement agencies have been warned about their personal responsibility for guaranteeing a major breakthrough in the fight against crime, for carrying out the certification and further purification of the cadres, and also for creating a professional nucleus that is capable of establishing order in the work sector assigned to it.

They have been advised, jointly with other interested agencies, to develop by 1 March 1990 a program of technical-organizations, ideological, and law-enforcement measures for fighting crime and for preventing violations of the law in the city of Tashkent, and to resolve the questions of creating the proper conditions for the work of the justice administration of Tashkent City Ispolkom, the Akmal-Ikramovskiy and Oktyabrskiy rayon people's courts, the republic refresher courses for workers in the justice system, and the Internal-Affairs Department of the Akmal-Ikramovskiy Rayon Ispolkom.

The Buro has required the Communist administrators of soviet, trade-union, Komsomol, law-enforcement, and economic agencies in Tashkent, in the first half of this year, jointly with the councils of the labor collectives, to define the specific contribution to be made by each enterprise, institution, and organization to guaranteeing the protection of law and order, and to resolve the questions of rendering material, financial, and technical

assistance to the law-enforcement agencies. It has assigned the task of restoring on a qualitatively new basis the activities of the volunteer people's druzhinas [home guard], public stations for protection of law and order, councils to prevent violations of the law, commissions to fight alcoholism, comrade courts, and commissions for workers' control of the activities of trade and public nutrition. In the primary party organizations, these sectors of public activities will be assigned to initiatory, well-principled Communists from among the administrators, specialists, and advanced production workers.

The Central Committee Buro discussed the question of introducing order into the preparation and conducting in the republic of jubilee cultural measures, literary and art holidays, and symposiums and conferences. The appropriate republic-level commission has been created, and it has been given the responsibility, jointly with the interested organizations, of developing and forwarding recommendations with regard to these questions to UzSSR Council of Ministers.

The session adopted a resolution to hold a conference of advanced workers in the republic's agroindustrial complex on 16-17 March 1990 in Tashkent at the V. I. Lenin Palace of the Friendship of Nations. The preparation of the conference has been entrusted to UzSSR State-Cooperative Committee for Agriculture.

People's Front Official on Role of Latvia's Russian Population

90UN1011A Riga ATMODA in Russian 29 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with Yanis Shkapars, People's Front Duma board chairman, by A. Kazakov: "Each Must Find for Himself his Own Place in Independent Latvia..."; time, place not given]

[Text] In order to judge the evolution of the movement, and to some degree, that of the new issues dictated by the reality of today's political processes, the People's Front position on certain issues must be formulated once again on the eve of the election. ATMODA continues the series of interviews begun with leading NFL [Latvian People's Front] politicians. Our interlocutor today was Yanis Shkapars, People's Front Duma board chairman.

[Correspondent] To start, I would like to ask you about the main idea uniting the entire democratic movement of Latvia, the idea of independence. How is it seen today? Has anything changed in its presentation or formulation?

[Shkapars] The idea of Latvia's independence was quite definitely formulated in the second NFL program. Formulated there also is the answer to the question, what will an independent Latvia be like? Independent Latvia must become a democratic parliamentary republic. We must resolve two issues at once, raise two Cyclopaen boulders. The first boulder is sociopolitical, that is, the transition from a totalitarian system to a parliamentary one. The second is achieving independence. This is our two-in-one goal.

We have also determined for ourselves the path for achieving this goal. This is the non-violent path of democratic transformations.

Yet Latvia's existing structure, including its national structure, is very complex. Therefore, the common democratic principles in our movement are particularly topical.

[Correspondent] Can it be considered that these democratic principles have priority over the others, and how are the remaining ones defined?

[Shkapars] Yes, democratic principles are the foundations of our movement. If this is not to be, then we cannot resolve a single major political issue. For example, the nationality issue. Today, the Latvian and non-Latvian segments of the population are divided approximately in half, and therefore, in resolving the Latvian issue, we must to the same degree take into consideration, and as possible, resolve the issues of other nationalities. I think that we have already laid the foundation for such a resolution, and that this is the central issue of our entire democratic platform.

In this regard, I would like to say that within Latvia's nationality issue the core is the Latvian-Russian issue, the relations between the Latvians and the Russians,

because we cannot otherwise resolve either the issue of independence or the issue of paths to society's democratization.

[Correspondent] Thus, the issue of the Russian population's independent participation in Latvia's political life will come up again?

[Shkapars] Yes, since we are counting upon learning of Russian interests and problems not from Interfront, which is hardly expressing them, but from the Russian intelligentsia, especially those in the humanities. It is the intelligentsia which will raise specifically Russian problems in today's Latvia, as well as those that the Russian population will face in the future free Latvia.

The Russians themselves must reveal their own pain in Latvia. We simply cannot do that. The Russians must pose their questions themselves, and after this we must look for concord and contact, that is, meeting each other halfway as full and equal, self-aware subjects.

[Correspondent] Interests can negotiate and coordinate only through counter movement toward one another.

[Shkapars] Yes, and it seems to me that for this, we can even speak about the formation of new, effective political structures. It seems to me that the Russian population, just like the non-Latvian population in general, has not yet created those structures through which it could express its interests and problems, within the framework of which is possible a meeting of the Latvian and non-Latvian populations for an agreement of interests. We are speaking not only of cultural interests, but primarily of political structures.

It is no longer possible today for one person to speak in the name of a national group: "I, in the name of the Russian people, in the name of the Russian population..." Today, the problems, issues, pain, and energy of all strata of the population must be accumulated in political structures with a definite social basis.

[Correspondent] That is, the Russian population must responsibly formulate its interests, and on general democratic principles, coordinate them with the interests of the Latvians—with a unity of goals?

[Shkapars] Absolutely right. And the phase has now arrived at which a new quality is necessary for this agreement of interests. This must not just be agreement on private issues, since the political processes have acquired such a degree of intensity that the situation could change radically tomorrow. Therefore, we must constantly coordinate and refine our interests. There cannot be normal, joint movement forward without this.

We would like to know the valid and representative opinion of the Russian population on all the issues, to know whether we can count upon the Russian population in the resolution of the further fate of the republic. Must we fear opposition, or may we count upon support? Without such knowledge, we cannot calculate responsible political decisions.

[Correspondent] Meaning that we are talking about agreement of fundamental common interests?

[Shkapars] Yes, we must determine together what our common interests and goals are like. In particular, we must define our opponent. There sometimes ring out rash voices about the Russians being our opponent. Actually, both Russians and Latvians have the same opponent, and quite a different one. It is the old totalitarian system, the old state and party bureaucracy, especially the corrupt bureaucracy, not infrequently locked into the shadow economy. This is a very dangerous opponent. And we face a rather cruel political struggle against it. We must therefore be united in the face of our opponent. We will become easy prey for it if we fight senselessly among ourselves.

Secondly, we must determine our common goal. I think that this goal consists of seeing that the people get in a winning position. Not some sort of privileged stratum, but the people, the people of Latvia, and not especially the Latvian, or the Russian, or some other people.

Thus, united, we have an opponent and a goal, and we must determine and articulate this precisely. This is probably one of the main tasks of the Russian intelligentsia. And this is today's task; it cannot be postponed for a day.

[Correspondent] Can it be said that what is required from Russians today is not simply passive loyalty, but active, independent participation in all political and state-building processes.

[Shkapars] Of course. The Russian population must become an equal participant in these processes. Loyalty is not enough if the struggle intensifies. Passive loyalty is not bad, either, but it is not enough today. All democratic forces must actively include themselves in the work. The issue of the organizational association of our efforts is therefore very important now.

[Correspondent] Do you wish to say that a united political structure is necessary, within whose framework we will jointly wage the fight for an independent, law-governed, democratic state?

[Shkapars] Yes, exactly. A common political structure under a single democratic platform. And the law-governed state itself is a sufficient guarantee of all our interests, including nationalities interests. At the same time, such a structure must become a model of how we are going to live together in independent Latvia.

I am convinced that a person who stands for a democratic, parliamentary Latvia must not fear for his future. He must be bold and confident. He must find for himself his own place in free Latvia...

Soviet-Greek Society Forms Donetsk Chapter

90UN0889A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 10 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by V. Sheptukha: "Forum of the Greeks from the Ukraine"]

[Text] A constituent conference of the Regional Society of the Soviet Greeks of the Ukraine was held in Donetsk. There were almost four hundred delegates from many oblasts of the republic, first of all, from Odessa, Crimea, and Zaporozhye oblasts, and also from Moscow, Georgia, Krasnodarsky Kray, Rostov oblast, and other regions. The place for the conference was not an accidental choice, since only 10,000 out of the total of 96,000 Greeks residing in the Ukraine live outside Donetsk oblast.

The participants of the conference mentioned, that the very fact that it was held, as well as the opportunity for discussing vital problems of small countries and nationalities, is possible because of the restructuring of the social life of our society based on the principles of democratization and glasnost, and the creation of a lawful state. The course for the regeneration of national traditions and language, and for the establishment of the self-awareness of talented people, who during the years of Stalinist repression and Brezhnev's criminal indifference to the individual, suffered tremendous losses, corresponds to the present general trend of our country's internal and foreign policy.

After an animated discussion, the delegates agreed upon the structure of the newly formed Society, approved its Rules and Agenda, and developed general plans for the future as well as forms and methods of the activities.

It is anticipated, in particular, that a broad complex of measures will be realized in order to publicize the social and cultural achievements of Soviet Greeks by means of the press, radio and TV, literature, and verbal propaganda. Also foreseen, is the establishment of a Greek cultural center, the study of the geography and history of the Greek settlements, the preparation of national cadres (including Donetsk), the establishment of cultural relations with Greeks abroad, and the establishment joint enterprises with them, etc.

The Society will do much to promote the realization of the national and cultural needs of various strata of the Greek population in order to solve the tasks of perestroika, to form (especially amidst the youth) conscious, highly cultural social thinking in the spirit of internationalism and to develop the sense of national dignity. At the same time, it was emphasized that spiritual regeneration is incompatible with the national narrow-mindedness. It is necessary to learn from people nearby—Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Belorussians, and representatives of other fraternal nations of the USSR.

The delegates elected Professor I.O. Yali, doctor of philosophical sciences, from the Donetsk Institute of Soviet Trade, as head (on an alternating basis with five others) of the Council of the Regional Society of the

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Soviet Greeks of the Ukraine. M.Yu. Kolle, an engineer from the publishing house RADYANSKA DONETCHINA, was elected as executive secretary; K.A. Hristodulidi, chief bookkeeper of the Donetsk Coke-Chemical Plant, was elected as head of the Auditing Commission.

Deputy Justice Minister on Uzbek Language Law Implementation

90US0656A Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
20 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Uzbek SSR Deputy Director of Justice Mirzaulug Elchiyevich Abdusalamov by I. Alimov: "The Law on Language: The Opinion of a Lawyer;" date, place not given]

[Text] **The adoption of the Law on the state language of the Uzbek SSR played a great role in the resolution of the language problem. How are the subdivisions of the republic Ministry of Justice participating in its realization? Uzbek SSR Deputy Director of Justice Mirzaulug Elchiyevich Abdusalamov responds to this question from UzTAG correspondent I. Alimov.**

[Abdusalamov] We have organized a special commission for the realization of the law in the justice organizations and institutions. A plan of concrete measures has been prepared; this has been taken to all subordinate organs.

A collective of authors, which included lawyers—scholars and practitioners—also developed detailed commentary on the law on the state language, in which recommendations for its application in concrete cases are given. After the appropriate finishing work, it will be made public, either in the periodical press, or in a separate publication.

The appropriate articles of the currently effective republic legislation remain to be changed. It has been proposed that corrections be made in the Uzbek SSR Marital and Family Code, in particular, the part that states that citizens, regardless of nationality, may, if desired, give a child the surname derived from the first name of the grandfather or father. This had not previously been allowed. In accordance with the Uzbek national traditions, parents are also given the right to write children's names with the addition of the words "khon," "zhon," "bek," "bonu," "bibi," "oy," "khuzha," and others, and patronymics, with the addition of the words "ugli," "kyzy," "iy," or "zoda." The name, patronymic, and surname, again at the desire of the parents, may be written in one word or several.

It should be taken into consideration that it became possible to introduce such changes at any age. But after age 10, the consent of the child is also required; at 18, a person decides such questions independently.

To introduce changes, it is sufficient to go to the residence-based ZAGS [Registration of acts of civil status]. The request will be fulfilled with the exception of two

cases—if the person is under investigation, on trial, or has a court record, and if the appropriate state organs object to such changes.

I must warn straight off that the change and alteration of surnames, names, and patronymics entails great expenses. ZAGS staffers in each individual case must restore the primary records of birth and marriage certificates, etc. The verification of the corresponding state organs is required in order to prevent the citizen's exploitation of such a change for mercenary purposes—to dodge investigation and trial, the payment of alimony, or responsibility for other violations of the law.

Recently, there have been more frequent requests from citizens to restore nationality written incorrectly at one time (especially from among the Tajik population in Bukhara and Samakand oblasts). Proposals have been prepared for improving documentational changes of nationality, which at present are considered by the appropriate departments.

The Ministry of Justice has sent to the aforementioned organs proposals on bringing the current republic legislation into correspondence with the Law on the state language. Thus, it is proposed that one of the articles of the Uzbek SSR code on administrative violations of the law be supplemented with a statute on responsibility for humiliating the honor and dignity of citizens expressed in the form of an official's refusal to accept and consider a statement, complaint or proposal on the basis of ignorance of the republic state language or the language of inter-ethnic communication. Unfortunately, such incidents have already been allowed.

In the opinion of lawyers, the republic Criminal Code also needs supplementation. It must stipulate severe punishment for a disparaging or inimical attitude toward the state language or other languages, if expressed in the infringement of citizens' constitutional rights to free choice of language in communication, indoctrination, and education, the humiliation of citizens' honor and dignity on a linguistic basis, the creation of hindrances or limitations in the use of languages, and public appeals to commit these acts.

And finally, the Law on the state language stipulates various deadlines for bringing its individual articles into effect. I ask that particular attention be paid to such a circumstance: It states there that in every case, it is a matter of over the course (and not at the end of) of a period of so many years. In other words, this process is continuous and vital. Therefore, in those places where the necessary conditions are already ripe, the transition may be made to the state language even now, without waiting for the expiration of the deadlines indicated.

Press Agency Recounts Spread of Uzbek Civil Unrest Rumors

90US0656B Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
22 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by UzTAG correspondents A. Baranov and S. Fenyutin: "In the Turbid Airwaves"]

[Text] Overall, it was typical Saturday duty, with many phone calls, inquiries... Only last Saturday, unlike the typical one, was not marked by any particular diversity.

At about 11 AM, a citizen called from Tashkent:

"Editorial office? Tell me, what's going on in Lenin Square?"

"And what might be going on there? We are unaware..."

"The editorial office, and you're unaware," the citizen said indignantly. "They say there's a rally with many thousands of people going on there!"

"Fine, we'll try and find out. Call back in about 20 minutes..."

He called back punctually in 20 minutes:

"Did you find out what's going on in the square?"

"It's raining there, just like everywhere else in Tashkent."

"Rain? But what about the people?"

"No people were spotted. In any case, not thousands of them. And there is no rally."

"That's strange..."

That was how "promising" a beginning our duty had on the eve of republic election day. But we couldn't even have guessed at what would start up at noon.

"Hello, how are you! Is this UzTAG? I'm bothering you from Moscow, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, the French press agency. Kindly tell me, what is your situation there now?"

"Everything here is in order, thank you."

"But no demonstrations are foreseen? And what measures are generally being taken?"

"We don't expect anything of the kind. What exactly it this about?"

"A curfew has been imposed there. The radio reported on it: interethnic clashes with victims..."

"That's a misunderstanding. Maybe Tashkent was confused with Dushanbe?"

"No, they were talking about Samarkand..."

"There hasn't been anything like that in Samarkand, either."

"That's strange!"

Just in case, we called back Samarkand. We were convinced that there were no grounds for the alarm expressed by our interlocutor. And just then there was another call.

"How do you do. I'm speaking to you from Moscow, from the Japanese telegraph agency KYODO TSUSIN. Central Radio reported in the night that a curfew has been imposed in Samarkand..."

"That's not true!"

"Not true, right? But what about interethnic clashes beginning there between the Tajik and Armenian population, is that real? That was reported on the radio from Moscow, according to Tashkent radio."

"No, that didn't happen, either. We don't know about Moscow radio, but Tashkent didn't report anything of the kind, and couldn't have reported it."

"Could you tell me if there's a TASS department in Samarkand?"

"There is a TASS-UzTAG staff correspondent there. And we just talked to him—he's quite surprised and perplexed by this information. Just like everybody else in Samarkand is, by the way."

"Yes, it's strange."

That day, we came to hear that word "strange" on more than one occasion, and in varying tonalities. They called from the Latin American agency PRENSA LATINA, from the West German agency DPA, from YOMIURI, the biggest Japanese newspaper... They requested that we brief them on how the situation was developing in the republic, what caused the mass unrest, what measures the Government was taking to stabilize the situation?

They took in various ways our explanation that they had received false information, that nothing unusual was taking place in the republic, either in Samarkand or in Tashkent, other than a second day of rain. Some were relieved; some were disappointed, some barely hid their mistrust... They would call back and ask again, isn't there any news, didn't any sort of rallies or demonstrations take place?

At Uzbek SSR Gosteleradio, we tried to clear up how such information could be born. We got the simple reply that there had been nothing of the kind on the republic television or radio channels, and that republic radio broadcasts were not sent to Moscow. Many had already seen for themselves on the VREMYA program the piece by USSR Gosteleradio staff correspondent Mukhtar Ganiyev denying the fabrications. Erkin Rakhimov, all-union radio staff correspondent for Uzbekistan, is ill and is now in Moscow, so he could not broadcast anything from the republic. Nor was there any such report on the foreign-language broadcast channel of the republic radio.

And as far as the rallies are concerned, there were some all the same. As UzTAG staff correspondent L. Tokarev informed us, more than a few took place spontaneously

last Saturday and Sunday in all rayons, in many residential blocks of Samarkand. Their participants angrily and unanimously protested foreign radio provocation.

**Soviet Diplomats, Others Involved in
Afghan-Uzbek Drug, Contraband Ring**

90WD0152B Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 23 Jan 90
Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Artemenko, *PRAVDA* correspondent (Tashkent): "Greed"; first paragraph is *PRAVDA* introduction]

[Text] Uzbek SSR KGB personnel have stopped the criminal activity of employees of the USSR Consulate General in Afghanistan and a group of inhabitants of the border town of Termez, who had been smuggling illegal drugs, antiques, and other goods for a long time.

Two Soviet cars driving to our country crossed the state border of the USSR and Afghanistan at the Ayratam checkpoint of the Termez customs service early one January morning last year. Consul V. Babkin from the USSR Consulate General in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif was behind the wheel of the Volga. The other people in the car were Babkin's wife and the consul-general himself, V. Milushin, with his wife. The RAF was driven by G. Khatskevich, a driver from the consulate general. As soon as the cars had stopped at the checkpoint, the border guards' dog "went to work" on GAZ-2410: It began barking and pawing the hood, fenders, and trunk. Khatskevich was visibly upset by this. The customs inspectors asked him to park the car over the inspection pit.

"The things inside belong to diplomats and cannot be searched," the driver snapped.

Deputy Chief A. Nemov of the Termez customs service walked up to V. Milushin and V. Babkin:

"We suspect you are transporting items which are not allowed into the USSR."

"You are mistaken. We packed only what we were supposed to bring," the diplomats said.

Nevertheless, Milushin and Babkin had to put all of their luggage through the x-ray equipment. During the search, a metal container filled with a strong-smelling substance was found in one of the cardboard boxes in the trunk of the Volga. An quick analysis of the contents revealed that the container was full of opium alkaloids....

A team of investigators in charge of priority cases in the investigative division of the Uzbek SSR KGB followed the trail of the smugglers for almost a year before the January incident at the Termez customs house. They unraveled an entire chain of crimes committed by a group of Soviet citizens in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

They began on a small scale in March 1988. Driver G. Khatskevich frequently had to drive to his native land on official business. He knew which goods were in demand in his country and which cost less in Afghanistan. He decided to go into business, and it did not take him long to find dependable assistants.

Two residents of Termez, F. Avlikulov and V. Karimshakov, gave Khatskevich two gold rings worth 800 rubles. They asked for drugs in return. Without declaring the jewelry to customs inspectors, he took the rings to Afghanistan, where he exchanged them for hashish. On his next trip to the USSR, Khatskevich hid the drug in the spare tire of the Volga, drove it across the state border, and gave it to his accomplices. They sold it for 9,000 rubles. These were their first modest joint earnings.

Nothing whets the appetite better, as the saying goes, than a taste of food. Inspired by their success and by the money they had earned, Avlikulov and Karimshakov raised the stakes, so to speak. They regularly bought gold items in stores in Termez and Dushanbe, and each time their boss arrived from Afghanistan, they gave him a bigger parcel than the last time. Khatskevich succeeded in finding excuses to make extra trips across the Amu Darya, and each time he took gold back across the border, without declaring it to customs inspectors.

As the packages of rings for Khatskevich grew larger, the earnings of the accomplices increased. Just when business was booming, tragedy almost struck: Avlikulov said he was suspicious of Karimshakov, and the conspirators decided to leave him out of their future transactions. Avlikulov suggested a substitute—A. Karimov, who justified the recommendation on his very first outing by selling some opium for more than 200,000 rubles.

Khatskevich also had to "rack his brain" regularly. He constantly had to find new hiding places. Once he inserted the gold rings behind the decorative border in the back seat of the Volga assigned to Babkin. In this way, Khatskevich "used" his boss. When Babkin left the consulate general for the day, Khatskevich peeled back the trim and removed the jewelry. Soon V. Milushin, the consul-general himself, was "used" in the same way. Khatskevich drove him to Termez, but the boss did not even suspect that some hashish and some fabric were hidden in the trunk of his official car. Incidentally, Khatskevich had good reason to "exploit" his bosses. After all, he did them favors too. Several times, for example, at Babkin's request and with his afghanis, he had purchased foreign brocade, had taken it across the border, had sold it in Termez at outrageous prices, and had brought back fabulous amounts of Soviet money to the diplomat in Mazar-e Sharif.

In December 1988 the smugglers made preparations for their biggest deal. Karimov gave Khatskevich 167 gold and diamond rings, and Khatskevich exchanged all of the 267 rings he had transported in October and December for more than 19 kilograms of opium—worth 2 million rubles.

Khatskevich made careful preparations for the return trip. This was not easy because it was the first time he would be carrying such a large and highly profitable shipment. It is a significant point that Gennadiy Grigoryevich was a jack of all trades—he could fix things

perfectly and mend things beautifully. He had an idea: He removed the bottom of a 20-liter tank, packed the drugs inside, and then soldered the piece of tin back in place. The false bottom was invisible to the inexperienced eye.

The day before their departure, Milushin and Babkin asked Khatskevich to buy some fabric. In deference to his superiors, he bought 205 meters for the consul-general and a meter less for the consul. Babkin and Khatskevich packed all of the fabric in packing cartons for air conditioners. Before they left for the USSR, all three agreed that the cartons would be in the Volga carrying the consul-general, the consul, and their wives. Khatskevich would follow in the RAF with the rest of their things.

It took Khatskevich no time at all to figure things out: The customs inspectors would not search through the things in the diplomats' car. For this reason, he decided to take advantage of this loophole and moved the box with Babkin's fabric from the Volga to his own car. Then he put the container of opium in the empty space. Milushin and Babkin did not know about the switch.

A day after the consulate-general personnel were detained, the investigative division of the Uzbek SSR KGB instituted criminal proceedings on the grounds of the information of the Termez customs house and the results of the customs inspection. The investigative team was headed by Deputy Chief S. Medvedev of the investigative division and the senior investigating officer for priority cases, V. Bersenev....

What had sent these men, whom the investigation and trial revealed to be quite prosperous, down the slippery path of smuggling? After all, each had a completely respectable job, prestige, and the respect of his colleagues. During the trial they frankly confessed that they were not in need, that the cause of their downfall was simple greed and the temptation of easy money. Where did they plan to spend it? They could only shrug their shoulders: Somehow they had never given this any thought.

The Criminal Cases Collegium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court was in session for around 20 days. Its members included A. Popkov, the presiding justice of the republic supreme court, and people's assessors N. Serebryannikova and Ye. Fedoseyev. The trial established, for example, that during nine trips, Khatskevich had secretly taken 520 gold rings across the border of the USSR and had brought back around 37 kilograms of drugs and more than 1,500 meters of fabric from Afghanistan. The other members of the criminal gang were accused of cornering gold and speculating in drugs and fabric on a particularly grand scale.

The trial demonstrated that by illegally taking large quantities of gold out of the USSR and bringing fabric into our country without paying customs duties, Khatskevich, Avlikulov, Karimov, and Karimshakov had caused the Soviet State to suffer economic losses in

the sphere of domestic and foreign trade. By bringing large quantities of drugs into the USSR and distributing them to members of the population, the criminals had gravely injured the health of the Soviet people and had thereby inflicted serious damage on the society and the state.

When the verdict of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court was announced, G. Khatskevich, F. Avlikulov, and A. Karimov were sentenced to lengthy prison terms with the confiscation of their property. They will serve their sentence doing hard labor in correctional labor colonies. The items admitted as material evidence in the trial were confiscated by the state. Khatskevich had to pay 302,400 rubles and Avlikulov had to pay 144,500 rubles. Karimov had turned over his illegal gains before the trial. Karimshakov was given a suspended sentence with 3 years of probation and was fined around 10,000 rubles.

Milushin and Babkin warrant special discussion. In addition to making illegal use of his official status by taking 205 meters of fabric from Afghanistan across the state border into the USSR, the consul-general had several antique Afghan sabers, daggers, and bayonets, skillfully inlaid by Afghan master craftsmen, in his car. These antiques are of national, historical, and aesthetic value and they certainly could not be taken out of the country. Furthermore, the official from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was bringing weapons into the country illegally.

A resolution instituting proceedings against the diplomat was passed at the beginning of last year. He quickly developed an illness, could not be put on the stand, and the case against Milushin will have to be tried separately, but the former diplomat is still in a Moscow hospital.

Babkin also got off easy, with nothing more than a slight scare. With the consent of the prosecutor, the investigators took into account the fact that he had returned all of the money he had made illegally, all 32,000 rubles, to the state treasury, that he had expressed sincere remorse, and that he was of retirement age, and they decided to dismiss the charges against Babkin.

The Criminal Cases Collegium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court issued an interlocutory order: In view of the fact that Milushin and Babkin are members of the CPSU and are on the rolls of the Moscow city party organization, the Moscow CPSU Gorkom was to be informed of their illegal actions.

It is probably time to hold communists responsible for their own actions. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs will probably take some kind of action. The dismissal of schemers solves part of the problem, but it will be much more difficult to prevent other actions of this kind by ministerial personnel.

**Soviet-Swedish Joint Counternarcotics Operation
'Viking' Detailed**

90WD0152A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian
No 1, 1-7 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Valeriy Aushev (Moscow): "The White Secret in the Ebony"; first three paragraphs are NEDELYA introduction]

[Text] Computerization, the electronic exchange of information and statistics on declared freight, and the training and re-certification of personnel with a view to the requirements made on the economy by perestroika will be instituted on a broad scale in USSR customs establishments in 1990. They will continue the augmentation of foreign contacts and interaction with the customs services of the countries belonging to the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), the Washington session of which was attended by a Soviet delegation with observer status, headed by V.K. Boyarov, chief of the Main State Customs Administration of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Moscow was chosen as the location for an international seminar in 1990 on ways of combating illegal drug traffic in transit. Representatives of many prestigious international organizations—the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the Customs Cooperation Council, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Interpol, and others—have been invited to attend the seminar.

An incident which began at Sheremetyevo Airport No 2 is an example of Soviet customs' participation in the fight against the drug mafia.

The bag looked like an ordinary bag. It was a common zippered travel bag, made out of a gray synthetic material, with a small padlock and a luggage tag. Among its contents, two ebony figurines aroused the interest of senior inspectors Yu.V. Kulakov and E.V. Serov of the Sheremetyevo customs service, who were x-raying the luggage of transit passengers on the flight from Dakar to Stockholm. Cavities filled with a foreign substance showed up on the screen. A sample of the substance from one of the figurines was sent to the field laboratory for analysis. It was heroin!

The Main State Customs Administration of the USSR Council of Ministers quickly made arrangements with Swedish customs for a monitored shipment. This is a common international practice in which officials allow a shipment of illegal drugs to be brought into, taken out of, or transported through the territory of one or more countries with the knowledge and under the surveillance of competent agencies in order to expose the people involved in a contraband operation. In other words, the "movement" of the luggage is monitored en route. To avoid scaring off the actual owners, the hand luggage of the passengers on this flight was not searched, and the bag was sent to the plane with the other luggage.

The Swedish customs officials and police called this "Operation Viking." They put Arlanda Airport in Stockholm under surveillance. Who would take the bag off the conveyor belt in the baggage claim area? This person would be allowed to pass through customs without any trouble because he would probably be turning the "merchandise" over to someone else.

When the plane arrived, a man and woman walked through the transit zone and the passport inspection point, pretending that they did not know each other. The woman took a seat on a bench in the arrivals lounge. The man retrieved the bag and went to the customs inspection area. A short time later, his partner followed him. Both successfully bypassed the "green corridor," and then they were greeted by a third person as they left the terminal. It was here that all three were detained and taken to the airport police station, while their luggage was returned to customs and was x-rayed.

The Soviet side's alarm signal was corroborated. The drugs were confiscated and the two passengers and the person who met them at the airport were arrested....

This was the first monitored shipment in which Soviet customs officials participated on a transit flight, but it was not the only such incident in the fight against the international drug trade. In the last 3 years, with the direct participation of KGB personnel, our customs officials have conducted broad-scale joint operations with their colleagues in Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands, resulting in the confiscation and destruction of more than 11 tons of illegal drugs.

Analysis of Organized Crime in 'Shadow Economy'

90UN1195A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKIY TRUD
in Russian No 2, Feb 90 (signed to press 24 Jan 90)
pp 65-70

[Article by A. Krylov, docent, Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, candidate of economics: "On the Shadow Economy Without Emotions"]

[Text] The shadow economy, or illegal business, is a specially created, relatively independent economic structure, capable of expanded reproduction, which has ramified links both within itself and with the national economic system. It feeds on the latter and in so doing exerts a more or less substantial influence on all the vital functions of society. Parallel, there exists such a negative phenomenon as large-scale petty theft nourishing and securing the stability of the shadow economy. It is also linked with organized crime. As far as the mafia is concerned, it is the kind of organized crime activity which has a strong connection with representatives of political and state power.

In order to conduct a more active and successful fight against the shadow economy, it is important to explain the character and forms of all its links and the reasons for the phenomenon.

To this day one can hear that previously (in the 1930's-1950's and in the later period) in our country there was neither professional nor organized crime, and especially the mafia. This assertion does not correspond to reality. Both in the 1930's and in later years there were shop workers [tsekhoviki], large criminal gangs, organized gambling business, etc. It is another question that the scales of these phenomena were smaller and, given the absence of glasnost, they were not evident. One can speak of a mafia in the conditions of our country as of the beginning of the 1970's, although the seeds were sown already at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's. The distortions and deviations from the Leninist conception of socialism and the formation of the administrative-command system were connected with the wide use of the methods of intimidation, open force, and political arbitrariness.

About the shadow economy as a sufficiently massive phenomenon in our country, one can speak as of the 1960's. As a direct reason one may regard the situation that took shape after the adoption of the New Criminal Code in 1961, which secured a partial humanization of legislation only in the criminal sphere. A real democratization in the economy did not take place. This explains, in our view, the splash of illegal economic activity in the 1960's and 1970's. In the shadow of the great sleeping bear—state production—in the absence of control from below, the representatives of the most diverse "sectors" of the unofficial shadow economy began to feel perfectly free. Today hundreds and thousands of people take part in it. It manifests itself in various shapes and forms. In determining measures of combatting it, it is important to imagine the peculiarities of these shapes.

Professional crime—this is where, for the violator of the law, criminal activity is not only a source of income, but also the goal, the meaning of life. If in the 1920's there were a total of about 90 types of criminal professions in the country, today there are several hundred. According to the estimate of the chief of the administration for the struggle against organized crime of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Doctor juris A.I. Gurov, among the plunderers of state property alone one can single out about 200 illegal professions. We are talking about a million-strong army of professional thieves, i.e., there are as many of them as there physicians, engineers, or pedagogues in our country. The professional criminals, as a rule, work alone or in small groups (gangs). In spite of the great number of participants, this form of criminal activity is still far from the mafia.

Organized local criminal groups, acting within the framework of any region or sector of the national economy. Practically every region has its own criminal structure, which controls all sources of both illegal and very high legal incomes. Thus, there were a number of such groups in Uzbekistan. We know about the formation of the gang of Boloshin, which consisted of 21 persons and existed for 4 years. They carried out 30

large-scale attacks on "businessmen." Two sets of uniforms of militia officials, forged identity papers, weapons, automobiles, video equipment and a rich collection of films about police work in the West were taken from the criminals.

An example of a local criminal group, acting within the framework of one department, is the group of plunderers and bribe-takers from the system of consumer services and individual sewing in Kharkov, which was unmasked not so long ago. Its members had criminal links with enterprises of the Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics, including 23 enterprises processing various fabrics, 5 factories, which turned out "illicit" products, and 20 dress-making and tailoring shops of the Kharkov Rayon Combine for Consumer Services. More than 100 persons were engaged in the sale of unregistered production alone. The criminal group was headed by the former chief artist of the Kharkov Factory for Individual Sewing and Clothing Repair No 3, Davydov. It had a "council", whose members included officials of other factories and dress-making and tailoring shops. The criminals had good "protection"—corrupt relations with officials of the law enforcement organs and economic departments.

Territorial criminal formations, as a rule, keep youth groups under control in which the "pack" psychology is strong, and in a number of cases also the so-called criminal romanticism. Precisely from such youth groups comes the replenishment of the criminal formations.

The mafia is organized crime which has a strong connection with political power. All the signs of the mafia are characteristic, for example, of the events that took place at the end of May and the beginning of June in the Fergana Valley. A clear-cut and strict leadership was observed in the conduct of the youth groups that committed excesses. Here weapons, transmitters, money, and necessary information were distributed in a centralized manner. What is more, the place of the events itself was not chosen accidentally. Shadow economy activity and corruption in all spheres were extremely developed in this region; it can be compared with the beehive stirred up by the "Uzbek Affair" which lasted for many years.

In activating the struggle against crime in the economic sphere, it is important to differentiate massive economic crime (petty theft, miscalculations, misweighing, padding, etc.) and organized economic crime. In the first case, mismanagement and irresponsibility, shortcomings in accounting and management methods serve as the ground. In the second case, a mechanism is specially created which makes it possible to commit, with impunity, criminal actions of one sort or another in a systematic manner and for a long time.

With all the external "harmlessness", massive petty crime is no less dangerous for society than organized crime. It costs society billions of rubles, it leads to the deformation of the consciousness of the majority of the

country's citizens literally from childhood, it nourishes organized economic crime. And in this sense they have common socio-economic roots.

Audits indicate that practically every fourth purchase in trade is accompanied by misweighing or miscalculation. Distortions in reporting in construction account for more than 70 percent of the value of the work actually carried out, in motor transport—100 percent and more. Great are the distortions in reporting the time worked, and consequently also of the volumes of work in the extractive industries (30-40 percent), in the timber industry (up to 50 percent). In agriculture, in the determination of the crop capacity of the fields they overstate the figures by 20-30 percent, the weight gain of cattle by up to 50 percent; the cattle not accounted for in the pasture exceed the cattle accounted for by several times. Every year several hundred thousand so-called "pilferers" [nesuny] are arrested. If one takes into account that by no means every violator is arrested, then even with the stolen goods valued at R3 to 10, the annual loss inflicted on the state by the "pilferers" comes to tens of millions of rubles.

Organized criminal activity in the sphere of the economy (in contrast to petty criminal activity) is connected with large dimensions of illegal, frequently non-labor incomes, dangerous by virtue of its latent (concealed) character, by virtue of the savageness of relations.

According to estimates by experts, there were approximately 20,000 criminal groups in the country at the end of 1988. If we compare these figures with the approximate number of cases of petty massive crime, it will become obvious that the losses inflicted by petty massive economic crime are significantly larger. It should be noted that the mass media, by exaggerating the same cases, voluntarily or not, are creating the idea of the existence of an all-powerful mafia. Without denying its significant dimensions and broad sphere of action, nevertheless one should be aware that still greater losses are inflicted on society by petty economic crime, which is secretly being justified by public opinion and everyday logic.

The shadow economy is based on the numerous shortages of the existing socio-economic system and especially flourishes in conditions of the growing shortages of goods and services. The needs which the official economy cannot satisfy are in the end realized by the shadow economy. This is why the latter does not by any means always and among all people call forth a negative attitude. Indeed, it satisfies, on the one hand, perfectly normal, but for some reason officially "forgotten" needs of people and, on the other, needs resulting from the vices of people. The shadow economy which is feeds on human vices, without any doubt, should be stopped, which, incidentally, is being done in all countries of the world. In that struggle they can and should united (for example, the struggle against the drug business within the framework of Interpol). As far as shadow economic activity is concerned, which is aimed at the realization of

in principle normal needs, here the forms and methods of struggle depend to a greater extent on concrete socio-economic conditions.

The shadow economy in the most diverse countries is engaged in the production of the most profitable goods and services, supplementing the legal economy or competing with it. In so doing, the profitability of the shadow economy depends to a significant extent on the state of the legal economy: The greater the "gaps" in the latter, the more active and profitable the underground business. For example, the middle of this century, the monopoly position of a number of a number of tobacco firms in the world market made the production and resale of cigarettes extremely profitable for the shadow economy. The restriction of the production and sale of weapons also encouraged in many cases the shift of this type of activity into the sphere of shadow business.

According to data of Western economists, a rapid growth of shadow economy activity in the developed capitalist countries was observed in the 1970's, which is related to the reduction in the growth rates of the legal economy. University of Zurich professors B. Frey and Kh. Vek came to the conclusion that in 1975 the greatest role was played by unofficial economic operation in Holland and in Belgium. It was also of great significance in Austria, Italy, and France, and it was significantly less in England, the United States, Finland, Japan, and Switzerland. At the beginning of the 1980's, a significant increase in the scales of this phenomenon was registered in Sweden, Norway, and Holland, a moderate increase—in England, Spain, Switzerland, and the FRG, but there was a reduction in the United States, Canada, and France. However, the share of the illegal economy continues to remain significant: Its share in the gross national product in Norway and Sweden fluctuates in the range of 6-17 percent, in the United States—8-12 percent, in Canada and France—5-8 percent.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, in our view, the appearance of the shadow economy in the final analysis is promoted by the processes of nationalization [ogosudarstvleniye] of all forms of property and the monopolism and predominance of rigid management structures that do not permit any deviations. In the economy, this manifested itself in rigid directive planning, in the social sphere—in a pre-determined perspective of social development, in the propagation of social uniformity, being understood as primitive-levelling distribution and consumption. In lawmaking and law enforcement activity the principle ruled: "One can only do what is allowed by the law."

As a result of such vulgar constructivism, whose goal consisted in overcoming the, in principle, insurmountable social differentiation of society, many perfectly natural needs of people came to be included among the officially condemned. One could aspire to live well, but only as all the others live, one could increase requirements, but only to the extent to which they can be accessible to all. That sort of official conception had

nothing in common with the real, strongly differentiated socio-economic structure of society. For this reason, the diversity of concrete interests which could not be satisfied within the framework of inflexible, inert state production, stimulated the development of a shadow economy. The sharp reduction in the economic growth rates at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's worked in the same direction.

A situation developed where the state produced new technology, but was in no hurry to secure the corresponding infrastructure for its normal utilization. As a result, in the collectivized sector of the economy a trend toward the naturalization of economic operation took shape, which up to now is turning into colossal losses. An essentially private service, not taken into account by the state, developed in personal consumption. According to expert estimates, the sphere of consumer services accounts for a total of about R5-6 billion of illicit incomes, including about R0.5 billion being received in the sphere of automobile service. Great is the volume of services and incomes of the shadow sector in the repair of household equipment and radio equipment.

Today the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are growing an enormous quantity of vegetables and fruit, but only part of it reaches the consumer. It is thought that about 30 percent of the agricultural production, and for some types of vegetables and fruit up to 50 percent, spoil. Only spoil? Perhaps, part is stolen and resold, and written off to spoiling? The technique of thefts during the transport and storage of agricultural produce is well known: Its quality is deliberately lowered, conditions are created for its more intensive spoiling, and then, in writing off thousands of tons of spoiled produce, it is simple to set free "illicitly" hundreds of tons of good produce.

The disproportions that stimulate shadow economy activity take place also in other spheres. Thus, the state propagates tourism and active forms of the conduct of leisure, but this is not being supported in material terms. As a result, the market of recreational services today is estimated at R2.7-3.2 billion. Objectively the population's needs for education and medical services are growing, but the supply of these services on the part of the official state institutions and organizations is strongly lagging behind. For this reason, the volume of shadow services in the sphere of education reaches R1.5 billion and in the sphere of medicine—R2.5-3 billion.

Shadow economy activity is stimulated not only by unsatisfied personal consumption. The rigid administrative system is giving rise to an enormous shortage of resources and services in production itself. Operators and pushers in the sphere of production consumption are as widespread a phenomenon as speculation, false weights, and miscalculations in trade. The difference lies only in the fact that we are talking here already not about thousands and millions, but about billions of rubles.

Still another powerful source nourishing the shadow economy are massive cases of overreporting in production. It is precisely in this manner that for a long time the full utilization of productive capacities and the fulfillment of plans and even obligations were attained in many cases. Overreporting was elevated to the rank of economic policy already in the 1930's. The difference lies only in the fact that during the 1930's to the 1950's they overreported "from above", in order to raise the authority of the leaders and to inspire the broad masses to further labor feats. During the 1970's and the 1980's, they began to overreport with the knowledge of the workers "from below", in order to receive, in essence, the same unearned incomes—increased wages. It is difficult to name a sector and sphere of the national economy where the volumes of work were not distorted. They overreport the quantity of minerals mined and shipped, expenditures for experimental and design work, the weight gains of cattle and the productivity of the fields, the number of lessons and pupils, lectures, and trade union inspections. It should be noted that this is one of the sources of the uncontrollable inflation.

It is asked, how is overreporting connected with the shadow economy? Any overreporting is production which in reality is non-existent, but wages, and bonuses, that are in reality paid, energy and amortization deductions written off to production. Precisely this is what guarantees the regular functioning of the shadow economy.

The investigations of foreign criminologists indicate that, as a rule, operators of the shadow economy in the beginning stages of their activity look at the political processes rather indifferently. But in proportion to the consolidation of their positions, the growth of incomes and ambitions, they react with increasing interest to political changes. At the same time, the official authorities, when they do not have sufficient social support or special police forces, try to involve the influential representatives of the shadow economy on their side, to operate through them. The link and the subordination of the official authorities to the operators of the shadow economy even leads to the fact that the criminal world may cooperate with the law enforcement organs and is used by them for the conduct of certain operations. Thus, there exist documents which corroborate that Italian-American Mafia members were hired by the American special services for the conduct of actions against Fidel Castro in Cuba, that representatives of the Mafia took part in the organization of the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, but in post-war Italy were utilized in the struggle against gangsterism and the general outburst of violence, which destabilized the situation in the country.

We should note still another extremely important quality that is characteristic of representatives of the shadow economy. As a rule, they do not want any changes in society; stagnation is a fertile environment for them.

In all developed countries there exists a so-called economic police, whose function includes the exposure of the conditions that foster illegal profit. In our country, this function is partly fulfilled by one of the services of the internal affairs organs—the service for combatting the embezzlement of socialist property (BKhSS). This service was created at the end of the 1930's after the process of nationalization of all basic economic relations had already been completed. The service for combatting the embezzlement of socialist property, from the very beginning, carried out the social order of the state, and its chief task reduced itself to the protection of state property against encroachments on the part of individual citizens, the suppression of cases of profit, the abuse of official position, mismanagement, squandering, etc.; it happened that it "went out" after party and state executives as organizers or participants of shadow economy activity. But frequently such cases were "dropped" or disappeared in the safes of the corresponding departments, and officials of the service for combatting the embezzlement of socialist property, connected with such cases, either were sent abroad as advisers and then into retirement, or they received a rather important promotion unexpected by all.

Today the problems of overcoming the negative, including the criminal [kriminogennye], socio-economic processes concern all. They are being discussed in the periodical literature, on television, at conferences in academic institutes and educational institutions. The development of glasnost in our society has illuminated, has made many really existing processes, pursuits, and actions, far from the ideals of socialism, the property of the public. What has become obvious is the fact of the existence not simply of economic crime, but of a whole sphere of the shadow economy as a well-organized criminal activity in economic life.

All this has given rise to a splash of public activeness. People are demanding from the appropriate departments and institutions that they take more decisive actions. At the same time, the internal affairs organs for the time being do not have sufficient legal and material-technical possibilities to fight effectively against underground business. The decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Decisive Intensification of the Struggle Against Crime" of 4 August 1989 created only some organizational prerequisites for the solution of the problem at hand. On all levels, from the city to the union government, provisional committees have been created for combatting crime, which consist of representatives of the law enforcement organs and the public. The rights of the militia officials and the internal troops have been expanded and made more concrete with respect to the use of exceptional measures, up to the use of weapons in critical conditions of the struggle against criminals representing particular danger. Envisaged are measures to reinforce criminal responsibility for the attempts on the life and dignity of militia officials and other persons taking part in the struggle against crime. Plans call for

the substantial improvement of the material-technical supply of the employees of the internal affairs organs.

Of course, all of these measures should also have an effect on the struggle against economic crime. However, a substantial reduction of the shadow economy requires the solution of a number of more general socio-economic problems. We are talking about overcoming the contradictions, which have become aggravated to the extreme, between the principles of production, distribution, exchange and consumption that have become established in society, on the one hand, and real production relations, on the other. We must proceed from the presence of strongly differentiated socio-economic interests in society, form new thinking which is adequate to the material-substantive conditions, and then reflect it in the legislation currently in force. This is the task, above all, of the social and economic institutions, the law-making departments, and the public organizations. The internal affairs organs can and must give information support. The point is that possess unique information about the most criminal sectors of the national economy and spheres of the socio-economic life of society. This information, in conditions where sociological research in our society, and all the more so in this sphere, is only developing, can become the only real base for the adoption of principal and urgent economic-legal decisions.

The internal affairs organs, which possess a strongly ramified territorial structure, without special expenditures, could have a great mass of sociological information, on the basis of which criminological prognoses can be developed.

Simultaneously in the struggle against the shadow economy broader use should be made of strictly economic methods. Experience of such work exists in the internal affairs organs. Thus, at the end of the 1930's, an unofficial buro for judicial book-keeping expertise was created in the Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation [OBKhSS] of the militia administration in Moscow. Later, in the 1960's, economic methods in the struggle against the theft of socialist property began to be used more widely, which found reflection in works of a whole series of criminologists: S. P. Fortinskiy, S. P. Golubyatnikov, and N. V. Kudryavtsev. In the 1970's, after the experiment in the Administration of Internal Affairs of the Leningrad Oblispolkom in regard to the use of economic analysis in the activity of the apparatuses for combatting the embezzlement of state property, a decision was taken to organize special groups for efficient economic analysis in the departments for combatting the embezzlement of state property.

The active use of methods of economic and legal analysis in the 1970's in the internal affairs organs was a consequence of the economic reform of 1965. The internal affairs organs reacted to this with the development and introduction of economic analysis in the operational-investigation activity of the apparatuses for combatting the embezzlement of state property, which substantially

expanded the information base. At that time a special scientific subdivision was created—the Central Scientific Research Laboratory for Economic-Legal Problems of the Protection of Socialist Property, headed by Doctor juris G. K. Sinilov. The chief tasks of this unique scientific institutions were: The conduct of comprehensive research on the reasons and conditions that promote thefts and other official and economic crimes; the development of measures of an economic, legal and organizational character for securing the safety of socialist property; finally, participation in the preparation of normative acts regulating the socio-economic processes with respect to the protection of socialist property.

The staff members of this laboratory (among them was the author of these lines) already at the end of the 1970's exposed the regularities which were the basis of large thefts in the sphere of trade, agriculture (cotton and vegetables), light industry (the processing of wool and fur), in transportation and construction. Dozens of informational materials were prepared for the directive organs, with suggestions aimed at the elimination of the reasons and conditions promoting thefts of socialist property. Some proposals were put into effect. However, on the whole, the activity of the laboratory, apparently, irritated the important representatives of the command system who were already sufficiently strongly corrupted with the operators of the shadow economy. For this reason, at the beginning of the 1980's, they disbanded this laboratory, having left only a few dozen people as a department of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

An important condition for the successful struggle against the shadow economy is the securing of the real equality of all subjects of economic operation and an obligatory element of such equality is the protection of the property of all the subjects in society. If society realizes the principle of the state's monopoly over the protection of law and order, then the internal affairs organs must secure an identical level of protection of all forms of property and the forms of legal economic operation based on them. With respect to this, we need a fundamental reorganization of the service for combatting the embezzlement of state property, which to this day basically protects state property. Taking into account the real possibilities, obviously, it is necessary to pursue the path of some decentralization of the protection of property. We have in mind an expansion of the possibilities of the various subjects of economic operation and their rights with respect to the property belonging to them.

Since, in the broad sense of the word, we are talking about the replacement of the administrative command system with a socialist market, the chief task that arises in connection with this before the internal affairs organs is the suppression of non-economic competition. In the immediate future, we should define more precisely what pertains to economic and non-economic competition, propose to the practical organs methods for exposing and

suppressing non-economic relations that violate equivalent exchange between the subjects of economic operation.

The principle put today at the basis of the struggle against non-labor incomes—any legal incomes are labor incomes—cannot be accepted as satisfactory. First of all, it does not reflect the economic content of the problems of labor and non-labor incomes. Secondly, because of the secondary character of law and the extremely unsatisfactory state of the legislation now in effect, the identification of legal incomes with labor incomes simply distorts the real economic content of many types of incomes. For this reason the theoretical study of this question and the precise normative regulation of the possible limits of the redistribution of the incomes of the various participants of the process of economic operation with regard to their labor contribution, shares, public services, etc., are necessary. Without the solution of these general questions it is impossible to put the struggle against the shadow economy on a clear-cut legal basis.

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Comparative Statistics on Republics' Rising Crime 90UNI021A Riga ATMODA in Russian 28 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by I. Upmatsis: "Criminal Statistics or 'Statistical Criminals'?"

[Text] The so-called policy of glasnost, which throughout the entire world is termed simply freedom of information, has finally allowed us to take a look at the records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, records which during the entire 50 years of the Soviet regime comprised one of the most closely guarded state secrets.

For the first 10 months of 1989 (from January through October) 1,988,900 crimes were registered in the USSR; this amounts to 34 percent more than for the corresponding period of 1988. The data for Latvia are 23,800 and 28 percent respectively. The crime structure is as follows: larcenies of personal [i.e., private] property—35.5 percent; larcenies of state and public property—11.3 percent; thefts and robberies—5.8 percent; crimes against the person—3.9 percent; traffic violations—6.1 percent; hooliganism—5.7 percent. Of course, this data, and particularly the absolute figures, make a significant impression. But it is even more depressing to look at the table displayed below, which reflects the number of crimes per 100,000 of population:

	1980	1988	1989 (Estimate)
USSR	578	657	873
RSFSR	743	834	1116
Latvia	823	865	1102
Lithuania	414	581	886
Estonia	755	775	1350

Ukraine	394	474	635
Belorussia	472	482	660
Uzbekistan	246	358	421
Kazakhstan	515	626	836
Georgia	336	315	322
Azerbaijan	250	203	224
Moldavia	390	768	978
Kirghizia	326	453	630
Tajikistan	269	276	329
Armenia	249	183	265
Turkmenia	286	376	500

It might seem to a person who is unfamiliar with "Soviet statistics" that there is no more dangerous place in our "beloved" empire than Latvia or Estonia. But, at the same time, we must be puzzled by the well-known facts about Kazan's juvenile "gangs," the deeds of Azerbaijan's "internationalists," and shoot-outs on Moscow's streets....

And so what should we make of these figures? We need to approach them critically, as we should any statistics, these things, which in Mark Twain's renowned expression, constitute the highest form of lying. It is utterly meaningless to compare these figures with the data of criminal statistics from Western countries. For each country has its own system of criminal legislation and its own system of registering crimes. Therefore, the announcement that things are better in our country inasmuch as in the United States there are 5,664 crimes committed per 100,000 population (1988 figures) is not to be taken seriously. Let's begin with what is designated as a "statistical" crime. It is a crime which has been officially registered by the police. These crimes do not encompass those which the police do not consider as crimes. For example, when a person receives from the police a standard reply to the effect that there are no grounds for instigating a criminal case. Here is a paradox—your purse has been stolen right out of your pocket, but it contained only 49 rubles; therefore, this deed is considered as petty, and so it is as if no crime occurred. That's what the law is in such cases. But even that is not the main thing. The main thing is that nowadays the police prepare reports on their own work, taking into account the "percentage of cases to be opened," i.e., the correlation between the crimes which have been registered and those regarding which cases are to be opened. As a result, in order to ensure a sufficiently high percentage of cases to be opened, it is advantageous not to register crimes. During 1988 the percentage of cases to be opened amounted to 70.6; in Estonia it was 63.2; and in Lithuania—75.7. And now let's compare these figures with data from those parts of the "empire" in which the crime level is relatively low: Armenia—84.0; Georgia—90.5; Azerbaijan—83.9; Belorussia—80.5; Uzbekistan—79.2. Taking into consideration the fact that the level of financial security (read—"total poverty") of the law-enforcement organs through the

"empire" is equal, one could draw the conclusion that in certain places crimes are concealed more basically than in other places. Because the people employed in the Baltic republics' criminal search and investigation organs are hardly stupid or lazy officials. Still, even their percentage of cases to be opened is quite exaggerated, since in the United States it amounts to 20.7, in the FRG—45.8, and in Japan—65.8.

We undoubtedly ought to take into consideration the fact that the police have at their disposal the most obsolescent motor-vehicle transport (if, indeed, they have any at all); that the limits on gasoline are laughable; that the spaces available to the police are worse than they were during tsarist times; that there is actually no system for keeping criminal records; that nobody takes seriously the pursuit of a criminal concerning whom an investigation has been announced because of a lack of information; that experts are operating basically by methods which were introduced at the beginning of this century. This list could be continued indefinitely. I think that, under such conditions, no American policeman could either open or close any criminal case. Furthermore, our staff member of a criminal investigation department or investigative organs receives for his toil not quite 50 dollars a month (at the new rate of currency exchange), whereas an American police patrolmen receives about 2,000 dollars a month. Where are we to find policemen in Latvia?

It does no good to be horrified at the rising crime rate because we do not even know its true dimensions. When we focus our attention on the "empire's" pitiful financial status, we can see no grounds for supposing that anything will change in police work, since the "empire" can find funds for "black berets," for tear gas and other gases, for plastic shields and nightsticks, but cannot find funds for the protection of its own citizens from thieves and killers. Obviously, our republic will have to grapple with this problem on its own because, if we wait for help from the "empire," we will soon not even be able to venture out onto the street.

Journalist Murdered for Exposing Corruption

90UN0964A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Special Correspondents A. Kalinin and V. Kuznetsov: "Legend of a Journalist"]

[Text] The court determined: the killing was the result of a drunken fight. No, it was revenge, the people believes. Revenge was taken against the journalist for his devotion to the truth: in defending the truth, Nikolay Nikiforov himself ended up a victim.

Chuvash ASSR—"Death of a Journalist": an essay under that heading was published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA last 14 June; it told about the death of Nikolay Nikiforov, a department head at the rayon newspaper ZNAMYA OKTYABRYA in Chuvashia. A newspaperman with a trenchant pen, Nikolay bravely

fought the corrupt leaders of Komsomolskiy Rayon without regard to rank and office; when the rayon newspaper lacked the capacity, he appealed for support to the republic press. His sudden, tragic death was regarded by residents as revenge for his criticism and shocked the entire republic, arousing a wave of anger that knocked bureaucrats who had compromised themselves and some militia and trade employees from their long-occupied spots.

And then at the end of December in the House of Culture in the settlement of Komsomolskoye the open court trial of the case of the journalist's killing came to an end. Sh. Faskhutdinov, a 32-year-old driver on the Komsomolskiy Sovkhoz, and I. Afanasyev, a tractor operator on the same sovkhoz, came before the court. The former was sentenced under Article 103 of the RSFSR Criminal Code to 10 years' deprivation of freedom in an intensified-regime colony, and the latter was sentenced under Article 189, Part 1, to three years' deprivation of freedom in a general-regime colony.

The sentence was read, the court withdrew behind the scenes, but people did not disperse. A situation arose in which anything could have happened. It was important to prevent disturbances. That is why the place where the sentence had been read a minute before was taken, in turn, by the mother's lawyer Nikolay A. Bogushevskiy, and L. Chitaney, the secretary of the newly constituted party raykom. They called on the audience to show good sense and warned against possible excesses. "I agree with you in principle, but not in form," said Bogushevskiy. "I give you my word that I will appeal the sentence." Finally everyone went out, gathered at the gate, and in a dense crowd started moving toward the center of town. No, this time there were no rallies and ultimatums. But the community did not agree with the court's decision. And it took this disagreement away with it. Now that disagreement is like yeast that at any minute may brew the intoxicating beer of mass discontent.

What was the community demanding? A spectacle? Blood? Capital punishment?

The community was demanding that the martyr Nikolay Nikiforov, who accepted suffering and death in the name of justice, be publicly canonized, that anathema be pronounced not only on those who had stained their hands in blood, but on those who had sent those people to do the killing.

Yet the court had classified the tragedy as a banal drunken fight.

The community defended its version; it had formed it on the basis of its own age-old notions of good and evil, on the basis of its life experience, on the basis of its own suffering, humiliation, and its own interpretation of justice, which either everyone or no one acknowledges.

Two versions of Nikolay Nikiforov's killing had been developed: the court version, which illuminated only one

insignificant episode in the life of the journalist Nikiforov, and the community version, which is more like a legend but which more fully reflects his human essence and will never agree with the first, because it completely rejects it.

Nikolay was becoming a legend in his own lifetime. After all, it was he, and not someone else, who had been taken off into the forest in order to "come to an agreement," gotten drunk and compromised. It was he who had been threatened with reprisals both over the telephone and in front of other people. It was he who had been practically run over by a vehicle on his way to work. Violence against him seemed like a matter of time, and on the editorial staff he alone did not think that way and would joke: "Yes, but who needs me?"

First of all the question arises: just why he, and not someone else? He was not more talented than others. More ingenuous, yes, and more honest, possibly. He was assigned to write his first critical article about a certain kolkhoz chairman. There were plans to dismiss the chairman, and a pretext was required. This was a routine administrative feint in which the newspaper was the means and the journalist the one who carried it out. The readers did not know this. They saw the journalist only as the messenger who had been sent to execute a judgment. And they started bringing him all their pains and burdens. This community-wide pain is too much for one person to handle. Isn't that why venerable journalists in time acquire a certain callousness, as though their heart is covered with callouses, as a kind of defensive reaction by the normal human psyche to abnormal nervous overloads. Nikiforov did not have time to develop saving callouses. Becoming something like a loud-speaker, he gradually built up within himself the high tension that was developing in society and, together with it, the information that was supposed to reveal the truth to him. For him, the truth was not dangerous. A person of conscience, Nikiforov became the means of communication for people who were unfortunate, insulted, persecuted. Moreover, their sole means of communication. If he had not been alone on the newspaper staff, the editor would have been removed. It is always simpler to remove the editor, which by no means requires committing a crime. But Nikiforov was alone. And he was muddying the water in the quiet swamp of the Chuvash back woods. The opinion developed that if Nikiforov was removed, the newspaper staff would be just fine.

It is known that Nikiforov spent his last evening with the Ilyins, with the family of his colleague from work.

He had left the newspaper office earlier than usual. He bought a television stand and some sort of dish ware in a store. Ilyin helped his colleague load everything in the car and haul it home. Then they bought a bottle of rum, which they took to the rayon center.

That night he did not return home.

Yet the protagonists of his critical articles live right near the Ilyins!

The final episodes in Nikolay Nikiforov's life have been filled out by rumor. There have been stories talk about beatings, terrible tortures, an old bomb shelter in a village school where he was supposedly hidden, stories about how he tried to flee, about how people even saw him in the village and he asked for protection against his persecutors. Witnesses have turned up who saw or heard something; anonymous letters have been written. All this seemed plausible and the only true story, and any other official interpretation was met with mistrust and regarded as an attempt to shield the real killers from responsibility.

Such an attitude was also due to the fact that Nikiforov had become not only a symbol of self-sacrifice and a popular hero who had given his life for restructuring, but a banner with which the rayon center's residents marched to storm their own Bastille.

We wrote that for many years Komsomolskiy Rayon had been governed by P. Muzhikov, first secretary of the party raykom. Establishing himself in the years of stagnation, those golden years for bureaucrats, he surrounded himself with toadies and protected them not only against punishment but even against criticism. Tyranny and lawlessness occurred in the rayon, and theft and drunkenness flourished. People were patient for a long time, the way people know how to be patient in our remote rural areas, which have been inured to believing that it is a long way up to god and a long way away to the tsar, that the bosses are always right and that it's dangerous to complain, lest things get worse. At the same time that people everywhere were talking endlessly about restructuring, here in Komsomolskoye everything remained the same; people were deceived, humiliated and robbed, and the bosses got fat. People endured. They thought that an honest and just Archangel would come along some day and give everyone his just desserts. But no Archangel came. Their patience gave out. And the death of the journalist Nikiforov brought people out onto the square. A revolution in Komsomolskoye was carried out in his name. And for that reason, that name could not be, must not be sullied.

Yet certain people very much wanted to portray the journalist as a wild drunkard. He was not one! In general, he drank little. This is stressed by everyone who knew Nikolay. Practically everyone in the settlement knew him. Quite likely, this popularity irritated some people. It irritates them even now, after Nikolay's death. "Just think of it, they've made him into a Pavlik Morozov"—that sentence, uttered by one of the rayon's party officials, has been heard in one form or another more than once. Efforts to depict the tragedy as a drunken brawl were made even before the trial. And even at the trial something like irony and even mockery kept coming through in some speeches. But in the courtroom every carelessly spoken word about the late journalist aroused a storm of anger. And not just because one should say something good or say nothing at all about the dead.

When the people tossed out the overfed local Brezhnevian rulers, it was believed that restructuring had finally come to Komsomolskoye. All that had to be done was to complete what had been started. To bring the former leaders to trial, expel them from the rayon, and drive from office everyone else who had stolen, deceived and humiliated people. And life would become different.

But it turned out that no one had any intention of bringing the leaders who had compromised themselves to trial. Although they had lost their posts, they all continued to work at the managerial level and lived, if not serenely, at least comfortably. Muzhikov works as deputy general director of an enterprise in Ulyanovsk and sometimes drives to the village in his personal Volga, as though to show that his people still take care of their own. The rest of the executives remained in their former offices. Free-thinking continued to be persecuted, and the bosses continued to live comfortably, though not quite so openly, while life for ordinary people became more difficult, almost unbearable.

All this was interwoven in the most cunning fashion with the investigation of the journalist Nikiforov's killing.

People wanted a speedy trial, but the investigation dragged on. The militia blamed the community, alleging that rumors and conjectures were throwing the investigative group off the track and confusing the various versions of how the murder had occurred. The community blamed the militia: they claimed that they had all been bought off by the killers and were deliberately encumbering the case in red tape and leading it down a dead end. At the same time, a situation conducive to crime continued to mount in the rayon. After Nikiforov's death yet another killing occurred, which rumor immediately linked to Nikiforov's killing. At the official level this link was categorically denied, which aroused even more distrust in people. Attempts were made through anonymous letters and phone calls to intimidate witnesses who had given testimony in the Nikiforov case.

The community knew that these threats were not empty words. Everyone recalled the disappearance of Kamaliyev, the warehouse keeper at the Alga Kolkhoz, who, according to his wife, had factual evidence concerning speculation on the part of the kolkhoz executives (chairman Aprakov), which had been written off as military hardware and gear. The shock was still fresh from the sudden and strange death of three people immediately following the disappearance of Kamaliyev. The public linked these events—people who had known something about the warehouse keeper's disappearance had departed from life. Three times we visited Komsomolskoye, and on each occasion we learned about more people who had perished under mysterious circumstances. One got the impression that the word "death" had firmly established itself in the vocabulary of the rayon's inhabitants. The barometer of societal life was

pointing to "cloudy," and fear prevailed in its atmosphere. This fear grew even stronger following the journalist's death. We ourselves even came under its influence from time to time, when we would suddenly notice a vehicle following us, when we would tremble at a sudden knock on the hotel door at night, or would hear warnings, or receive anonymous letters through third parties. We saw this fear in the eyes of people with whom we spoke. One got the impression that it was 1937. Sometimes people would break through this sticky, foul film of fear, and then spontaneous rallies and demonstrations would break out, but after that they would sink again into its swamp, when punishments would be handed out for participation in rallies, and the testimony of witnesses would result in warnings and threats. Cafeteria workers who had gone to court despite a prohibition by the bosses received penalties and lost their bonuses. Workers at the rayon farm machinery association who invited us to a meeting at their lounge ran into a prohibition and had to cancel the meeting.

Hope arose when the investigative group was taken over by E. Myslovskiy, investigator for especially important cases with the RSFSR Procurator's Office. Especially when it became known that he had worked in Uzbekistan. The community believed that the legend about its martyr-hero would now receive a legal frame. The experienced legal specialist Ye. Myslovskiy probably guessed that he was doomed to be misunderstood. Investigating the Nikiforov case was like trying to sort out the reasons for Prince Igor's captivity. The logic of the investigation would keep coming up against tactical and strategic blunders and the prince's personal grievances, and in the final analysis his actions would be classified as causing damage to the state. And so it was here: in any event the investigation would come into conflict with the community's notions. These notions could be changed only with a persuasive substantiation. And such a substantiation had not been made.

The investigator Ye. Myslovskiy and, after him, IZVESTIYA's staff correspondent Razboynikov essentially accused us of spreading the story that there was a mafia in Komsomolskiy Rayon. Come on! We had merely described the situation that existed in the rayon on the eve of the journalist's killing. The essence of that situation was confirmed by participants in an extraordinary plenum of the rayon party committee at which Muzhikov received a vote of no-confidence. "We in no way want to suspect or, god forbid, accuse anyone," we wrote at the time. "Could the killing have been accidental? In principle, it could have been. But it is even more possible that it was not accidental. Most people today agree on the latter version." At that time Chuvashia's minister of justice, the republic procurator and the first secretary of the party raykom agreed on that version. And today, despite the court's decision, many people refuse to part with it. And as for terms, we do not know what a political mafia is, but we are convinced that organized crime exists in the rayon. However, to name

its organizers and inspirers is not within our competence. But let us return to the court decision.

The court established the following: On 2 March 1989 Nikiforov, who was in a mild state of intoxication, came up alongside a vehicle driven by Fashutdinov, which started skidding at the intersection. Fashutdinov was drunk. He invited Nikiforov into his vehicle, where I. Afanasyev, who was also intoxicated, subsequently took a seat, and the three drove off toward the city of Kanash. For vodka, as the killers said in court. However, before they had reached the city, they turned around and started driving back. 20 kilometers from Komsomolskoye, Fashutdinov stopped the vehicle at Nikiforov's request, and all three climbed out onto the roadside. Then Afanasyev walked around in front of the vehicle, and a quarrel broke out between Fashutdinov and Nikiforov by the rear of the vehicle and turned into a fight. In the course of that quarrel Fashutdinov strangled Nikiforov with his own scarf. Then, in order to conceal the evidence, he and Afanasyev hauled the corpse to the 179th km of the Ibesi-Altyr highway and threw it into a gully.

But there were many serious questions that the trial never did answer. A good many of them are pointed out in an appeal that the victim's lawyer A. Bogushevskiy has sent to the RSFSR Supreme Court.

Let us leave the right to resolve this dispute to the highest judicial office. But the trial in Komsomolskoye did not satisfy the journalists, either, who had awaited it no less than the residents of the Chuvash settlement. It was believed that even if the killing really had been committed in the course of an ordinary quarrel (anything can happen!), the court would at least take into account the personality of the victim, the critical thrust of his articles, and finally, the threats that had been repeatedly directed at him, and would issue a special finding. It did not issue one. As though there had been no threats. As though they have not been made against other journalists who are presently in the forefront of restructuring. There is no longer any need to persuade anyone that any sort of violence against journalists, or against any other fighter for justice, can be attributed to a drunken stupor or personal motives.

In Ye. Myslovskiy's article, says V. Mikhaylov, editor of the rayon Komsomol newspaper, "I read that in previous years the executives of law-enforcement agencies had worked persistently to implant the concept of 'isolated negative phenomena,' and a resolute end was put to any attempts to dig any deeper, explain the overall situation, and point out who and what were concealed behind 'atypical situations,' and the main argument always looked weighty: it was necessary to rapidly punish the guilty party and close the case, and there were no grounds for poking beyond the framework of the specific crime. I have the feeling that this time, too, he was guided by the same desires."

At present, Mikhaylov is temporarily not editing the rayon newspaper. Plenums of the Yalchinskiy and Komsomolskiy Komsomol raykoms, and a meeting of residents of the village of Komsomolskoye have nominated him as a candidate for RSFSR people's deputy. Every day he has meetings with voters. Practically everywhere people tell him to carry the case of Nikiforov's killing through to its conclusion. It is not easy for Mikhaylov; he has many rivals. They include some who have been nominated with the authorities' blessings. And they, naturally, get most-favored status. Mikhaylov, on the other hand, is counting only on the voters' support.

Incidentally, even executives who have compromised themselves are persistently working to break through into the deputies' corps. They include those about whom Nikiforov wrote and those who have come up in the case of his killing. Why? For the sake of immunity? Or maybe for power? It is impossible even to imagine such a thing in democratic countries, where any compromising of oneself becomes an insurmountable barrier on the path to office.

The whole rayon came out for Nikolay Nikiforov's funeral. An orchestra played, and people wept. He was posthumously nominated for the prize of the Chuvashia Journalists' Union. Journalists collected money for a memorial. Young Pioneers named their volunteer militia's aides' group for him. For whom? For a drunken young man who was killed in a drunken fight, or for a principled journalist stricken down by murderers?

"Thus died the journalist Nikolay Nikiforov, a fighter for restructuring." This concluding sentence from the procurator's accusatory speech drew not applause but indignation. Because it was said with irony, was put in quotation marks. We would also like to conclude our notes with that sentence, but without any quotation marks.

MVD Briefing on Juvenile Crime

IZVESTIYA Report

90UN1015A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by V. Zaykin: "Juveniles and Crime"]

[Text] On 20 February we were informed at a briefing given by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs about some extremely disturbing figures regarding the level of juvenile crime. Last year 212,457 youths took part in committing crimes. That is an increase of 14.9 percent....

Particularly alarming situations were noted in Vladimir Oblast (with a 46 percent increase), Yaroslavl Oblast (42 percent), in the Tatar and Buryat ASSR's, as well as in Arkhangelsk, Gorkiy, Kemerovo, Sakhalinsk, Ivanovo oblasts, and in Moscow (with increases ranging from 31 to 36 percent). Crimes against property are the most widespread—constituting two-thirds of the overall total.

Further increases were also noted in thefts of transport means, hooliganism, and crimes against the person.

In 1989 crime increased among virtually all categories of juveniles. "Leading" here are students at PTU's [vocational-technical schools]—accounting for 26 percent of the total number. Lagging slightly behind are students at regular schools—with 24 percent. It may seem strange, but among working youths the crime rate is higher than it is among unemployed youths—22 percent as compared with 15 percent.

Last year one out of every three crimes was committed in a group. Among juveniles, group crime increased particularly on the territories of Vladimir, Yaroslavl, Vologda, Sakhalin, Astrakhan, Arkhangelsk, Ryazan, and Ivanovo oblasts, as well as in Moscow, in the Tatar ASSR, the Belorussian and Azerbaijan SSR's.

Major-General B. Voronov, chief, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Preventive Service Administration, provided an analysis of the situation at the briefing.

He noted that a bad family situation must be regarded as one of the most criminogenic factors impelling youth toward crime. In 1989 alone inspectors dealing with juvenile cases conducted preventive work with 203,000 parents who were exerting negative influences on their children's behavior. The annual number of divorces is approaching a million. Every year 700,000 children remain without one of their parents. The proportion of law-violating youths living in broken families amounts to 36 percent.

More and more frequently children are leaving their families of their own volition. Last year alone 958,000 youths were brought to the internal-affairs organs, 99,000 of whom were so-called "runaways"....

Extreme neglect of the leisure sphere is likewise exacerbating the problem. "There's no place to go and nothing to do...."—this is heard more and more often by staff workers of the law-enforcement organs from youths who have broken the law. Nowadays leisure time for youths consists primarily of going to discotheques and video halls where often the films which are shown are not the type which inculcate the best qualities in young fellows and girls. B. Voronov expressed his opinion that the upsurge in violence which occurred during the year just past, when the number of rapes increased by 12 percent and the number of homicides—by 50 percent, was not at all by chance. Moreover, such an increase was noted for the first time in the last five years.

In recent years a direct interconnection has been observed between the anti-lawful behavior of youths and their psychological imbalance. The health-care organs have registered more than 300,000 young fellows and girls between the ages of 15 and 17 who have psychological anomalies. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that this country has no medical-treatment and educational institutions capable of treating and curing these children.

Emotionally unstable youths have a tendency to use narcotics. At present the internal-affairs organs have on their registers 6,679 juveniles who are drug addicts. Moreover, hidden or covert drug addiction exceeds the official figures approximately five-fold. Toxicomania is also on the increase and is outstripping all other methods of "turning on" by using drugs.

In 1989 the internal-affairs organs arrested 25,000 law-breakers who were members of various formations fighting against each other. More than half of them were juveniles. Last year 432 persons were held criminally liable and 3,500 were administratively punished for illegal behavior connected with the activities of such groups. Especially unfavorable situations evolved in the Tatar, Mordvinion, Udmurt, Chuvash, and Mari ASSR's, along with the Gorkiy and Ulyanovsk oblasts. Warring gangs of juveniles and young adults were likewise registered in the Union republics. In the Ukraine their membership comprised 6,000 persons, in Kazakhstan—about 2,000, and in Belorussia—approximately 1,000. In Semipalatinsk, for example, the number of gang fights last year increased from 6 to 16. Most of them entailed serious consequences....

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Report

90UN1015B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by I. Baranovskiy: "More Crimes at a Younger Age"]

[Text] This matter was discussed at the regular briefing held by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. As the journalists were informed, during 1989 youths committed 223,940 crimes. This is 21.2 percent more than in 1988.

In and by themselves, these statistics are alarming, but of special concern is the fact that youths are more and more frequently committing "major" crimes. Thus, almost one-fifth of all serious crimes were committed by "kids"; they accounted for 26.7 percent of crimes involving larceny of state property, 39 percent of thefts, and more than one-third of cases involving stolen equipment. Group crime is also rising. In 1989 it increased by 17.4 percent. In other words, 144,000 youths, associated in various "gangs," took part in mass fights, thefts, and rapes....

Nor can we fail to be disturbed by some other figures—there was an almost 40-percent increase in the number of juveniles who were heavily drunk at the time when they committed crimes, and there was a 21.3-percent increase while under the influence of narcotics.

No matter how paradoxical it may sound, juvenile crime is "becoming younger" right before our eyes. Last year 60,970 kids under 14-15 years of age were involved in cases where they were held criminally liable. Such kids

will try to "keep up" with the slightly older fellows and girls. Approximately 13,500 of them were involved in various cases.

Figures, figures.... But what actually happened in these cases? Where were the law-enforcement organs, and what about the public? These are rhetorical questions. Of course, measures have been and are being undertaken. Thus, in 1989 some 111,495 youths were involved in criminal liability. This is 22 percent more than last year. But surely punitive measures alone will not untie this knot for us. And this is understood in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But all the most noteworthy plans for curbing juvenile crime and the preventive measures nowadays are either not very well thought out or not backed up by actions.

Journalists Tour Penal Colony Near Kiev

90UN0848A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 6 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by O. Kuts, Kiev Oblast: "Meeting Place—A Colony"]

[Text] The republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] has called meetings with journalists in the most unexpected places lately. A year ago they invited us and our colleagues to the detention facility [slidchyy izolyator] on Lukyanivtsi in Kiev. Last summer I had the opportunity to visit beginning classes and departments [kafedry] of the Kiev Higher School of the MVD. Now comes a new round in the expansion of glasnost: a briefing was arranged for workers of the press, radio, and television, relating to problems of the activities of the corrective-labor institutions. But the biggest surprise was the address indicated on the invitation. "The briefing will be held in a strict-regime colony," we were informed tersely.

On the way there we learned the more exact address of our destination—Installation No 85, in Bucha near Kiev. I don't know how others feel, but it called to my mind rather vivid memories. The fact is, located not far from there, in Bucha Lesovaya, was a Pioneer camp of my childhood. Every year we would take a two- or three-day hike from there and thus satisfy our hearts' romantic yearning by the end of our stay. And each time, one of the bigger boys, just to make us nervous, would spread the latest rumor about the recent escape of dangerous criminals from the colony....

Looking ahead, let me say that the journalists at the briefing were interested in cases of escapes from the colony. Nobody made a secret of it. We were told that in the first 11 months of last year alone there were 16 escapes in our republic: six from under guard, seven from colonies, and in the other cases the prisoners betrayed the trust of the administration.

In accordance with the advance plan of the organizers of the briefing, the mass media workers visited two shops in the production base. The workers there were not much

different from ordinary ones except for uniformly short haircuts and their baleful glances at us. The posters and exhortations on the walls of the shops strove desperately to make up for the prisoners' lack of optimism, with an abundance of perky slogans. All the guests called attention to it, and V.M. Korniychuk, deputy minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, agreed with the criticism that was expressed. Volodymyr Mykhaylovych emphasized, moreover, that Ministry officials intended to listen to journalists' comments in order to make use of them in their further work.

The next stop on our itinerary was a dormitory (read: barracks). We gazed upon a facility consisting of a row of 90 double bunks; evidently all their occupants were engaged at the moment in carrying out their labor duties. From what Supervisor [vykhovatel] O. F. Zenchenko told us we learned that every supervisor is in charge of 50 prisoners [vykhovantsy], but not long ago the norm was twice that number—and, as you can imagine, these guys are not innocent schoolchildren.

An interesting item of information for members of the press: 47 of O. F. Zenchenko's charges subscribed to various periodicals worth a total of 162 rubles. Occasionally, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia, the patriarchal exarch of the Ukraine, who took part in the briefing, inquired by the way whether the convicts had received the holy scriptures their church had sent at their request. (This was Metropolitan Filaret's second visit to Colony No 85.) The supervisor answered that all 14 copies of the Gospels had reached their destination, some going to the library and some to the prisoners.

Truly, in the struggle for a man's soul, everyone is obliged to join forces.

Then V. M. Korniychuk told the journalists, "No, we are not about to exchange our political departments for church parishes, but we are willing to hold detailed discussions about future collaboration—for example, some theological seminary, perhaps the one in Odessa or the newly built one in Kiev, could take the colony under its wing."

It may be that specific things like this are to be seen as reflections of the "revolution" which was explained to us so persuasively by O. P. Severov, a department head in the Kiev Affiliate of the All-Union Institute for Upgrading the Qualifications of Leadership Personnel of the USSR MVD. Its essence is seen in the turn to the human personality, the ability to be compassionate and sympathetic. After all, we are fighting crime, not the criminal. For this reason, the experiment designed to create a new model of the corrective-labor institution must be accompanied, above all, with a restructuring of our mentality and, of course, the mentality of colony personnel themselves.

This restructuring in relations with the press was manifested, for example, in the following episode. Having taken the prepared tour of the shop, the dormitory, the

clinic, and the club, the television people asked permission to film the solitary confinement cell block. The opportunity was immediately given to all the other journalists as well, as the doors were unbolted into one of the units of what is known as ShIZO [Penal Isolation Cell], where two prisoners who had broken the rules were serving time.

In short, enough impressions had been gained before the end of the tour to commence an official meeting. My colleagues endeavored to deepen their knowledge of the various aspects of the life of the denizens of the colony, from the cost of the daily rations of the prisoners to statistics concerning sexual pathology among the convicts. Equally as broad was the array of questions concerning conditions for the workers in the corrective-labor institutions—from the salary of the warden to the comfort and morale of the guys hired to guard the prisoners.

A year ago I had the chance to attend a republic seminar-practicum organized by the Ukrainian SSR MVD concerning problems of the organization of working and living conditions for citizens who have been released from prison, and so, naturally, I was curious to find out whether anything had actually changed since then in the plan of social adaptation of the contingent being discussed here. It is common knowledge, after all, that without a passport, hope for a residence permit, or a job, and having lost his social roots, a person cannot stand the trials of freedom.

"In all the towns where residence was previously restricted, the question is now dealt with in regard to each specific person who has been deprived of family connections there. It has also been possible to overcome difficulties in regard to the issuance of passports. When it comes to job placement, however.... Until the appropriate law is passed, we are hardly likely to see fundamental changes."

The briefing—that is, a brief conference with representatives of the press—eventually turned into a kind of press conference and lasted a long time. To get a fuller picture it would be necessary to have the fuller participation in the meeting of the central figure who was the focus of our fascinating discussion. I am referring to representatives of the hundreds of men who are serving their time in Strict Regime Institution No 85.

Narcotics Use, Trafficking Among Military Personnel Investigated

90WD0114A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 6 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by L. Mazyrin, personal correspondent: "Insidious Drugs"; first paragraph is SOVETSKIY PATRIOT introduction]

[Text] In the past, the discussion of this terrible illness in our country was unacceptable, as if it did not even exist. Meanwhile, it was growing and spreading like the

metastases of a cancerous tumor, claiming more and more victims. Most of the victims are young. The illness has brought people so much grief and has been the cause of so many terrible events and tragedies. The illness is diagnosed as drug addiction.

Different Points of View

I recently saw an officer I know. I asked him what kind of new recruits the army was getting these days.

"What can I say?" the major answered my question with another question. "They come in all kinds. Some do not know much about anything even after basic training. Some already have a craving for liquor or drugs. We can make sure that the ones who do not know enough can catch up with the rest. This is easy. It is much harder to deal with the ones who use dope."

Soon afterward, I had to visit one of the military groups in the district. Once again I asked the same question.

"Every time new recruits arrive in the construction battalion," Maj A. Shikhov said, "there are always some dope addicts among the young men. They inject it, they smoke all kinds of garbage, and they engage in substance abuse. We had a private named N. Kotov, a substance abuser with a spotless record. I do not know how he passed the examination of the medical commission. He was investigated and then discharged. Oleg Spichak from Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and Igor Krupnov from the Moscow suburbs are now being treated in the drug treatment clinic. They became addicted to drugs while they were still in school and could not give up the bad habit in the service. Regrettably, conversations with them and other measures had no effect."

"But where did they get the poison?"

"Through many channels," Aleksandr Sergeyevich said with a worried sigh, "and sadly enough, it is extremely difficult to cut off the flow. The dope is sent to them in packages from friends or is brought by relatives who come to see them. In general, anyone who looks for this filth will always find it."

This made me wonder why people like this get into the army. At the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Army Gen. A. Lizichev, head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, said that a thorough analysis of the demographic situation in the country indicates that we cannot be selective in the choice of recruits today. Once again, we are drafting many young people who already have a criminal record and physical or moral defects and who have already used drugs and alcohol, and especially in construction forces.

I must clarify one point: Drug addicts, those who are genuinely ill, are not called up for military service, but only if they are registered in a drug treatment clinic, if they are on record as users, and if they are receiving treatment. But what if they are not exposed in time? Can they pass the inspection of a draft board successfully?

Unfortunately, our medical "nets" still have large gaps. It has been learned that medical personnel cannot ascertain the habitual use of drugs in those who have the slightest experience in drug use or who use drugs in quantities small enough not to have any perceptible external effect.

In a conversation with Col I. Kunitsyn, military commissar of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, I asked whether the young people who came to the induction center ever included drug users. Igor Nikolayevich did not answer the question directly, but did stress that it would be impossible because there are only three addicts on record in the republic.

"Is that all?"

"The figures are recorded in official documents," he specified.

What kind of inspection do draftees usually undergo? First they are examined by the medical commission of a rayon military commissariat, where there are no narcotics experts at all. Are there narcotics experts on the staff of the commission of the republic induction center?

Maj N. Petrov of the medical service, a specialist in the professional and psychological examination of draftees in the military commissariat, answered this question:

"There should be a narcotics expert on the staff, but there is none."

Even the district hospital does not have a specialist in this field. The staff register does not call for one. It does not have a toxicological laboratory either, although it is also essential today.

"Does this mean that people of draft age who use drugs and toxic substances cannot be kept out of the service?"

"Here is the situation," the psychologist said. "In the last 2 years, no drug addicts who managed to 'pass' the examination of preliminary draft boards have been returned to our republic."

With this final "accord," the physician and the military commissar made me think that drug addiction among youth in the republic might not have reached alarming proportions. In any case, this is what the personnel of the drug treatment clinic in the autonomous republic are inclined to think.

Deputy Chief Physician Leonid Lazarevich Gaft cited these figures: There are 4 teenage patients under the age of 18, and, in all, there are 15 people on record for the non-medical use of drugs and 1 for substance abuse. There are 73 non-medical users of medicine and narcotic substances.

Quite frankly, these figures are reassuring, but is there any real reason for complacency?

The Point of View of Law Enforcement Agencies

It was no coincidence that I visited the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs. I wanted to investigate this matter more thoroughly, and people here were eager to help me. A department to combat drug addiction was recently established here (the first in the country). It was manned by the most experienced personnel, including energetic young men with good professional training, many of whom also received good training in the army. The department is headed by Aladin Musayev, a militia captain regarded by ministry officials as one of their best criminal investigators.

Specialists have estimated that 80 percent of the drug users are young people of draft age—under 25. Drug addiction was described as a fire in our own home by the author of the novel "Plakha" [The Executioner's Block]. The personnel of Musayev's department are expected to localize the sources of the fire in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR before it reaches serious proportions. Unfortunately, this tendency does exist.

In 1988, for example, 144 drug-related crimes were committed in the republic. Now 873 people are on record in the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the non-medical use of drugs, and 306 of them have been diagnosed as drug addicts, including 54 minors. Toxic substances are abused by 120 people, 76 of whom are minors. This year 126 drug-related crimes were committed in the republic in just 9 months. These are depressing statistics. Compare them with the statistics of the drug treatment clinic.

The staff of the counternarcotics department is still perfecting its work methods, but the first results have already been recorded. In 1989 department personnel apprehended eight criminal gangs bringing drugs into the republic. More than 200 kilograms of drugs were confiscated from them. They uncovered 32 cases of the sale of drugs. One large operation probably warrants more detailed discussion.

We saw "Wolf Hole," a documentary film, on republic television. The operation was conducted by a criminal investigative team from the Ministry of Internal Affairs headed by Aladin Musayev. It began in the republic, but it took place mostly in Dzhambul Oblast. The personnel of the criminal investigation department followed the trail of the criminals and apprehended more than 10 dope dealers and found substantial quantities of toxic substances hidden in caches for sale.

"This was a major operation," Musayev recalled. "We confiscated 125 kilograms of marijuana."

He invited me to come along on an operation scheduled for some time in the next few days. Then, as if in apology, he added:

"It is true that it will not be on the same scale at all, but it is useful for a journalist to come face to face, as they

say, with those who sell the poison and those who use it. This time we are going after some teenagers."

Gera and Co.

We rode into a neighborhood. It was a warm sunny day. Ramzes Ganzhuyev from the counternarcotics department had an appointment with 10th-grader Gera. Vyacheslav Avetisyan and Khamid Zaurbekov would be there to back up their comrade.

Ramzes looks just like a boy: He is a cheerful man who has no trouble making contact with boys. They quickly recognize him as a friend and confide in him. He probably has more contacts on the street than any of his colleagues, and this is essential in criminal investigation.

Soon Ramzes returned:

"Gera got lost somewhere. He will be here in half an hour or an hour. Let's go away for a while so we do not attract too much attention."

"What kind of person is this 10th-grader?" I asked the members of the operational team. From their concise replies I learned that Gera is a short, thin, and neatly dressed young man. He is reasonable and resourceful. In general, he is a model Komsomol member. But...this "model member" smokes "grass" and sells dope. They say he has money. Could he be someone's middleman? All of the facts have to be uncovered.

We returned about an hour later. It was dark. Ramzes and his comrades went back to the meeting-place, and militia Captain Sultan Dadiyev and I kept an eye on the five-story building. In the doorway to Gera's home (he is a student at Secondary School No 60), some teenagers were "hanging around," apparently in the hope of "getting high," but Gera had nothing that day.

"There will be some in two days," he promised Ramzes. Ramzes was disappointed, but he was in no hurry to leave.

"Stop your worrying," he was told in an adult tone by Gera's friend, a short student from the vocational and technical institute. "You will 'get high,'" and then he named a meeting place for the next day.

In the morning we were certain that Zhenya, a fair-haired young man with a freckled face, would keep his word. He arrived on time, but he was not alone. He was with his friend Andrey, an upperclassman from Secondary School No 38. He was carrying a big briefcase, and from the side it looked just a little smaller than its owner. Could the promised item be inside?

"The 'shipment' from Tashkent did not arrive," Zhenya anxiously informed the young men from the criminal investigation department. "The militia got it. But there should be some from Astrakhan. Let's go...."

All of the other addresses also led to teenagers from various schools in the city and the vocational and

technical institute. New names of children who regularly used and even sold drugs were gradually revealed. All of this aroused sad thoughts.

The operation gave us much food for thought. The children told their older comrades that many boys smoke "grass" in the schools and the vocational and technical institute. But if you ask the directors or educators, all of them will assert the opposite and will assure you that this could never happen. It turns out, however, that it could and does happen, and on a fairly broad scale.

What are the biggest concerns today in the schools, vocational and technical institutes, and teknikums? They want students to attend classes and do tolerable school-work. They have no time to deal with drug abuse, the first signs of addiction, and the causes of other negative behavior. They are probably waiting for instructions "from above." The parents of teenagers do not take notice of this contagious behavior either. And those who know that their sons are acquiring a drug habit have mixed feelings. They do not want to ask drug treatment experts for help because this might spoil their offspring's record.

"They come to us only when a teenager commits a drug-related crime," my assumption was confirmed in the drug treatment clinic. "But after all, it is easier to prevent disease than to treat it later."

Today's teenagers are tomorrow's soldiers. How will they go into the army, serve their country, and perform their duties if some of them cannot resist "getting high" even at the age of 15 or 16?

And do we want a drug addict to carry a gun? We should remember how the drunken and doped-up thugs terrorized the Mskhet Turks in Fergana and what they did in Stepanakert.... And what about the Yakshiyants gang? These were the inveterate addicts who exchanged a child for a package of drugs without hesitation, trading a life for a few vials.

Password: "Say Andrey Sent You..."

They are right when they say that the army is a scale model of the society. If drug addiction is a social problem, a juvenile problem, in the society, the army cannot be a decontaminated zone. A social defect does not disappear as soon as the recruit puts on a khaki uniform. Strict commands and prohibitions do not work either. This means that the system for the diagnosis and prevention of the dread illness must work flawlessly throughout the country. A strict and precise system is needed. Does it exist in our country, and does it work?

In the office of the military procuracy of the Groznyy garrison, I was shown the file on former Private 1st Class Sayfulo Yadgarov, who was recently convicted of a crime. This raises many questions: When did he acquire his craving for drugs? How was he able to distribute them to his colleagues? Where did he get such expensive dope? The answers are surprising and confusing.

The young man was 20 years old. His term of service was almost over. Friends and relatives were waiting for him in Uzbekistan. But instead of going home, he was sentenced to 2 years in prison. It is an undeniably sad case, and, regrettably, not an isolated one. The personnel of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs told me that a new operation would be conducted to apprehend individuals dealing in drugs. Once again, it appeared that servicemen were involved in the drug traffic along with civilians. At first it even seemed unbelievable that this terrible illness was spreading so quickly among the soldiers.

"There is no reason to be amazed. Anything can happen," Musayev stretched out his hands in a helpless gesture.

We rode for an hour or two. There was not a single populated point nearby. Finally, we reached a firing range. During the week the soldiers use the range for firing practice and learn to drive combat vehicles here, but this was the weekend and no one was around.

We stayed a specified distance behind the KamAZ in front, communicating by wireless. A soldier stood by one of the buildings. He gave the young men from the militia who had changed into military uniforms their specific "points of reference." He gave them the name of a dealer and told them how to get to a shack in the hills. In conclusion, he suggested: "Say Andrey sent you."

We stayed where we were, and the other group drove off to the "contact point." After a short time we heard on the radio that "the operation was a success."

Everything was quite simple. The sergeant greeted the "buyers" cheerfully, walked to the building housing the group of soldiers guarding the installations on the proving ground, took his store of grass out of a cupboard, and calmly climbed into the car of his unknown "guests."

In unit headquarters the sergeant who had been caught in the act turned over his "inventory"—a cellophane package containing enough marijuana to get the whole company high. The commanding officer, deputy political worker, and chief of staff were called together. They were stunned. And this was understandable. This would be a stain on the reputation of the entire group!

I spoke with Nikolay Bezduyny. He was called up for military service by the Konstantinovskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in Donetsk Oblast. He was a Komsomol member. He had served a year and a half and was a squad commander. He was a slender fair-haired young man. His mustache was also fair. His face was pale, but his eyes were glazed. Had he been smoking?

"No," he said. "I never smoke that filth myself."

He said something unconvincing in his own defense. It was obvious that he had invented a story about where and why he had acquired the dope.

Witnesses were called to the scene, the documents needed in such cases were drawn up, and the package of

marijuana was sealed in the presence of the witnesses. It will accompany Bezduddy throughout the investigation as material evidence.

I listened to the excuses of the commanding officer and political officer and thought: Far from all of the existing

opportunities are being used to keep drug addicts and their insidious dope out of the army. After all, it could cause the most unpredictable events. Many people know this. They have already had to learn some sad lessons, but for some reason they did not benefit from this....

Commentator Bovin on Own Career, Journalism Issues

90US0635A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian
No 6, Feb 90 p 10

[Interview with Aleksandr Bovin by Olga Belan: "Without Illusion"]

[Text] [Belan] Several years ago, in one of your speeches you said that international journalism in our nation is undergoing a crisis. Do you feel that the situation has changed now?

[Bovin] It is changing, but more slowly than one would like. An international journalist should have the right to his own viewpoint. This is the heart of the matter and we are working for this.

We are being pulled back by the inertia of the past and all sorts of fears. But there are also objective factors which restrain, if it can be so said, the emancipation of international journalism. For example, I would very much like to write about Kim Il-song and about the situation in North Korea and what might happen there. But for now there is no such opportunity.

[Belan] Are you prevented by the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]?

[Bovin] That's not all. My article, if it were written, would not reach the MID.... At present, in the press a situation has developed where much depends upon personal courage and upon the personal position of the editor. And an editor such as Bubka puts the pole at 6 m and makes a record while another would leave it at the level of 4 m. And everything is peaceful but there is no record. So let us follow the example of Bubka!

[Belan] But the recent situation with the editor of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Starkov and Averin from KNIZHENOE OBOZRENIYE showed that, having aimed high, one can err strongly in landing....

[Bovin] Why? Both editors entered battle and won. In my view, Gorbachev should not have raised the question of Starkov's retirement. That is not a matter of his level. Probably a negative role was played by officials from the CPSU Central Committee who are accustomed to writing out reports on the press and heaping all the blame on it. Starkov sought the advice of comrades. They worked out the position of not giving up, not despairing, but rather fighting; if you want to remove him then do so but it will involve a scandal. The press got involved and the Moscow organization of journalists and the people's deputies got involved. They were not allowed to expel Starkov. And that is how it should be.

[Belan] Nevertheless, in speaking so much about pluralism, we remain intolerant of a foreign opinion. In speaking about consolidation, we do everything to divide ourselves....

[Bovin] A struggle is underway. And in a struggle in order to join together it is essential first of all to separate. That is an old truth....

[Belan] Let us return to the international area which is still closer to you. We all now have lived through a rather stormy emotional outburst in line with the events in Eastern Europe. Certainly this could have been predicted....

[Bovin] ...But it was impossible to write about this. Everything could be seen with the naked eye. Everything, let me repeat. And we kept silent in order not to insult Zhivkov or nor offend Husak.... In Romania there was a revolt and people were killed but we merely muttered through our teeth.

[Belan] But certainly very recently there was a congress of the Romanian Communist Party and we sent a delegation there, we awarded Ceausescu some medal—it is all shameful to recall. But our international specialists were silent.... How can one explain such a low level of our international journalism?

[Bovin] It is not the level of journalism but rather the level of politics. Now politics is changing and journalism is unable to keep up with the changes. It is hard to produce a good international journalist. We do not have any school for this. For many years, we generally grew out of the habit of thinking or analyzing. Journalism was either problemless or the appearance of a problem was created. And a majority went through this schooling precisely and it is very difficult to adapt.

[Belan] Then tell us how you work and what is the secret of your persistent years-long popularity?

[Bovin] Well, I am not a real journalist, and I became it when I was over 40. My schooling was different. And my "back" was more covered. I have strong nerves. So I feel myself freer. For me, journalism is a sort of scientific work. Journalists, as a rule, draw on living impressions. But I from studying newspapers, documents, political speeches, from paper generally. Analysis in my view is what one should focus on.

[Belan] But your impressions after trips don't become a subject of your writing?

[Bovin] They do. But they play a secondary role. For example, recently I was in West Germany and spoke with Genscher. For this reason, in an article I wrote: "In speaking with me, Genscher said...." This was an embellishment. In principle, I could write without leaving Moscow. Impressions give color but the heart of the matter, if you wish, is colorless. As for popularity...I always endeavor to set out the logic in the development of events in a clear and precise manner. I endeavor to do this honestly. Probably the readers like such an approach....

[Belan] Is it pleasant to be a popular man?

[Bovin] Generally, yes. Although we should not overdo it. I am at times confused with Borovik or Zorin.

[Belan] And regardless of your popularity, you still lost in the elections for people's deputy. How can you explain your defeat?

[Bovin] There were many different factors at work. Some did not like it that I worked with Brezhnev. Others did not like my independent position. Still others did not like something else.... I in no way intend to divorce myself from my past. At meetings with voters, I did not adapt to the prevailing attitudes. For me, for example, as a lawyer, I did not like everything in the actions of Gdlyan and Ivanov and they precisely at that time were particularly wreathed in a halo of romantic martyrdom. And I also said that our nation is not ready for a multiparty system. And also I am almost 60....

[Belan] Could you tell us in more detail about your work on the CPSU Central Committee in that very "Brezhnev past"?

[Bovin] Brezhnev and the Central Committee are completely different things. Certainly Brezhnev was very different. Without experience of working on the CPSU Central Committee, I would not have become a journalist. This was an excellent political university and a serious school for analyzing events. I worked initially as a consultant and later as the leader of a group of consultants for the department which was concerned with the socialist countries. I met with many interesting persons and was involved in an interesting matter.

[Belan] Did you have to make compromises?

[Bovin] That certainly was part of it. For example, it was necessary to write all sorts of papers for Brezhnev. I wrote what I thought. But if Brezhnev thought differently, then I would have to rewrite it.

[Belan] Did that happen often?

[Bovin] Sometimes. We argued a great deal and defended a position. You see, during the first half of his "reign," Brezhnev allowed this. Later it was worse.

[Belan] What was your attitude toward the introduction of our troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968?

[Bovin] I was categorically against it. I supplied the "leadership" with the corresponding papers.... And when they introduced troops into Afghanistan, I was somewhat indifferent. Clearly the issue was that I had a good knowledge of Czechoslovakia, I knew many of the leaders and had many friends there. I understood that there was no counterrevolution there. But I had never been involved with the problems of Afghanistan and did not know the political situation there. Spain in 1936-1938 came to mind: we will help them and then leave. Later on, when I began to study the situation, I saw everything in a real light.

[Belan] At that time, at the end of the 1970s, did you already realize that we were mired in the swamp of stagnation?

[Bovin] Of course. Many understood this. Otherwise, there would not have been perestroika. If you read carefully the materials of the congresses and the plenums of those years, you will find a number of clear-sighted and just statements. The problem was that everything stood still and nothing was turned into reality.

[Belan] You left the Central Committee after what specific events?

[Bovin] Formally, even now no one has told me why this happened. I can only guess.... However it was, I am grateful to fate which led me to IZVESTIYA.

[Belan] And the story with Zhores Medvedev? They say that this also played its role in your departure from the Central Committee?

[Bovin] I think that this is already a legend.

[Belan] Nevertheless, what actually happened?

[Bovin] Zhores Medvedev, a prominent biochemist who was actively involved in politics was placed in an insane asylum. That was what they did then with dissidents. A hubbub started up. The scientific community came to his defense. At that time, I was preparing some paper for Brezhnev. And when I reported it, I commented that it was a shame about all of this with Medvedev as we were making things worse for ourselves.... It was Brezhnev's habit that if you tried to push him, he would sit with a placid face and not respond at all to what had been said. He "digested" for a long time. But at that time, I don't why, he immediately summoned Andropov over the intercom when I was in the room. And he asked him: "Was it you who gave the orders about Medvedev?" The answer was approximately thus: "No, the directorate was overdoing it. I have already been phoned from the Academy of Sciences. I will investigate." Brezhnev did not say anything to me, but provided an opportunity to see for myself that he had "gone into things."

[Belan] Was he a good man?

[Bovin] On the human level, in my opinion, he was. On the political level, scarcely.... He did not have enough education, culture and intelligence generally. In Turgenev times, he would have been a good landowner with a large hospitable house.... I gained the impression that at first Brezhnev was depressed by the responsibility which had been heaped on him, by the power, and was confused.... Later, they began to use the analogies available to him. I recall the following instance. There was business in Ulyanovsk. The local leadership was sitting at a covered table. Brezhnev said: "I am now like the Tsar. Only then the Tsar could grant a village. I cannot grant a village but I can give an order."

[Belan] What is your opinion of Article 6 of the Constitution?

[Bovin] It must be repealed. The Constitution will be revised and repealed.

[Belan] Regardless of the fact that you are a professional international journalist, you have always shown an interest in our domestic problems. What particularly concerns you now?

[Bovin] Certainly the same as everyone. The ongoing stagnation in the economy, the outbursts of nationalism and the increased crime. But even more by this. We seem to be painfully rushing back and forth. Not a day passes when over the television someone is ringing the bell or swinging the censor. Someone is trying to make a saint out of Nicholas II; someone is sniffing vast shoes and is exclaiming over the situation in the Russian countryside before the revolution; someone is frightening the Philistines with a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy; someone is touched by the charms of the market.... It is shameful to read and listen to all of this. Certainly now no one is tongue-tied. We must learn to look at things historically and not let rosey shades descend over any question.

[Belan] But, it seems to me that rosey shades are inherent to us in assessing not only historical phenomena but also the present days....

[Bovin] We are very fond of pleasant things. For example, let us take relations with America. It is all well and good that they are assuming the nature of normal collaboration. But then there is the question of Panama. The Americans have behaved, let us put it frankly, boorishly. And we at first were afraid of calling things by their real names. Where is the new political thinking, the concern for common human values? Malta and Panama—these are the ties that link life together. And we must see both sides. And write about everything. Soberly and without any illusions.

[Belan] Do you have any favorite subjects, or, possibly, favorite countries?

[Bovin] No. What is interesting, what is timely, that I write about.

[Belan] At present, this certainly would be the crisis of socialism in Eastern Europe?

[Bovin] Yes, this is extrainteresting. No matter how events turn out in Europe, the movement will be directed at positive changes. It is not important what "isms" will be used as the name. It is important that people live normally, in a human manner. It has long been understood that "we should do unto others as we want done unto us." But nothing is happening.

[Belan] But it seems to me that at present, people have begun to deal more poorly with one another....

[Bovin] A reassessment of values always leads to crisis phenomena in the area of morality and the conduct of people. Moreover, we have begun to speak freely about the problems which we previously were silent about. And as it says, in the beginning there was the word. But deeds have fallen behind and while there is glasnost, there are few things to buy. This is terribly irritating.

[Belan] Tell us, do you have shortcomings?

[Bovin] Of course. It would be better to ask my wife about shortcomings.

[Belan] What do you consider your main merit?

[Bovin] I am an optimist.

[Belan] Do you envy anybody?

[Bovin] Thin people.

[Belan] Are you a rich man?

[Bovin] Everything is relative. My family does not live from payday to payday. We have no car. But I have joined a dacha building cooperative. It has been in the works for 10 years now.... But I do not refuse myself the pleasure of sitting with friends.

[Belan] Do you like comfort?

[Bovin] Generally, yes. For this reason I like to stay in good hotels. But comfort, as they say, should be "working" and that means a comfortable desk, a large bright room and books at hand.

[Belan] Are you satisfied with your lot?

[Bovin] As a man, yes; as a citizen, both yes and no, as a communist, no.

Kaganovich 'Invited' to Bykovnya

90UN1076A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in
Russian 14 Feb 90 p 2

[Open letter to L.M. Kaganovich: "Waiting for You in Bykovnya"]

[Text] The people of Kiev have no doubts that you know quite well the village of Bykovnya situated at the outskirts of the Ukrainian capital. It was here that your henchmen spent nights covering up the traces of their crimes committed by your orders. It is here that many a thousand victims of your terror are buried. They were Ukrainian and Russian, Jewish and Polish, party and non-party, military and civilian; there were workers and peasants, priests, women and children—all victims of the criminal system created in our republic just as in the entire of the USSR by hangmen. And you were one of the most resourceful of them. The people are also sure that your memory has preserved, in spite of your advanced age, many other of your crimes, that you remember a lot of other geographical locations marked with your bloody seal—the seal of the First Secretary of the Ukrainian communist (Bolshevik) party Central Committee and the accomplice of the arch-executioner of the people Iosif Dzhugashvili (Stalin).

It was comparatively recently, they say, that you enjoyed meeting with the young pioneers as you told them about your true Bolshevik-Leninist contribution into building of socialism. If only these children knew how well you can illustrate your stories with the women's and children's skulls found in the Bykovnya graves which had been shot through from behind with NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] bullets.

Stalin considered you the main expert on the "Ukrainian affairs". You even learned the Ukrainian language and loved to show it off occasionally as you quoted a folk saying or some lines from Shevchenko. And, being a master of your trade, you were the first to start to persecute narkom [People's Commissar] A. Shumskiy who demanded your resignation. In addition to Ukrainian dictators P. Postyshev, S. Kosior, and V. Chubar you have on your conscience the suicides of M. Khvillevoy and M. Skripnik, and the martyrs' deaths in Solovki of Les Kurbas and Mikola Kulish. Your hands are covered with the blood of the assassinated Ukrainian Renaissance, of an entire era that destroyed the best of the scientific, artistic and technological elite of the Ukraine. Together with V. Molotov you were one of the organizers of a genocide unprecedented in its numbers: the thoroughly planned slaughter of 7 to 9 million Ukrainian peasants in 1932-1933. During that time Stalin and his clique artificially caused starvation and brought about the total destruction of the agricultural potential of the Ukraine. And the Ukraine found itself cast back into some medieval horror.

But you remained true to yourself and, even after your return to Moscow, made a spectacle of censuring the

"Sonata 'Patetique'" in the A. Tairov's Kamerny Theater. You demanded "strengthening society" by punishing severely everything that, in your opinion, seemed nationalistic.

By the way, you—the organizer of "Stalin's Artek" and a proponent of strict measures—acquired now unexpected supporters. They came from a direction which you could have not foreseen. The ideologists of the infamous Pamyat are trying very hard to ascribe your crimes to the so called "conspiracy of the kikes and masons against the Russian people". But they are intentionally deceptive repeating the same pro-fascist efforts to set people against each other through their ethnic origins and to push the society to ruin, devastation, and pogroms. According to their plans, after all that the scared Philistines will beg for the "new order" and the iron fist making it possible to revert the country again back to the times of Stalin and Kaganovich, Beriya and Brezhnev.

That will not happen! The people have a different kind of memory: their memory does not have quotation marks. They will not allow the rivers of blood to flow again, they will not allow the reappearance of the GULAG, of the shots through the backs of people's heads, or the massacre provoked through the ethnic reasons.

All this was what people spoke about at the meeting dedicated to the memory of Stalinist victims. The meeting took place in the tragic forest near Bykovnya on 7 May, 1989. It was the very place where your Kiev followers managed to unveil a memorial to the "victims of the German fascist occupants" as they were covering up their tracks in the fourth year of the perestroika. The Minister of the Ukrainian MVD [Ministry for Internal Affairs] who was responsible for this sacrilege has not resigned yet as 12,000 of the participants of the meeting demanded.

After the public funeral service the members of the Memorial passed round the hat. People started throwing small change into it—for the railroad round trip ticket to Kiev for you. There were one- and two-kopeck coins, altogether to the sum of thirty something rubles.

The Memorial offers you the money and suggests that you arrive on 6 May, 1990, to Bykovnya to provide a witness's testimony on the mass murders of Soviet citizens. We notify you about the offer through the VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA and the VECHERNIY KIEV newspapers.

It is not for us to pronounce judgment on you—a 97-old man—who, only through the grace of Destiny, lived to the days of the dictators' and hangmen's atonement for their crimes before their people. It is not for us to pronounce judgment on you who will be facing God at any moment. But maybe something human is left in you and maybe you, one of the last witnesses of those terrible mass murders, would want to relieve your soul by repenting and telling the people the truth about the secrets of the Bykovnya forest.

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

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But if those memories do not overburden your conscience, if you do not feel a desire to make your confession to the people, let God and the people's memory be your judge. Then you do not have to come. And you can use the money collected at the meeting any way you want.

[Signed] Anatoliy Zubkov, journalist,

Vitaliy Karpenko, editor of the VECHERNIY KIEV newspaper,

Les Tanyuk, a director, co-chairman of the Ukrainian "Memorial",

Aleksandr Shlaen, chairman of the Soviet "Baby Yar" center,

Ivan Shpak, retired officer, 2nd category disabled,

Vladimir Yavorivskiy, writer, a USSR People's Deputy.

Ukrainian Communist Party Ideology Chief on Establishing Glasnost in History

90UN0956A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 19 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary L. M. Kravchuk by Ukrainian SSR State Television and Radio Committee Special Correspondent Yu. G. Shkarlat: "To Know One's Past"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Leonid Makarovych, as the political involvement of the masses rises there is a corresponding rise in people's interest in historical knowledge in general and in the past of our republic. Today the public's attention is focused on the events of the winter of 1918-1919, and, in particular, 22 January 1919.

[Kravchuk] It should be emphasized first of all that people's interest covers more than that date alone. People are now truly very much interested in our history, our past. It is only natural that people should want to know their own history and finally cease being dumb clucks [Ivany] who do not remember their own heritage.

As far as January 1919 is concerned, that was a very difficult period in our life. Not just January, either. The revolutionary events in the Ukraine, the creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Civil War, and the Intervention—all of these were events which were evoked by the will of the people to creative revolutionary action. The people want to know the truth about that period.

[Correspondent] In preparing for this interview I glanced through several encyclopedias and the Ukrainian Encyclopedic Dictionary. The events there are treated rather narrowly, and their importance and significance are not indicated.

[Kravchuk] That's because such events used to be interpreted in a one-sided manner—in fact, they were deliberately distorted, and the only facts that were presented were those which were "correct" from the standpoint of certain historians of those times, as well as the standpoint of people who were in positions of leadership then. Naturally, that led to one-sidedness, to a narrow interpretation of events.

In history and in life, however, such things cannot be. What is happening now? Some historians do not want to give up their old positions and concepts; they stick with them and do not want to analyze the events of our life or study the archives. Everything is open now—documents, archives. All you have to do is go and analyze them, observe which forces were active, what they were trying to do and what they achieved, how people acted, certain historical personages, what contributions they made in that period to the history of the Ukraine, of our people.

But there are other forces now who wish to smash and destroy everything, who knowingly or unknowingly wish to return to the old times, to entrench authoritarian thinking and authoritarian actions, on the one hand, and to interpret facts any way it suits them, on the other.

[Correspondent] What is the position now in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee with regard to elucidating those difficult aspects in the history of our republic?

[Kravchuk] The Central Committee poses the question this way: to elucidate the essence of that period on the basis of documents, on the basis of historical truth. Let me emphasize once more that there is just one principle in science, if it is truly science. It is the principle of truth, of truthfulness. We must not forget anything or reject a single page of our history. Everything must be done to ensure that the people are aware of the events and know the truth about that period.

Naturally, it is very important to do this. I have already mentioned certain aspects, but in addition it is essential to keep in mind that not everyone is able to overcome his own inertia of the old thinking, old approaches, in order to examine any page of our history in an objective and truthful manner. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee believes that it is essential to decisively dissociate ourselves from those pages of our history which were besmirched by the Stalin regime, which the present generation of Ukrainian communists cannot and need not be answerable for.

That's what we will do, and if you recall, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Volodymyr Antonovych Ivashko raised that issue at a meeting with the Kiev party aktiv. He said that the Central Committee wants to make a political assessment of the events that took place in our life, especially as regards the 1930s and 1940s, the famine of 1932-1933, the big stratum of events in the western Ukraine in 1939-1941. And that important effort is already underway.

At a recent meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat, participants made a thorough examination of questions relating to a political assessment of certain pages in the history of the Ukrainian Communist Party in the 1930s-1940s and the early 1950s, the famine of 1932-1933 and its consequences for the Ukrainian people. Presently in preparation are a number of important documents reassessing certain decrees of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo during the 1940s and 1950s having to do with the development of literature and the arts.

I want to say once more that this process must have a precise and scientific basis; we need to approach everything calmly, deliberately, very analytically, taking a serious attitude toward the events of the past and the present, so that we may not be accused of establishing subjectivism again in the evaluation of historical events. Let me emphasize once more that the people need to know the truth, because if they do not they will be subject to all kinds of notions.

Consider, for example, why our ancestors worshiped idols. Because they were unable to explain natural and social phenomena. Why do people now go to rallies, yell a lot, sometimes without knowing the essence of the problem that is being discussed? Why does the mere recollection of the Cossack riflemen evoke horror in some people? Why? Because people do not know history, they do not know the truth, the documents.

Any phenomenon has its pluses and minuses, and this is something that needs to be kept in mind. We are very ill-prepared when it comes to history. We have only recently perceived that we lack historical culture, as, indeed, we lack political culture. We've only just begun to shape a genuine historical consciousness. We have clarified this under perestroika, and, of course, if you give the people a genuine historical science—and that's what we're striving for—it will enable them to go to rallies and conferences and judge everything knowledgeably. And then it will be very difficult if not impossible to manipulate people. At present, however, there are those who exploit their ignorance and interpret facts as they please.

[Correspondent] If I understand you correctly, our historical science is now working along those lines and is studying the documents that have lately become available. Nevertheless, for example, not long ago a scientific session was held under the aegis of the Grand Council of the People's Movement [Narodnyy Rukh]. It also attempted to interpret those events. In this connection, how do you assess the position of the public and the informal organizations in regard to these matters?

[Kravchuk] You know, I think that this first attempt on the part of the Grand Council of the People's Movement to get together with scientists and historians and interpret that very difficult page in our history must be viewed as a positive event. Unfortunately, however, not everything was placed on a scientific basis. What I would

call the rally approach was also maintained at that meeting. Rather than a well-considered, objective examination of events there were attempts to conduct it in a manner which, I repeat, is more characteristic of a rally. But it was a first attempt, after all. It failed to yield realistic results, and could not have done so, but the point is that we have come to an agreement that we need to work together on such matters with scientists and the informal organizations. There will be differing points of view, differing positions, differing opinions—that's what pluralism is all about. I only wish there were more evidence of cultivated debate of the kind we sorely lack, just as we lack the ability to listen to and understand one another.

Strictly speaking I do not wish to cast a shadow on anyone, but if that meeting had been attended only by scientists and historians there might not have been so much yelling. But because it was also participated in by people who, frankly, had only a very superficial knowledge of the essence of the historical period of those times, everything which did not coincide with their point of view was rejected out of hand. That's not science. I wish the organizers would act on the basis of that responsible position. Even if this meeting was not all that successful, it doesn't mean that we should condemn it and not hold any more. That would be wrong.

[Correspondent] Leonid Makarovych, with regard to the essence of those events all recent publications have uniformly characterized the Ukrainian People's Republic as a bourgeois-nationalist entity, and I believe that it is this assessment which is now being criticized by the "informals." In your opinion, is that a correct assessment of that formation?

[Kravchuk] Well, you know, any event, fact, or phenomenon needs to be subjected to thorough analysis. Only then is it possible to speak of the essence, character, and category of the phenomenon. Vladimir Ilich Lenin said that categories in science are like steps from ignorance to knowledge, from less knowledge to more knowledge. And the more knowledge contained in a category, the more accurate the category will be.

I do not wish to insist that science make use of labels or accusations. Science is a serious view of life. If a person or a government is fighting for sovereignty, for the people's right to be free, for its own culture, its own revival, its language, its land, its ecology, its spiritual life—is that nationalism?

[Correspondent] It is a striving for genuine national consciousness....

[Kravchuk] Do you know where nationalism begins? At the point where you hear that the Ukraine is just for the Ukrainians. That's nationalism. When non-Ukrainians are told to get out of the Ukraine, that's nationalism. Where superficiality and arrogance replace the view of reason. In connection with this I want to deliberately compare two periods in the life of the Ukrainian people: 1919 and 1939. The Ukrainian people have always

striven for unity and always will. It must not be forgotten that the idea of their unification was advocated by the bolsheviks, in particular V. I. Lenin, and that the Great October Socialist Revolution provided a powerful impulse to the national-liberation struggle in the lands of the western Ukraine.

It is also a fact, however, that that struggle on the lands of the western Ukraine was spearheaded by the government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Just what that government was, its social and political structure, and whether it accomplished its goal, are another matter, but the fact remains. And to this day it has been passed over in silence in our historical literature, but the truth must be told.

It must also be pointed out that the fact the attempt to unite the people was led by a bourgeois government—the Directory—does not make that attempt darker but rather brighter. It was still the Ukrainian people's striving for unity. The fact that Stalin and the Stalin era did frightful things to the western Ukraine made the people's striving darker rather than brighter.

In nature, there is a striving by the people, the masses. And there are governments which emerge onto the historical arena and, consciously or unconsciously, follow the channels of the people's strivings, or the opposite. And how they do this determines their place in history. They are either accepted by history and the people or disappear from the stage. In his "The Childhood Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism," Lenin wrote that leaders remain leaders only if they reflect the strivings of the people.

A government is the leaves, while the people's strivings are the roots. Leaves are not eternal. But the people will always remain. And if, for example, we interpret 22 January 1919 as the people's striving toward unity, if we neither minimize nor exaggerate it in the context that it was, so to speak, carried out by a particular government, we will be acting like civilized people, reasonable people who wish to know the truth of their history.

Incidentally, I recently saw a reference to that date by the Secretariat of the People's Movement, and read it. I have no particular criticism of it. But if it had only contained the theme of just what the years 1919 and 1939 were, that they had something in common, that the people's strivings were reflected both times, and they persist still, so that this link might be extrapolated to our own days, our own time, our own era, we would be demonstrating our civility, so to speak, our reasonableness and our desire to look at life and interpret it as it is. Incidentally, I caught Dmytro Pavlychko's unannounced speech at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Do you know—that approach, linking the years 1919 and 1939, was the dominant theme in his speech. Let me quote from it: "Therefore, recognition of the juridical invalidity of the secret Soviet-German treaties of 1939-1941 that have been revealed does not cast any doubt on the rightness of the reunification of the people of the western

Ukraine with their brothers in the East and the reasonableness of a new state order between the Ukraine and Poland after the Second World War. What was done is, after all, consistent with the historically legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainian people and the principle of self-determination of nations."

If only the Movement would make use of and support this approach that we have been discussing, the position taken by one of the most active public figures in our republic, Dmytro Pavlychko, I think it would be a good thing.

We must keep in mind that there are facts, events, and evidence in history that cannot be ignored. Consider, for example, the fact that some historians are of the opinion that the Ukrainian People's Republic would have lasted longer if outside Russian Soviet troops had not crushed it. However, here is what Vinnichenko had to say about that: "It must be stated once again, sincerely and frankly, that if our own peasantry and workers had not revolted against us, the Russian Soviet government could not have done anything against us. It was not the Russian Soviet government that drove us out of the Ukraine—it was our own people, without whom and against whom, I have said many times, Russian Soviet troops could not have occupied a single district in our territory."

[Correspondent] When was that statement made?

[Kravchuk] That was in 1920, on page 204 of his work "Rebirth of a Nation." It probably makes no sense to charge the head of a government with bias in the analysis of those events.

[Correspondent] What steps are being taken to expand glasnost concerning the events of 1917-19 in the Ukraine?

[Kravchuk] We will do everything necessary to inform people about those pages in the history of the Ukraine, so that they may know about them and judge them knowledgeably. With that aim in mind, for starters, RADYANSKA UKRAYINA is printing special pages today and tomorrow recounting the essence of the events of those times. They will present official documents, factological material, and historical testimony. All of this is in order to enable the people themselves to analyze objectively what took place then and to draw their own conclusions. But it marks just the beginning of an ambitious and important undertaking. It will go on a long time.

[Correspondent] What do you think about the fact that leaflets are being distributed in Kiev and Lvov calling on people to take part in a living chain which is being organized by the People's Movement on 21 January, to extend from Lvov to the republic's capital?

[Kravchuk] I think attitudes here should be rather simple. In any democratic state people can express their position in some form regarding particular events. So this need has arisen among a certain segment of our people, and we cannot and will not do anything to thwart

it. Let people express their attitudes about things. That's the democratic approach, the kind of approach taken by a state which we call law-governed and which we are building now. It is true that only the first steps have been taken, because it is not a simple matter. That is the first position. No prohibition, no pressure. I only hope that it all takes place within the bounds of law and order, so that organization is maintained, so that those who are to be responsible for it really will be. I hope it will not turn into undesirable situations of the kind that would later require explanations as to causes that are incomprehensible to the broad masses. Why should every initiative have to turn into something which later makes the people ask questions? Why? And where is the responsibility of those who have decided to organize this undertaking?

This is not my position alone, it is the position of the Central Committee. As far as elucidating and analyzing those events is concerned, efforts will also be made to inform the people of what really happened.

There's something else I want to say: problems of history are not resolved at rallies or in "living chains." I am convinced that if you were to ask every second or third person in that chain whether he knows everything he ought to know, he would say he doesn't. It's not his fault, it's his misfortune that he does not know history and has not read the documents and the relevant literature. In order to join a chain and attend a rally it is necessary to know the course of events, to know the whole situation. Then the rally and speeches at it will be constructive—the kind designed to clarify the situation rather than complicate it. This is what I would like to ask of those who are to take part in the "living chain" and those who are organizing it, and responsible party and soviet organs in the various districts, so that everyone can approach the matter as befits a democratic, law-governed state.

Ukrainian Communist Party Rehabilitates Former Members

90UN0771A Kiev PRAVDA in Russian 10 December 89
p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Ukrainian CP Politburo Commission: On the Additional Study of the Materials Linked to the Repression in the Republic in the 30's, 40's, and early 50's"]

[Text] Matters concerning the rehabilitation of persons repressed without grounds in the 30's, 40's, and early 50's were examined, and archival documents of the so-called counterrevolutionary "centers" and "blocks," anti-party groups and opposition groups, which supposedly functioned in the Ukrainian SSR in the repression years, were reviewed in the Commission's regular session conducted by its chairman, Ukrainian CP Central Committee Second Secretary S.I. Gurenko.

Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Committee for State Security, Comrade N.M. Golushko; deputy republic prosecutor, Comrade V.N. Prik; chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court, Comrade A.N. Yakimenko;

chairman of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Party Control Commission, Comrade V.M. Gayevoi; deputy director of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History [a branch of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism], Comrade I.F. Kuras presented their information.

The Commission noted that the republic law enforcement organs undertook the work to fulfill the CPSU Central Committee and the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Resolution, the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of January 16, 1989, on the rehabilitation of the aforementioned categories of people. The working groups of the law enforcement organs, occupied with the preparation of materials for the examination, were reinforced by the cadres. Methodological and practical assistance was provided for those in the provinces. This was positively stated in the results of the review of criminal activities. More than 108,000 persons have been rehabilitated between the time the CPSU Central Committee resolution went into effect on July 11, 1988, and the founding of the Decree of the CPSU Supreme Soviet Presidium on January 16, 1989. Decisions with respect to 15,404 persons were upheld, since the accusations brought against the guilty parties were corroborated in the records of criminal activities.

The work on the examination of matters of party discipline of former party members who were rehabilitated in criminal form began to be carried on more actively. Nearly 2,000 former CPSU members were restored to the Party and rehabilitated posthumously on party terms, 961 of whom were restored in the third quarter of this year. In 115 cases, party rehabilitation was rejected, inasmuch as the exclusion from the party of the aforementioned persons was not connected with their rehabilitation.

More than 150 former party members were rehabilitated by the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. The Party Control Commission removed the false accusations before them through the decision of the Central Committee Secretariat. Fully cleared of any wrongdoing is former Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Peoples' Commissars N.M. Marchak, Second Secretary of the Kiev Party Obkom I.E. Miroshnichenko, Director of the Ukrainian Communist Party (b) Central Committee V.L. Shevchenko; First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Lenin Communist Union of Youth S.I. Usenko and G.G. Sukhoi, Deputy of the Ukrainian SSR Peoples' Commission on Education E.F. Girchak, and many other communists who innocently suffered in the years of Stalinist repression.

The Commission took into consideration the information they had heard. Comrade N.M. Golushko, KGB chairman; Comrade P.G. Osipenko, Ukrainian SSR procurator; Comrade V.I. Zaichuk, Ukrainian minister of justice; and Comrade A.N. Yakimenko, chairman of the Supreme Court, are charged with the adoption of measures to conclude examinations of criminal activities in the next

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few months, decisions on which were adopted by extrajudicial organs in order to then concentrate all efforts on the examination of activities, sentences on which to be determined by the courts.

It was suggested that a timely examination of matters concerning party rehabilitation of former party members who suffered under repression be provided to the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Party Control Commission, the party obkoms, the Kiev Oblast Control-Revision Commission, and the city party organizations.

It was recommended to the republic law enforcement organs and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Party History to accelerate the examination of

archive documents on the so-called revolutionary "centers," "blocks," the anti-party groups and opposition groups to a point where their conclusions are ready to be submitted into an examination for the Ukrainian Communist Party Politburo Commission.

Taking part in the discussion of issues were Commission members Comrade A.S. Chumak, director of the State-Law Department of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee; Comrade P.K. Musienko, director of the Central Committee Public Department, and Comrade V.A. Dashchenko, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Party Control Commission.

Table Ties Morbidity Rates to Air Pollution for 1987-88 Period

90US0562D Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA in Russian No 2, 1-15 Feb 90 Special Edition p 8

[Unattributed report: "What We Breathe"]

[Text] Harmful substances discharged into the air basin of the Russian Federation in 9 months of 1989 decreased by 2 million tons (by 7 percent) as compared with the corresponding period of last year. Discharges of solid substances declined by 10 percent and of gaseous and liquid substances, by 5.5 percent.

At the same time, more than 5,000 enterprises (27 percent), which pollute the atmospheric air of RSFSR cities, increased discharges by more than 1 million tons.

There was a particular increase in discharges into the atmosphere of the following: Smolenskaya GRES [State

Regional Electric Power Station], by 11,100 tons (27 percent); Nazarovskaya GRES (Krasnoyarsk Kray), by 7,100 tons (13 percent); Ryazanskaya GRES, by 6,500 tons (5 percent); Dorogobuzhskaya TETs [Heat and Electric Power Station], by 4,600 tons (8 percent); the entire USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification and the Kirovograd Copper Smelting Combine imeni Kirov (Sverdlovsk Oblast), by 13,999 tons (21 percent) and the Krasnouralsk Copper Smelting Combine, by 15,900 tons (26 percent)—both of the former USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy; the Slantsy Cement Plant of the former USSR Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry, by 9,500 tons (40 percent); the Sterlitamak Soda Production Association of the former USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry, by 27,000 tons (1.5-fold); the Kholm Pulp and Paper Plant of the USSR Ministry of the Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry (Sakhalin Oblast), by 1,400 tons (1.9-fold).

An increase in discharges into the atmosphere occurred on eight RSFSR territories, including the most significant in Arkhangelsk, Smolensk, and Kalinin oblasts.

The Population's Morbidity in Some Cities With Increased Environmental Pollution ratio to the average level accepted as unit in 122 studied cities)

Cities	Children's Diseases				Adults' Diseases			
	blood	eyes	upper respiratory tracts	other diseases of respiratory organs	malignant tumors	blood	hypertension	upper respiratory tracts
Arkhangelsk								
1987	6.88	1.64	1.44	2.95	0.98	6.59	0.81	1.51
1988	6.41	1.00	1.40	2.06	1.13	5.87	0.64	1.49
Novokuybyshevsk (Kuybyshev Oblast)								
1987	1.32	2.06	1.87	1.03	2.97	1.81	1.66	1.67
1988	2.27	1.05	0.95	1.18	3.12	6.37	2.08	1.98
Berezniki								
1987	8.52	3.02	1.53	2.15	1.26	5.41	4.64	1.67
1988	8.35	2.75	1.54	2.00	1.73	6.13	4.44	1.74
Perm								
1987	0.63	1.23	1.04	0.42	0.84	5.62	0.75	1.02
1988	3.42	0.87	0.89	1.03	0.96	4.33	0.75	0.87
Sterlitamak (Bashkir ASSR)								
1987	3.87	1.96	0.94	0.80	0.39	5.44	1.92	0.57
1988	1.91	1.76	0.83	0.85	0.44	3.76	2.63	0.77
Kremenchug (Poltava Oblast)								
1987	8.53	1.62	1.61	1.06	0.83	0.73	1.79	1.86
1988	7.42	2.00	1.42	0.78	0.97	0.77	2.02	1.82
Cherkassy								
1987	1.69	1.63	1.26	0.95	0.97	0.00	1.97	2.28
1988	5.31	1.55	1.50	2.14	0.90	1.00	1.44	2.54

**The Population's Morbidity in Some Cities With Increased Environmental Pollution
ratio to the average level accepted as unit in 122 studied cities)**
(Continued)

Cities	Children's Diseases				Adults' Diseases			
	blood	eyes	upper respiratory tracts	other diseases of respiratory organs	malignant tumors	blood	hypertension	upper respiratory tracts
Chirchik (Uzbek SSR)								
1987	2.03	0.82	1.42	1.49	0.97	7.85	5.15	1.48
1988	2.52	0.77	1.44	0.59	1.22	12.95	4.30	1.29
Chardzhou (Turkmen SSR)								
1987	3.28	3.53	0.58	0.10	1.27	0.86	0.30	0.42
1988	5.92	2.89	0.64	0.06	1.49	0.83	0.21	0.53

The level of pollution of the atmospheric air in the indicated cities continues to remain high. In Arkhangelsk average annual concentrations of methyl mercaptan (highly toxic substance) exceed maximum permissible norms eightfold, carbon disulfide and sulfuric acid in Berezniki and hydrogen fluoride in Chardzhou, two- to threefold, and benzapyrene in Perm, fivefold.

Aerosol Pollutant Levels for Major Urban Areas in 1988

90US0562C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 6, 10-16 Feb 90 p 3

[Table by USSR State Committee for Statistics]

[Text]

Discharges of Harmful Substances Into Atmospheric Air From Stationary Sources in Some Cities in 1988 (thousand tons)

	Total	solid	gaseous and liquid	including		
				sulfurous anhydride	nitrogen oxides	carbon monoxide
Alma-Ata	47	10	37	16	3	15
Arkhangelsk	85	20	65	45	5	13
Ashkhabad	7	4	3	0.5	0.5	1.5
Baku	421	163	258	18	16	49
Bratsk	158	41	117	21	6	85
Volgograd	228	42	186	38	19	60
Vilnyus	34	2	32	19	4	5
Dzhambul	107	32	75	52	13	3
Donetsk	178	22	156	31	7	110
Dushanbe	31	12	19	6	4	8
Yerevan	52	5	47	15	9	11
Zaporozhye	267	70	197	25	14	147
Irkutsk	94	29	65	29	8	26
Kiev	70	12	58	19	22	5
Kemerovo	122	37	85	26	28	21
Kishinev	31	4	27	11	6	5
Krasnoyarsk	259	78	181	39	13	115
Leningrad	236	46	190	74	47	41
Magnitogorsk	849	170	679	84	34	548
Mariupol	777	113	664	54	30	573
Minsk	112	10	102	30	17	41
Moscow	312	30	282	70	99	28

Discharges of Harmful Substances Into Atmospheric Air From Stationary Sources in Some Cities in 1988 (thousand tons) (Continued)

			including			
			of them			
	Total	solid	gaseous and liquid	sulfurous anhydride	nitrogen oxides	carbon monoxide
Mogilev	115	7	108	67	7	22
Novokuznetsk	833	136	697	90	34	562
Odessa	88	19	69	15	5	27
Riga	37	9	28	9	2	9
Tallinn	41	7	34	20	4	6
Tashkent	50	16	34	2	5	19
Tbilisi	42	7	35	4	3	22
Ust-Kamenogorsk	143	24	119	69	12	36
Ufa	304	9	295	72	25	36
Frunze	74	20	54	36	8	9
Chelyabinsk	427	94	333	60	29	210

Workers Issue Appeal for Chemical Needed To Halt Toxic Discharges

90US0562A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
18 Jan 90 p 2

[Letter from L. Artamonova, chairman of the labor collective council of the Khimvolokno Production Association, Svetlogorsk, Gomel Oblast: "Open Letter to the Labor Collective of the Slavyansk Khimprom Production Association in Donetsk Oblast"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

Having used official alternatives of effect on many authorities and having found no response, we are forced to turn to you through the newspaper. The following impels us to do this.

For 1989 the USSR Ministry of Light Industry allocated 13,000 tons of soda ash of your association to us. However, less than one-third of this quantity was unloaded. Not having received soda, which is a reagent, our shops are forced to dump untreated, aggressive industrial discharges into the Berezina River—the Dnepr's basin. The ecological situation, which is complex as it is, of our region directly adjacent to the Chernobyl zone, a situation aggravated by such a barbaric (on our part) pollution of nature, constantly leads to painful conflicts with nature protection bodies (which have already exacted from us 89,000 rubles for poisoning fish) and with informal movements and casts doubt on the competence of our management, which is unable to provide the association with the necessary raw materials.

Repeated missions of "go-getters" to Moscow, Slavyansk, and Kiev and meetings with your management (constantly promising something) led to nothing. Moreover, for 1990 we are getting a "pre-New Year gift" from

our ministry in the form of attachment—again to you!—for the delivery of soda in the volume of 11,000 tons.

We are puzzled why to this day the management of your association cannot firmly say to the staff of the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Industry and the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply that this assignment is not within your powers and stop disappointing the collective of 11,000 Svetlogorsk chemists again and again.

We turn to you, comrades, with the following request: Taking the complex situation into account, weigh your capabilities and give us a straight answer: Will your association be able to stabilize the contractual shipments of soda ash in 1990?

With friendly greetings and respect, on behalf of the labor collective.

Lithuanian Environmental Group Plans Protests at Polluting Factories

90US0562B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
1 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Z. Mikalauskas, ELTA correspondent: "Again an Alarm Bell"]

[Text] Early in the morning bells began to ring and blows on metal rails were heard. This time it was near the artificial fiber plant. There the Atgaya Society organized an action directed against air pollution.

The posters prepared for the action by the society's members state that last year the enterprise dumped 5,749 tons pollutants—acetone, methyl chloride, ammonia, and others—into the atmosphere. In the blocks located in the plant's vicinity air pollution exceeds sanitary norms severalfold.

At an improvised press conference enterprise representatives discussed what was being done to reduce air pollution. With an increase in the production of composite, pneumotextured, combined, and other new threads it is possible to greatly reduce acetate silk production, to use less acetyl cellulose and acetone, and thereby to reduce environmental pollution significantly.

At the end of last year an alarm bell was sounded near the Banga Television Equipment Production Association. Although only 1 month has passed after this action, the city's largest enterprise has already managed to eliminate some uncovered shortcomings and to reduce water pollution. Atgaya has become convinced that the picket lines organized by it are of benefit. Therefore, an alarm bell will be sounded at the end of every month near enterprises most polluting the environment.

Tajikistan 1989 Environmental Statistics Summarized

90US0712B Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 26 Feb 90 p 3

[Information from Tajik SSR State Committee for Statistics: "Justice Has Prevailed by Only 0.3 Percent With Respect to Individuals and Organizations Harming the Environment"]

[Text] Despite steps taken in the republic to improve the ecological situation, it is still not good in a number of places.

One of the main reasons is that associations, enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes are not making full use of the funds allocated for environmental protection measures. In 1989, for example, TADAZ used 185,000 (62 per cent) of the 300,000 rubles allocated; the Vakhsh Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plant, 65 per cent of its allocations.

Although the discharge of harmful substances into the air from fixed sources was reduced by 22,000 tons from the 1988 level, a high level of air pollution is still found in the cities of Kurgan Tyube, Kalininabad, Dushanbe and Tursunzade, in some cases exceeding the maximum permissible levels by a factor of 4 or more.

There is dangerous contamination of surface water by waste from industrial enterprises and livestock complexes and the runoff from irrigated fields. Underground water is being used up and contaminated. The area of soil damaged by erosion is increasing.

Emergency rapid discharges are having a serious negative effect upon the environment. Two cases of pollution of water works were registered in 1989 at the Anzob Ore Concentration Combine, where 2,000 cubic meters of sewage was dumped into the Dzhizhikrut and Anzob rivers daily.

A dam broke at the holding pond of the sewage treatment plant for the settlement of Sebiston in November of 1989, sending 1,200 cubic meters of waste water into

Sargazon Creek and on into the Tairsa River. The dam broke through the fault of the Dangaravodstroy trust, which had built installations with deviations from the design and placed them into use without the approval of water monitoring agencies. The damage amounted to 27,700 rubles.

A total of 1,196 people have been disciplined administratively and 13 have been held criminally liable for violations of environmental protection laws.

Only 35,000 rubles, or 0.3 per cent, of the 12,079,700 rubles of fines assessed for damaging the environment has been collected.

Because of this, steps have been taken to halt the operation of a number of enterprises such as the sintering shop of the Dushanbe Construction Materials Production Association—for 54 days; the plaster shop of the Isfara Construction Materials Production Association, for 43 days; the asphalt and concrete plant of the Inzh dorremstroy trust, for 14 days; and a number of other facilities, shops and units.

Initial Tajik Goskompriroda Performance Termed Inadequate

90US0712A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 26 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by L. Serebrennikov: "The Issues Were Discussed: Will There Be Action?"]

[Text] The essence of the Tajik SSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature, its goals and its tasks are reflected in the very name. Established a year ago, the committee has become a central agency of state control in the area of environmental protection and the prudent use of natural resources. The committee now numbers almost 300 specialists in various fields, and a million rubles is allocated for its yearly support.

During last year's intensive monitoring and inspection work Goskompriroda subdivisions inspected 3,367 facilities and enterprises in the republic. They revealed 883 violations of environmental protection laws, for which it was recommended that bonuses be withheld from directors and other officials at such enterprises as the Tadzhikstal and Tadzhiktekstilmash associations, the Tadzhik Aluminum Plant, the Dushanbe Fittings Plant and the Inzh dorremstroy Trust site. There have been more than 300 enactments ordering the temporary halting or shutdown of operations at shops, factories and production units. Fines have been levied totalling tens of thousands of rubles.

Goskompriroda specialists have prepared environmental protection programs, a statute on interaction with republic ministries and departments, standardized fines for polluting the environment and payment for the use of natural resources. Work has been started on a unified scientific and technical policy based on the specific features of the republic's environment.

At the same time there is serious concern about the fact that republic enterprises and organizations systematically fail to carry out environmental protection measures and about the inability of rayon, city and oblast environmental protection committees and specialists with the state committee itself effectively to pressure the negligent managers. This accounts to a significant degree for the fact that high concentrations of gas and dust, runoff of inadequately purified waste water into the rivers and over-saturation of the ground with nitrates and toxic chemicals are registered almost universally in republic cities.

All components of Goskompriroda have an acute shortage of transport and mobile laboratories and are poorly provided with equipment and supplies. The committee's central organization is slow in restructuring its work style and does to little to influence the performance of its subdivisions.

These and other problems were discussed at an enlarged session of the collegium of the Tajik SSR Goskompriroda. Taking part in it were heads of rayon, city and oblast environmental protection committees, representatives of the republic's community concerned with ecology, leaders of ministries and departments and scientists.

A plan for protecting the environment of the Tajik SSR was approved and will be submitted to the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. An appeal was approved in which Goskompriroda workers call upon all residents of the republic to become actively involved in the improvement of the human habitat.

Ecology, Land Use, Economics Relationships in Ukraine Compared

90US0715A Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA in Russian No 4, Feb 90 pp 61-68

[Article by V. Tregobchuk, doctor of economic sciences and chief of the Economics of Use of Nature Department, UkrSSR Academy of Sciences: "Economics and the Environment"]

[Text] At the contemporary stage of socio-economic development, the shortage of pure fresh water, the qualitative exhaustion of practically all water sources, and the pollution of the atmosphere—especially in the industrial centers and major cities, the level of which greatly exceeds the allowable concentration of harmful substances—have become real facts for the country as a whole, and for our republic as well. Add to this the fact that large areas of arable land, including agricultural lands, are being withdrawn for industrial, housing, cultural and road construction; erosion, degradation of the soil and impoverishment of the horticultural and animal world are taking place; and the environment in general is in a state of serious decline.

These things are causing enormous damage to the natural potential, and the effectiveness of social production

and the quality of its products are declining. But perhaps the greatest misfortune is the fact that the intensifying processes of pollution and destruction of the natural environment are having a negative effect on human health, and on the upcoming generation above all.

The physical and mental health of the people is continually declining because of the fact that the people are consuming poor-quality water and foodstuffs containing numerous harmful substances, and are breathing polluted air with high concentrations of toxic and carcinogenic elements. For example, according to published data, on the average every citizen of Moscow suffers from two chronic illnesses, while his average lifespan declined by ten years in the years 1968-1988 alone; and 70-75 percent of Moscow school children cannot be considered healthy. In all likelihood, the situation is no better in Kiev, which is one of the most polluted cities in the land, and one of the ten most polluted in the republic.

And this is why measures for rational use and preservation of natural resources, perfecting the use of nature and switching social production to a resource-, energy-, and environmental-conservation regime are no less needed today, if not more, than the measures for increasing material production.

One should, however, take note of the fact that in the last two decades, the development of the country's national-economic complex, and that of the republic, has gone in just the opposite direction. The increase in society's industrial potential was divorced from the direct solution of urgent social problems, and above all the food problem; moreover, without considering the ecological factors. As a result, while in possession of a powerful industrial-technical potential and enormous natural resources, the country has unbelievably lagged behind many of the world's states in terms of the level of social development and well-being, and has found itself on the verge of a general ecological crisis.

It was no accident that the first Congress of People's Deputies adopted the resolution, "On the Basic Directions of the USSR's Domestic and Foreign Policy," which pointed out that implementing a complex of measures for fundamentally improving the people's social, living and working conditions must be considered the most important task of the organs of Soviet rule. Among these, an important place was given to completing development of a nationwide ecological program, which embraces both priority and long-term measures for restoring the health of the natural environment, implementing universal expert ecological analysis of all economic projects and effective state control over the use of natural resources, and ensuring the publicizing of information about the quality of the environment.

Today society realizes more fully and completely the importance and urgency of the tasks for environmental protection, for fundamentally restructuring the use of nature, and for a weighty and sober approach, not

suborned by departmental interests, to all kinds of projects which affect the natural environment. In many regions of the country, society is more and more actively speaking out against unjustified decisions with respect to the use of this or that kind of natural resource, thoughtless large-scale construction projects, and unwise interference in the natural environment on the part of certain ministries and agencies.

At the March 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which examined the question of the CPSU's agrarian policy in contemporary conditions, it was stressed: "Society today is becoming actively involved in the solution of ecological problems. Such a position by Soviet society should be welcomed and supported in every way. It is truly a question of ensuring scientific justification and thorough consideration of every economic decision. No other approach is acceptable here." This concerns the ecological problems of development of both the agro-industrial complex and the national economy as a whole.

Today we must ensure complete understanding and recognition of the cause-and-effect relationships, and the dependence and results of the interaction of contemporary social production with the environment. Both positive and negative achievements in social production must be forecast, which will make it possible to resolve the crisis situations which have sprung up in the interrelations of man and nature; otherwise, they may complicate and aggravate them.

ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKSSR

Economic problems of further economic growth in the industrially-developed regions with intensive agricultural production have taken on special urgency.

The Ukrainian SSR today is numbered among the republics having the highest integral level of anthropogenic and technogenic loads on the natural environment on practically all its territory. Here the lands, the water supply, the forests and mineral raw-material resources have been brought into the economic cycle to the maximum.

Our republic occupies about 2.7 percent of the total area of the USSR, but nearly 20 percent of the nation's industrial and agro-industrial potential is concentrated on its territory; moreover, the kind of industrial branches and agriculture which have an exceptionally great influence on the environment—on land and water resources and the atmosphere, destroying and polluting them. On the whole, according to our calculations, the aggregate load of all the manufacturing and the populace on the environment and environmental resources in the UkSSR is almost 15 times higher than the USSR average, considering that it has about one-fourth the nationwide volume of industrial discharge into the environment.

A certain kind of "ecological expansion" is characteristic of the Ukrainian SSR, that is, an uncontrolled and not

always justifiable increase in the load on the environment. Being a result of the extensive development of the economy, the ever-greater quantitative growth in the material-technical potential of social production, increased chemicalization and land-reclamation work in agriculture, and so on, it is leading not only to the pollution and degradation of nature and the exhaustion of its resources, but also to a situation in which, in order to maintain the level of well-being achieved, it is necessary to expend increasing amounts of energy and resources, drawn from the environment. And this, once again, intensifies society's pressure on nature.

Therefore, in our republic the ecological problems of economic development and questions of the technical, technological and systemic restructuring of social production, to include the AIC [agro-industrial complex], and fundamental improvements in the use and preservation of all natural resources, are of paramount importance. Their solution is complicated today by the fact that for a long time the growth of national economic potential has been accomplished on a technically-obsolete base, without consideration of ecological factors and criteria, and in the absence of strict ecological limitations.

As a result, both in industry and in the AIC, frankly speaking, a biospherically-incompatible, environment-polluting, and environment-destroying material-technical base was formed, and the predominantly extensive path of economic development has led to the aggravation of ecological relationships and the emergence of shortages of many kinds of natural resources.

The effectiveness of social production at the contemporary stage depends to a decisive degree on how the improvement of its material-technical base goes, on introduction of principally-new kinds of equipment and technology appropriate to the ecological requirements, and on how many assets are directed toward implementing environmental protection measures. This will also determine the solution of many social problems, and ensure the ecological purity of foodstuffs and the habitable environment.

Transition to new, more complex and sophisticated, resource- and environment-conserving kinds of equipment and technology, which are able in the final analysis to form a progressive and practically ecologically-safe technical-technological base for society and for industrial and agro-industrial production, will be determined by the availability of the necessary material and financial assets, and the ability of industry to satisfy the demand for advanced equipment and technology.

Moreover, this transition is impossible without a rather lengthy period of resource accumulation. Given the low efficiency of social production as a whole, and especially in the AIC, rapid creation of these prerequisites is unrealistic. There is no basis to conclude that we will be able to solve the ecological problems soon after society learns of their severity.

Under the management system which has evolved, enterprises and associations are not oriented toward continually seeking ways and means for introducing the most effective and ecologically-safe kinds of equipment and technology to production. They have no interest in raising labor productivity or in resource- and nature-conservation by virtue of technical and technological innovations.

The fundamental obstacle in the path of solving top-priority ecological problems is the existing industrial branch structure for managing the national economy, and the imbedded habit of each branch to expand, and to assimilate assets wherever it is easiest to do so, where neither new equipment nor new technology need be applied.

Therefore, it is necessary to reject the stereotypes of the past at all levels of management of the national economy. Ecological perestroyka of production will not take place by itself, in proportion to an increase in national wealth and a decline in the net consumption of resources, as people used to think. In this matter, energetic and decisive measures are needed, aimed at making all industrial and agro-industrial production ecologically safe.

Under the new management conditions, in which all enterprises and associations will be transferred to complete cost-accounting, self-financing and self-management, they will strive to achieve production growth on the basis of more effective use of the existing resource potential and accelerated transition to new and progressive kinds of equipment and technology. As a result, the real prerequisites will appear for successfully implementing a complex of social and nature-conservation measures.

It is a question of accompanying the intensification of production in all spheres of the national economy with fundamental restructuring of its material-technical base, in order that equipment and technology, comprehensive mechanization and automation of manufacturing processes, use of chemicals and land-reclamation in the agrarian sector, be developed in the direction of not only increasing labor productivity and improved working conditions, but also minimizing the negative effects on the natural environment, and effective solution of ecological problems.

Today the ecologic strategy consists of switching from implementing individual or even comprehensive nature-conservation measures, to working out and implementing a conception of making all industrial and agro-industrial production ecologically safe, so that it functions in an ecologically and economically stable manner.

Solving this problem is one of the most important goals of Scientific-Technical Progress. And not by means of slowing down its pace and refusing to adopt results proven in practice, as certain scientists and specialists propose. We must strive to solve the ecological problems

of today, but with the help of the latest achievements of science and technology, introducing them on a wide scale in all links and spheres of the national economy, and especially in the AIC.

ECOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

The ecological situation in the republic has become exceptionally acute in connection with wide-scale and insufficiently justified measures for concentration and specialization, intensification and industrialization, chemicalization and hydromelioration of agricultural production. Put into effect without consideration of ecological requirements, they not only have not led to significant increase in agricultural effectiveness and solution of the food problem, they have also caused many negative ecological consequences.

These include the increasing chemical pollution of food-stuffs, land and water resources, and a sharp decline in the stability and self-regulating capacity of the agro-ecosystem, the humus content in the soils, and salination and acidification of agricultural croplands.

In this connection it is important to first implement the purposeful ecologization of farming and animal husbandry, branches which are having an ever-increasing effect on the natural environment over very large areas. In the Ukrainian SSR this means over 70 percent of its land area, and practically its entire watershed, including the seas. The "contribution" of agriculture to the overall pollution of water resources in the republic today amounts to 45-48 percent.

At the first stage of ecologization of farming, it would be wise to severely restrict and bring to a minimum the use of easily-soluble mineral fertilizers, especially nitrogens; and to implement universal transition, first of all to integrated systems, and then to biological and agrotechnical systems for battling diseases, pests and weeds; and to stimulating the biological activity of the soil by means of wide-scale application of organic fertilizers of animal and plant origin.

It is especially appropriate to speak about chemicalization of agricultural production. In the mid-1970's the USSR took first place in the world in production and use of mineral fertilizers in agriculture; and in the mid-1980's, in the use of chemical means of crop protection. Chemicalization of agriculture grew by leaps and bounds in our republic as well: in the years 1961-1988, the supply of mineral fertilizers to kolkhozes and sovkhozes grew from 482,000 tons to 5.2 million tons (expressed in terms of 100 percent of the nutrients), and in terms of fertilizers per hectare of plowed fields, from 14.6 to 157.9 kilograms; of that number, nitrogens increased from 3.6 to 69.9 kilograms, or by 10.8 and 19.4-fold, respectively.

Production and application of chemical agents for protecting crops in the republic increased in that same period from 4,600 to 65,200 tons, to include herbicides,

which increased from 50 to 8,100 tons, that is, by a factor of 14.2 and 162, respectively.

Many agencies and many administrators have always considered accelerated chemicalization of agricultural production the chief factor for rapidly solving the food problem at little cost, for raising the productivity of cultivated land, and to improve the quality of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials. But like many other measures, and irrigation in particular, it was implemented without the appropriate organizational-technological preparation, without increasing farming standards and a clear-cut system of agro-chemical servicing, and without an effective and efficient economic mechanism; thus, naturally, its expectations were unfulfilled.

While achieving wide-scale chemicalization of agriculture, we nevertheless have not solved the food problem. And here the unforeseen consequences have turned out to be more than sufficient.

The most perceptible blow from universal chemicalization of agriculture was dealt to the republic's surface and underground water sources. Increased nitrate content is observed in practically all water sources, and many open water sources have been subjected to eutrophication; that is, blue-green water growths are developing intensively in them. Medical scientists and biologists have proven that consumption of water with a high nitrate content leads to severe illness—methemoglobinemia, which attacks the nervous system and the brain, and above all in children and juveniles.

In addition, in many bodies of water, including the Dnepr, pesticides, herbicides and other toxic chemicals are found in the water; which, accumulating in zooplankton and the organisms of fish, then enter the human organism in the water and food man consumes.

As properly noted in periodical literature, the chemical "war" is already going on not only in the USA, but in our country as well. However, when the total severity of this problem was discovered in the USA, measures were taken immediately to significantly improve the culture of farming; an efficiently functioning agrochemical service was set up, new technologies were developed for local introduction of mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals, complexes of machinery and equipment were created for safe application of chemical agents, and measures and methods were worked out for preventing the chemical pollution of the natural environment.

An effective system has been set up in all states for transmitting information from scientific institutions to the farms and entrepreneurs. At the same time, chemicalization is strictly regulated by organs independent of departmental control, both at the federal and state level, which determine the chemical content of foodstuffs and in the natural environment. A code of laws is in effect in the country to protect nature and the consumers from excessive and unwise application of chemicals in agriculture; the negative consequences of chemicalization are

published openly, and so on. Beyond a doubt, the accumulated experience in the USA in the area of rational use of chemicals in the agroindustrial complex deserve the most intensive study and application.

Practical experience in agricultural production in most areas of the republic testify to the fact that, with the large volume and scale of chemical use attained and the very low standards for both chemicalization and farming in general, on the whole it would be more useful and better if we were to radically limit the application of chemical agents in agriculture, rather than use them stupidly and without controls. Today it is becoming obvious that further increasing the volume of application of mineral fertilizers and toxic chemicals on kolkhozes and sovkhozes not only does not make sense—it is extremely dangerous.

As far as mineral fertilizers are concerned, measures should be undertaken here to produce fertilizer without harmful admixtures, and with programmed release of nutrient elements; that is, fertilizers which do not place a heavy burden on the ecology. Unfortunately, no significant gains have yet been made in this matter. About two decades ago a technology was developed for deriving phenyl-nitrates [penoselitry]—fertilizers which replace granulated superphosphates, fertilizers which are ecologically pure, since the nourishing materials they contain can be completely assimilated by the plants and are not leached out of the soil. However, production of phenyl-nitrates has not been set up yet.

Land and water reclamation, water management and hydraulic power engineering construction, and regulation of the surface flow have become major and extremely complex ecological problems in the UkSSR. While land and water reclamation efforts in the republic were being carried out on a small scale they did not have a noticeable effect on the natural environment, nor did they have negative macroecological consequences. But now, when land and water reclamation, water management and hydraulic power construction have become large-scale, and the area of irrigated and drained croplands has sharply increased, the situation in the natural environment has fundamentally changed, and in many aspects and regions it has changed for the worse.

The very same thing applies to the creation of water reservoirs in series on large and medium rivers. Land and water reclamation and water management are at present among the factors having extremely grave effects on nature, and are distinguished by the exceptional complexity of their ecological consequences.

Construction of dams for power plants and creation of major water reservoirs—sources of water supply and main water-transport routes, as well as irrigation and drainage canals—are introducing new elements into the natural environment. Under their influences, and also under the influences of irrigation and drainage of large land areas, the centuries-old ecological equilibrium is

disrupted, and hydrobiological, hydrogeological, micro-climatic and agrobiological conditions are changed. At the same time, natural processes are either accelerated or slowed down, and new complex contradictions arise, both in the natural environment itself, and in all its interrelationships with man.

Because of the fact that insufficient attention was paid to ecological requirements in the past, many land and water reclamation and water management projects were not "introduced" to the environment in the best manner, and are quite often in "ecological conflict" with it.

For a long time virtually no significance was attributed to these problems, and they were not systematically studied. Damming river valleys with power station dams, which resulted in turning the rivers into huge water reservoirs, leads to inundation of large areas of meadowlands, river bottomlands, and agricultural croplands. As a result, many organic materials, woodlands and the like are now under the water.

As a result of raising the level of ground waters after the water reservoir basin is filled, many sections of land become saturated and the air-water ratio in chernozem soils worsens, which in zones of insufficient natural moisture causes accumulation of large quantities of salts, and in zones with sufficient or excessive moisture, the soils are transformed into clay. When the soil layers become swampy or salty in areas of severe saturation, the result is a radical decline in the productivity of agricultural croplands and forests. Quite often such sections are transformed from natural and cultural agro-ecosystems into wild and unproductive land areas.

Detailed analysis of the ecological consequences of water management construction shows, that in most cases the regulation of rivers in the plains and creation of major water reservoirs on them have negative consequences on the economy of the shore regions as well. Underestimation of the seriousness of ecological consequences, and disruption of the natural pace of processes in river basins have dealt an enormous blow to the fishing economy as well. Fishing productivity in estuaries and the water reservoirs themselves is steadily declining, as is the quality of the fish, owing to pollution and eutrophication.

To this one must add the great damage caused to the republic's national economy with the inundation of numerous villages and towns, as well as the meadowlands, flats and the like.

All of this testifies to the fact that one must approach the transformation of river ecosystems, which took shape over the course of tens and hundreds of thousands of years, with extreme care and consideration. Any interference in the nature of river basins must presume above all the rational use of nature and optimal management, the criterion for which is, on the one hand, ensuring maximum flow and useful bioproduction in the entire river basin and in the delta, and preservation of high

quality water resources and ecological balance in the water environment; and on the other, minimum economic losses and damage.

ACUTE PROBLEMS OF LAND USE

At the contemporary stage of socio-economic development of society, the ecological problems of land use have become very acute. Land resources occupy a special place in the biosphere, and in agriculture they are at the same time both an object and an instrument of labor, the basis for the continuation of the reproductive process. The land, as a natural-economic category represents a system of interconnected agricultural lands, the most valuable part of land assets, and the chief means of production in agriculture.

Since the quantity of land is limited, and high-quality croplands are becoming fewer and fewer for a variety of reasons; and, because they are irreplaceable as the instruments and objects of labor in the agrarian sector of the economy, all the forces of society must be directed toward increasing the fertility of the soil, and thereby—the intensiveness of use of the lands in the economic cycle. It is precisely the conservation of land assets, the reproduction and multiplication of its natural fertility, and the bioprotective potential of croplands that are the decisive factors in uninterrupted growth of the production of food and agriculture raw materials, per unit of land area.

Unfortunately, the state of agricultural land assets in the Ukrainian SSR, whose land survey rating exceeds the average national indicator by a factor of 2.5, is cause for alarm and concern. In most oblasts soil fertility is declining, the scale of wind and water erosion is increasing, and the processes of degradation and impoverishment of land resources are under way.

One should bear in mind that soil is essentially a living body, the living element of the biosphere, and therefore all man's economic activity one way or another reflects on the state of the land assets and its fertility. During the last two or three decades, the negative load on land resources has grown sharply, not only in connection with chemicalization and industrialization of agriculture, but also on the part of industrial production. They are being polluted with chemical substances and industrial wastes.

According to data from scientific research institutions, during the years 1961-1988, the area of eroded cropland increased by more than two million hectares, and at the present time amounts to ten million hectares—that is, it comprises almost one-third of all the arable land in the UkrSSR. Land areas in danger of wind erosion have reached 20 million hectares, or about one-half the agricultural cropland areas. Under conditions of modern intensive farming, which is carried out with the use of predominately anti-ecological equipment and technologies, the topsoil washout rate exceeds by about ten-fold the rate of the soil-formation process. Topsoil losses, for which 4-5 tons per hectare is an acceptable level, will reach an average of 31-36 tons per hectare per year, and

in the extremely wet years, on fields planted with cultivated row-crops, from 60 to 120 tons per hectare.

The average annual loss of humus in the republic, for the period beginning with 1960 has amounted to 41.8 million tons, including 23.7 million tons as a result of erosion. The entry of nutrient elements and fertilizers into the soil is today two to three times lower than what is removed by vegetation and as a result of erosion. Whereas the chernozems of the southern oblasts had contained 9.0-10 percent humus before being plowed up, now there is only 4.0-5.0 percent. As noted at the zonal meeting and seminar held in Dnepropetrovsk in 1986, during the years 1971-1985 alone, the soils of the UkrSSR lost 12 percent of their humus.

All this is the reason for the fact that, in spite of the major capital investments in the agrarian sector of the economy—water and land reclamation measures on a broad scale, increasing application of mineral fertilizers and chemical means for protecting plants, and supplying technology to agriculture—there has been no noteworthy success in increasing crop yields. For example, grain crop yields in the 9th Five Year Plan amounted to 24.7 centners, while in the 11th it was 24.3 centners per hectare; for sugar beets, the respective figures were 268 and 259; vegetables, 129 and 142. Yields from capital investments are steadily declining, but the operating costs of agricultural production are increasing.

All this testifies to the fact that it is necessary to fundamentally restructure land use and soil conservation, change the conception of the development and structuring of farming in the republic, directing it along the ecologically-safe path with adaptive intensification and wide-scale use of biotechnological factors for restoration of fertility and protection of plants. It is namely this that will permit solving the problems of protecting soil resources from degradation and destruction, and protecting the natural environment as a whole, while at the same time increasing production of foodstuffs and increasing its quality and ecological purity.

A report at the March 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed that, "For a variety of reasons we have ceased to give proper respect to the land. In most regions the fertility of the land is in decline... Thus, we cannot deal with the land in this manner any longer. The time has come to draw up and pass a law on the land and land use. We must intensify our legislative measures to protect arable lands from being squandered away. But even that is not enough. Greater attention must be given to scientific methods of land use and introduction of crop rotation and soil conservation technologies. And this is the direct responsibility of all land users."

In order to reduce the technogenic impact on the soil and the natural environment in general when practicing agriculture, and reduce the scale of its pollution and degradation, especially soil erosion, it is necessary to improve the structure of cultivated cropland and sown fields that has evolved in the UkrSSR. There is a very

high proportion of plowed land and cultivated row-crops in the republic, which inevitably leads to intensive wash-out of topsoil. Meanwhile, during the years 1961-1988 the proportion of plowed fields increased from 78.8 to 81.2 percent, and irrigated fields from 72 to 94.4 percent. It is necessary to take matters in hand, in order to significantly decrease the level of plowing up agricultural croplands.

Meanwhile, in the USA, for example, the area of land under cultivation had increased until 1929, when it reached its maximum, 211 million hectares. After 1930 there was a sharp reduction in area under the plow, which was down to 188 million hectares by 1954; 146 million in 1959; and 142 million in the mid-1980's (out of 425 million hectares of arable land); that is, the proportion of cropland under cultivation declined from 50 to 33.4 percent. The rate of cropland reduction has slowed down in the last 25 years because of increased demand for food on the world market, especially on the part of the USSR.

From an ecological point of view the reduction of the area of our republic's agricultural land with relatively low impact on the natural environment (hayfields, pastures, and very old plantations) was unjustified. During the years 1961-1988 the area of hayfields and pastures decreased by 12 percent, and that of old plantations by 40 percent; and their proportion in the structure of agricultural lands declined, respectively, by 1.3 and 0.9 percentage points.

In addition, the extremely low level of forestation of the territory of the UkrSSR does not promote the preservation and restoration of the natural environment; during the years 1966-1988, forest land increased by only 1.2 percent—from 13.1 percent in 1965 to 14.3 in 1988.

Measures to create rational agricultural districts in all farming regions are being implemented very slowly: planting new strips of trees to prevent soil erosion and to preserve water; building water reservoirs, anti-erosion measures and the like, and chiefly along the lines of contoured land-reclamation structures on agricultural territories. A great deal of work remains to be accomplished on this plane. As USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member A.V. Yablokov stated: In order to keep the natural environment of a major region in operating condition, capable of supporting, on the one hand, the climatic conditions, and on the other, ensure the production of foodstuffs and public recreation, it is necessary to keep about 30 percent of the area in a condition closely approximating its natural state. Of the remaining 70 percent, half must be devoted to production of foodstuffs. And if the area of agricultural croplands varies significantly in different regions, then reducing the area devoted to the "wild" state inevitably leads to ecological catastrophe. For now such a correlation is characteristic of only certain farming regions in the country (for example, the Baltic republics).

The intensiveness and effectiveness of land resource use are directly dependent upon both the peculiarities of the soil and climatic conditions, the absolute and relative levels of available land, and upon how the fertile soils are used, conserved and regenerated—as well as upon the economic mechanism of land use. Investment policy in this sphere requires fundamental changes in this sphere, and above all the correlation of capital investments in conservation and reclamation of the land. At the present time it amounts to approximately 1:9, but it should be, by our calculations, 1:2.

In spite of the fact that over 15 percent of the nation's plowed land area is concentrated in the UkrSSR, the republic's proportion of national capital investments in land reclamation amounted to 11.5 percent in the 11th Five Year Plan, and in the 12th, less than 11 percent. In the 13th Five Year Plan it must be raised to at least 13-14 percent, in order that measures for widespread cultivation of the degraded Ukrainian chernozems might be carried out.

At the same time a complex of measures for conservation, reproduction and increase of soil fertility and for the bioprotective potential of land resources are necessary; these must be accompanied by measures of organizational-economic and social procedure, restructuring of the nature of land ownership and land use, and planning and realization of land-conservation work—not only on a republic-wide scale, but also on every kolkhoz and sovkhoz, and in every production sector and team.

It is necessary to develop in every way and perfect various forms of leasing relationships in agriculture, with respect to the use of land resources. The interests of the cause and the specific features of the land as a means of production require that agricultural lands be offered for long-term use by collective, family and individual land-users. Payments for land use must be stable, and such that they would induce the rural workers to invest their assets in the restoration and increase of soil fertility.

Without effectively solving the problem of land conservation and determining its real owner, it will not be possible to achieve the planned growth rates for food-stuffs and agricultural raw materials.

Taking into consideration the UkrSSR's soil and climatic conditions which are favorable for agriculture, it is deemed expedient to reorient its national economy in the future toward the predominant development and rationalization of the AIC structure, toward effective and more complete use of its natural agrarian potential, and also its recreational and medical treatment resources. At the same time it is important to preserve to the maximum extent the nature-preservation and climate-regulating functions of the Carpathians and the Crimea, and to limit and strictly regulate construction of new industrial projects, in particular those which are unsafe in an ecological sense (atomic power engineering, and the chemical and metallurgical industries).

The development of the republic's industrial potential must be closely tied to the solution of the fool problem, and to ecological and social tasks. And it is important to re-orient the structure of its industry toward nature conservation, and place it on a scientific and intellectually-intensive path of development.

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Bryansk Oblast Contamination Improving

90UN0961A Moscow *PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK* in Russian No 6, Feb 90 p 10

[Article by Ye. Borisova: "Seventy Milion Rubles for Housing"]

[Text] The country's government will allocate R70 million to Bryansk Oblast this year. People from the rayons "contaminated" by radiation will move into new houses soon.

Following the Chernobyl accident, maximum allowable levels of radioactive contamination were exceeded in five oblasts of Russia. Fortunately, the situation returned to normal in four of them as early as the summer of 1986. The situation remained alarming only in Bryansk Oblast. In August, 76 families had to be evacuated from four localities in Krasnogorskiy Rayon. They were given housing, jobs, and all types of benefits and compensation. These were the first, most urgent measures. However, it was clear even at that point that many years of work on improving the ecological situation in the oblast were needed.

Seven rayons of Bryansk Oblast, with a population of almost 290,000, turned out to be quite heavily contaminated. Some 274 localities ended up being in the zone of "strict" control where restrictions on the use of food-stuffs of local provenance are in effect. You will understand the alarm of these people if you add to this 367 villages in which the level of radiation is lower, but in which one cannot drink milk. A number of preferences have been established for the residents of these localities; they receive monthly benefits for every family member.

In the fall of last year, the government of the Russian Federation determined that it was necessary to resettle more than 2,000 families in rayons where the level of radioactivity is within the norm. This decision was made taking into account the concept of radiation safety for the populace which had been developed by the health care organs. By January, 200 families had already had their housewarming parties. This year, design documentation for 23 new settlements will be prepared, and three settlements with 200 houses each will be built. In general, enormous work has been done in the years since the accident. Here are just several statistics: Road, construction, and agricultural equipment, cars, machine tools, welding equipment, mobile diesel power stations—more than 18,000 pieces of equipment and machines in all have been additionally allocated to Bryansk Oblast.

Residential houses (386,000 square meters), schools, day-care centers, and clubs (with almost 8,000 seats), roads, and water mains have been built. More than 200 localities have been decontaminated; 50 of them have been processed twice; and six—three times.

Agrochemical and land-reclamation measures have been reducing the contamination of farm goods year after year. This is extremely important: After all, radionuclides have contaminated close to half a million hectares of agricultural land in the oblast. Arable land accounts for more than one-half of it. By now, the content of radioactive substances in grains has declined by a factor of five to six. Last year, out of the 227,000 tons of grain procured in the oblast, only 1,000 tons, or less than 0.5 percent, turned out to be "dirty." The amount of meat unfit for use as food comes to the same 0.5 percent. For comparison, in 1986, 15 percent of the meat procured in Bryansk Oblast was contaminated.

...Nine radiological laboratories and groups at disease control stations were set up in the oblast immediately after the Chernobyl accident, as early as 1986. A laboratory of radioactive immunity was organized at the oblast hospital for children. In Novozybkovo, a radiological hygiene laboratory opened. Specialists from institutes in Moscow and Leningrad help physicians working in the

oblast on a regular basis. Scrupulous medical examinations of the entire populace began as soon as August 1986. To this end, 430 specialists were sent to the oblast. By now, a considerable amount of material has been accumulated, the analysis of which confirms: The physicians have found no diseases associated with the impact of ionizing radiation or any connection between the doses accumulated and the course of chronic diseases.

In summation, we should mention that last fall the State Commission for Emergencies of the USSR Council of Ministers considered tentatively the draft RSFSR State Program for Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. The program is planned to last five years. During this period of time, it is planned to invest over R2 billion in construction and land reclamation, health care, and reinforcement of the social sphere in order to restore the normalcy of life in the oblast.

On the instruction of the government, a review of the programs prepared by Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia is now being conducted. The union State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Health, and the Academy of Sciences are taking part in the review. The results of the review will be submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers in March.

U.S., Canada Donate to Chernobyl Relief

90UN1132A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
11 Feb 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "For the Children of Chernobyl"]

[Text] New York (RATAU)—About 100 tons of medicines, vitamins, various kinds of medical equipment, and toys intended for children who suffered as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant] will be sent Saturday from New York's Kennedy Airport to Kiev on board the Soviet transport plane Ruslan.

These gifts, with an overall value of several million dollars, were purchased with money collected from the people of the United States and Canada of Ukrainian descent on the initiative of the fund for aiding the children of Chernobyl which was created here.

The chairman of the fund, Rutgers University Professor Taras Gunchak, told the RATAU correspondent that they had also prepared for shipment electronic computers intended for the Ukrainian-speaking schools in the republic. Thus Ukrainian emigres and their offspring are trying to show concern for preserving and developing the national language and culture and making their contribution to the processes of restructuring and renewal in the homeland of their ancestors. We want the children of the Ukraine to have the opportunity to use the most modern technical equipment in the training process as early as possible. This is the first time in the history of Soviet-American relations that a special trip is being made to send such a large batch of cargo.

Professor T. Gunchak continued, saying that the idea of sending aid to the children was suggested by the people's deputy and writer Vladimir Yavorivskiy who visited America not very long ago. A large number of people responded to his appeal. Numerous divisions of the Society for Contributing to the National Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroyka and the Fund for Aid to the Children of Chernobyl were created. Through their efforts hundreds of thousands of dollars were collected in a couple of months.

This is only the beginning of a growing stream of fraternal aid to the people of the Ukraine, Taras Gunchak noted in conclusion.

Ukrainian Leaders Meet American-Canadian Relief Shipment

90UN1334 Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
13 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Gift of American and Canadian Ukrainians"]

[Text] The Ruslan AN-124 airplane landed at Borispol airport on 12 February, having delivered from New York's Kennedy Airport over 82 metric tons of medicines, vitamins, various types of medical equipment, products, and clothing. This cargo is intended for the

children who suffered from the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. All the gifts were collected by the Ukrainian community of the U.S. and Canada.

"The plane's flight systems poured their all into the manifestation of charity," said A.G. Bulanenko, arriving in the aircraft; he is deputy chief designer of the OKB [Experimental design bureau] imeni O.K. Antonov, at which Ruslan was created. "A press conference was held at which it was reported that in the beginning, the Ukrainians of the U.S. and Canada collected cash funds, and then the idea arose to purchase medications and other gifts with them."

Representatives of the Chernobyl children's aid foundation and doctors of the foundation in support of Rukh also arrived.

The plane was met at the airport by K.I. Masik, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers; Yu.P. Spizhenko, Ukrainian minister of health; I.I. Usichenko, republic Red Cross Society Central Committee chairman; leaders of the Ukrainian people's movement for perestroyka (Rukh); poet Ivan Drach; USSR people's deputies—writer Vladimir Yavorivskiy; poet Dmitro Pavlychko, chairman of the Ukrainian language society imeni Taras Shevchenko, and representatives of various informal organizations. At the press conference held, they expressed their profound gratitude to the Ukrainians living across the ocean for their generous gift.

"The Chernobyl tragedy was not only the suffering of a single people, but the suffering of all mankind," noted Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman K.I. Masik in a discussion with RATAU correspondents.

"The republic government therefore welcomes this gift with much gratitude, viewing it as a manifestation of charity, a tribute to the new times and new thinking in international relations. More than a little has already been done in the Ukraine for the elimination of the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. However, we also welcome any assistance from abroad with sincere gratitude. Moreover, we advocate the expansion of cooperation of scientists, medical personnel, and other specialists in this direction."

In conjunction with the republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives of public organizations, the government of the Ukraine developed a plan and realized the delivery of valuable cargo. A public committee under the patronage of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health has been created for the distribution of the gifts; it contains representatives of the Red Cross Society and informal associations.

Chernobyl Funds Diverted by Officials

90UN0959A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
14 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by V. Roshchin: "A Voyage for Selected People: Using Foreign Exchange Allocated for the Rehabilitation

of People Affected by Chernobyl, Bureaucrats from Minsktrist [Minsk Tourist Association] Organized Chic Cruises for 'Needy People'"]

[Text] *Early Monday morning the correspondents' office at RABOCHAYA GAZETA started receiving indignant telephone calls from Minsk citizens, demanding that it give "all-union publicity" to the most shameful story they could remember in Minsk. Although the night before the republic newspaper ZAYAZDA had already told its readers about the improbable swindle by the management of the Belorussian Council for Tourism and Excursions and the Minsktrist Association.*

This is indeed an emergency for Belorussia, suffering so badly from the Chernobyl accident. Tens of thousands of its inhabitants need to leave the zone soon; a great many need urgent health care and a normal vacation outside the contaminated regions. There are not enough resources to improve medical services. There is nothing with which to buy imported medical equipment. In answer to an appeal by several public organizations in the republic to compatriots living abroad, sizable foreign exchange contributions have been sent from abroad to the Chernobyl account. One would die seven deaths before deciding to waste this hard currency on somebody who did not have a high priority.

However, last September, a troubling document was discovered at the office of F. Solyanik, general director of the Minsktrist Association. Here it is: "The Minsktrist Tourist Excursion Production Association asks Ye. F. Roslik, the chairman of the Belorussian council for Tourism and Excursions to solicit the Central Council for Tourism and Excursions for hard currency for tourists to visit the FRG, Denmark and Sweden.

"The Baltic Shipping Company assigned Minsktrist the ship K. Simonov to organize two cruises with visits to ports in these countries during January 1990.

"The purpose of the cruise is to rehabilitate workers from regions suffering as the result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES."

At the end of this request the initiator of this kind act complained that for an entire year he had been conducting talks with USSR Goskomtrist. But these were unsuccessful—they would not provide foreign exchange for people affected by Chernobyl.

This same paper, signed by Ye. Roslik, was sent to Moscow, to V. G. Pugiyev, chairman of the Central Council for Tourism and Excursions. Persistence paid off. The all-union management was kind and the Belorussian Council for Tourism and Excursions finally received the desired sum—102,600 convertible rubles, without any stipulation about how they were to be used.

"When the costs were calculated at Minsktrist it turned out that, alas, this was not enough," explains A. Osinchik, chairman of the Workers' Control Inspectorate at the Belorussian Trade Union Council. Sponsors had to

be found quickly. And they were. Without any fuss and without agreement from his STK [Labor Collective Council] the manager of the Belmedbioprom [Belorussian Medical and Microbiological Industry] NPO [Science-Production Association] released 70,000 in foreign exchange for this charitable purpose. The Dormash [Road machinery] Association also volunteered to help, promising to buy 25 tickets. True, it is still not in a hurry to pay for the pleasures of a cruise.

But these are only details. The main, and totally unforgivable, aspect of this action by Minsktrist, is the distribution, or more accurately, the handing out, of the tickets obtained. About 900 wound up in the hands of people in the association (500 Central Trade Union Council tickets were sent to Kemerovo, apparently in response to demands of miners). Who received those remaining?

Anatoliy Nikolayevich goes on to explain, "People from the zone contaminated by radionuclides were not to be found among those 'rehabilitated' by the trip's organizers. There was nobody on the cruise from Narovlyanskiy, Braginskiy, Cherikovskiy, Krasnopol'skiy or the other rayons, the names of which are mentioned in Belorussia only with pain in one's heart. It is blasphemous that the 'suffering workers', for whose rehabilitation so much scarce foreign currency was advanced, were simply forgotten. This where the beneficence of F. Solyanik, his deputy M. Krasnevskiy and other Chernobyl 'benefactors' was so quickly directed!"

A Belorussian Trade Union Council workers' control group had to do a lot of work to discover the secret of these two foreign "rehabilitation" cruises. There were attempts to resist the group, hide documents from it and deceive it. But these did not succeed. The group revealed the shockingly immoral crimes of people for whom the temptation to gratify some "needy" person, was more important than the idea of honesty and duty.

Here are the facts and figures. The Belorussian Council for Tourism and Excursions seized 20 tickets for itself. The Minsktrist contract department grabbed 45 tickets, the tour department—20, and the service department 15. Supposedly, these were to give incentives to organizations with which they did business: builders, trade, food service and other "needy" organizations. The staff at the Turist Hotel in Minsk received 17 tickets, while 185 reservations on the ship were made for sponsors. In responding to cruise friendship from Minsktrist, the Belorussian Medical and Microbiological Industry generously shared some of its tickets with it.

Minsktrist gave, as if on a platter, as many tickets to trade and food service organizations in the capital as it did to Mogilev (24) and Gomel (46). Incidentally, at the oblast centers they also forgot about the Chernobyl victims.

Among the "acutely needy people" who wonderfully rehabilitated themselves on these cruises were A. Dichkovskiy and S. Simankova, professors and chairmen of

Minsk obkoms, N. Kochubeyeva, department head at the Oblsovprof [Oblast trade union council], A. Iovenko, deputy department head at the Minsk Obkom of the Communist Party of Belorussia, S. Sotnikov, department head of the Belorussian SSR MVD—it is difficult to enumerate all the nomenklatura. Belmedbioprom, the sponsor, distinguished itself: The daughters of the general director, A. Vaaks, his deputy, and the son of department chief Z. Krushch, who had just recently returned from a similar trip, went on the cruise.

The Presidium of the Belorussian Trade Union Council should, of course, examine such outrages at the Belorussian Council for Tourism and Excursions and at Minsk-tourist. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA will report the measures taken. However, in addition to the moral question, there is, in my view, also a legal one - forgery. This is a crime.

Follow-up on Diversion of Chernobyl Funds

90UN1063A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by V. Roshchin, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent, Minsk: "It Is Too Early to Declare an End"]

[Text] After the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA published the article "Trip for the Select" the telephone in its Minsk bureau became red-hot. I might remind you that the article dealt with some unsavory facts: The association "Minsk-tourist" organized foreign cruises for the "useful" people using the money which they had received under the pretext of providing health care for the people of Chernobyl. A great number of the trip tickets was distributed in violation of the existing order.

All of this literally electrified the people of the city and the republic. Indignant readers demand that the toughest measures be applied to the organizers and the "select" participants of the cruise. Those who feel insulted by the article call too. They claim that the article put the accents wrong and they are also unhappy about the article heating up the emotions even more just before the elections. The newspaper cannot take the blame for this for the simple reason that the infamous cruises themselves took place just before the elections. Having written the article I feel obligated to correct only one error: the name of the Belsovprof [Belorussian Trade Union Council] Workers' control inspection chairman, a principled and brave man, is Anatoliy Nikolayevich Osipchik.

As it was promised to the readers of the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA I report here about the measures taken. On Saturday, 17 February, the Belorussian CPSU Central Committee Buro had a session with the purpose to discuss the facts of these very cruises. The Buro expelled from the party the chief organizers of the fake cruise. They are the general manager of the association "Minsk-tourist" F. Solyanik and the chairman of the Belorussian council for tourism and excursions E. Roslik. The

problem of their inadequacy to their positions is being considered. The "Minsk-tourist" deputy general manager A. Kritchenkov was punished by a severe reprimand recorded in his party membership files. As well as F. Solyanik he was a cruise director and was mainly involved in the ticket distribution. The Belsovprof presidium decided to relieve him of his duties.

Severe reprimands for the cover-up, lack of control and lax attitude towards the personnel, with corresponding entries in the party membership files, were announced to the CPSU members S. Soboleva, a Belsovprof secretary; A. Martysyuk, chairman of the Minsk oblssovprof [oblast trade union council]; R. Davidovich, a secretary of the same oblssovprof. By the way, all of them are candidates for the people's deputies. The bureau asked to consider the problem of their remaining in their positions at the corresponding plenums, but... A plenum of the Minsk oblssovprof that took place several days later showed how its members defended their leaders and even demanded to punish the author of the article.

The general manager of the scientific and industrial association "Belmedbioprom" V. Vaaks was reprimanded severely, with a corresponding entry in his party membership file, for the violation in using hard currency reserves of the enterprise and for sending his daughter on the cruise.

The Minsk party gorkom [city committee] met to discuss the facts covered in the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA. The meeting expelled from the party the manager of the "Sportkulttorg" marketing center V. Vasiliev as he has abused his position, used connections to acquire a cruise ticket, and bought a car abroad. Severe reprimands, recorded in their party membership cards, were given also to the CPSU members P. Sakovich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian council for tourism and excursions; A. Dichkovskiy, the obkom [oblast committee] chairman of the State Commerce trade union; and V. Kashevskiy, a department chairman of the "Minsk-tourist" association.

The rector of the Minsk institute of personnel advanced training E. Dechko used his official position to pay for the trip ticket and thus violated the party ethical norms for which he was severely reprimanded. The problem of his remaining at the rector's position stays open to discussion.

The gorkom buro reprimanded severely a participant of the cruise N. Filippov, an oblssovprof secretary. The buro also noted that party organizations decided to punish A. Zhdan, the manager of the "Vysheyshaya shkola" publishing house, V. Sanko, trade union committee chairman of the Minsk industrial association for factory construction, and some other CPSU members who used connections and their official positions to go on a cruise.

A meeting took place in the Belsovprof presidium where the discussion took on a friendlier, softer character. There were a few attacks on the media (we have an audio tape of this): they claimed that the newspapers created a

mountain out of a molehill, that they whipped up emotions without any reason for it. Unfortunately, the official or, rather, clan egotism prevented some union officials from evaluating their actions with any criticism.

The GOMELSKAYA PRAUDA newspaper published the information on who had got the trip tickets. As it turned out only six workers could go on a cruise; every ninth participant is from the oblast. For some reason the newspaper did not name three owners of the tickets. The Belorussia CPSU Central Committee Buro requested that the Gomel and Mogilev party obkoms [oblast committee] consider the problem of party responsibility by the officials who allowed violations and abuses when organizing the "Chernobyl cruises".

The Belorussian SSR Procurator G. Tarnavskiy made a statement in the press of the republic: Having examined the materials of the procuracy he decided to start criminal proceedings against those who abused their official position.

Belorussian Decree on Chernobyl Program

90UN1115A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic: "On Progress Being Achieved in Accomplishing the State Program on Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic over the Period 1990-1995"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [BSSR] resolves:

1. To take under advisement information concerning this issue rendered by Deputy Chairman of the BSSR Council of Ministers A.T. Kichkaylo, chairman of the Bureau Commission of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party and the BSSR Council of Ministers on Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster.
2. To note that the government of the republic has been engaged in a constant effort within the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], and USSR ministries and departments, over the period of time following adoption of the State Program on Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster in the Belorussian SSR, to defend provisions of the program. The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party and the BSSR Council of Ministers have adopted a number of resolutions providing for the accomplishment of immediate program measures to include moving up the time for settling further out the residents of populated areas on the first list of the program, and resettling away from contaminated regions families with children under 14 years of age, pregnant women, and people who have medical documentation recommending that they reside outside these localities. To these ends, provision is made

for the allocation of more than 2,800 apartments of living space being introduced in oblasts of the republic in the first quarter of this year. Specific measures to be undertaken by ispolkoms [executive committees], ministries, and departments for 1990 have been determined—the construction of 48 modern agricultural centers and new operation of 5,069 farmstead-type homes. Social issues are being resolved. A listing has been approved of localities in which the consumption of milk and other locally produced food products is partially restricted and the necessary monetary relief is paid these residents. Improvements are being seen in medical and trade services being provided to the population.

Republic enterprises have begun to produce personal dosimeters. Programmed output calls for more than 50,000 such devices to be produced this year, and it is planned to obtain 10,000 from other regions of the country. Practically all builders working outside our borders have returned to the republic, with the exception of certain elements which remain in Armenia.

At the same time, a number of questions concerning elimination of the aftereffects of the disaster are being resolved sluggishly. Coordination by the BSSR Academy of Sciences in USSR organs of republic positions on the concept of residence in contaminated regions is being dragged out, as is agreement concerning provision of the necessary number of spaces in health improvement facilities for the population of regions suffering from the disaster, and provision to health care facilities of medical equipment and medicines.

3. That the BSSR Council of Ministers, BSSR ministries and departments, and ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies will undertake additional measures to eliminate the slack in accomplishment of a number of provisions of the state program, to ensure preservation of the health of the population residing in regions of radioactive contamination and enhance their financial situation, to work more persistently to resolve questions of effecting the material-technical supply and financial assistance for the program in union organs.

N. Dementey, chairman of the Presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet.

L. Syroyegina, secretary of the Presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet.

26 January 1990. Minsk.

Belorussian Decree on Chernobyl Aid

90UN1280A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 1

[“Decree of 20 February 1990, in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR: ‘On the Appeal to Parliaments, Governments, International Organizations, Fellow Countrymen, and All People of Good Will’”]

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR decree:

1. To approve the text of the Appeal of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR to Parliaments, Governments, International Organizations, Fellow Countrymen, and All People of Good Will and to publish it in the press.
2. To instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Belorussian SSR to disseminate the text of the appeal abroad, including through the USSR Embassy and other Soviet foreign establishments, attaching to it information material "On the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Plant for the Belorussian SSR and Overcoming Them," and to carry out the appropriate work in international organizations of the UN system.
3. To instruct parliamentary and governmental delegations and also other representatives of the republic, during trips abroad, to work with representatives of foreign states and the foreign public for the purpose of ensuring a positive response to this appeal, and to inform the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR on the work done and the results achieved.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
M. Kovalev, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers

Belorussian Appeal for Chernobyl Aid

90UN1280B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 21 Feb 90 p 1

[Appeal from Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR]

[Text] Appeal of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR to Parliaments, Governments, International Organizations, Fellow Countrymen, and All People of Good Will

The accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Plant on 26 April 1986, which in its scale and consequences was an extreme ecological phenomenon not only of a national but also international scale, has turned out to be a great disaster for the people of Belorussia.

A considerable portion of the territory of the republic, where more than 2.2 million people reside, has been subjected to a varying degree of radioactive contamination. Belorussia has lost about 20 percent of its agricultural lands. Many dozens of populated areas have ceased to exist—their residents are being evacuated to areas clear of radiation. New spots of radioactive contamination are still being found.

The people and the government have done and are doing much to neutralize the consequences of this tragedy and to restore the health of the victims of radiation. But the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster have turned out to be considerably greater in scale and more serious than many imagined, including even may prominent scientists and experts.

Joint efforts are needed to overcome this disaster.

Demonstrating great concern for the health of people, above all the children, who suffered from radiation, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR are appealing to the parliaments, governments, international organizations, fellow countrymen, and all people of good will to provide all possible aid and assistance to the Belorussian SSR in the efforts it is undertaking to neutralize the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Plant. The people of Belorussia will be deeply grateful for any aid.

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR

Council of Ministers of the Belorussian SSR

Nomenklatura Resorts Go to Chernobyl Aid

90UN1280C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 21 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by V. Levin, member of the board of the Belorussian Department of the Soviet Children's Fund, BELTA correspondent: "Operation 'Rescue'"]

[Text] As was already reported, 15 social organizations of the republic, united under the aegis of the Belorussian Republic Department of the Soviet Children's Fund into the coordination council "Children of Chernobyl," have announced Operation "Rescue." Its purpose is to concentrate all efforts and resources on the immediate evacuation of the population and, above all, the children from rayons subjected to radiation contamination. To this end, the staff of the operation has begun a search for homes in the rural areas in which families from the affected rayons could resettle. An operations staff of the operation has been set up. Its address: Minsk, Kommunisticheskaya, 2. The telephone number: 36-62-67. Someone is on duty at all times there.

The Gomel Party Obkom was the first to respond. The telephone rang at the board of the Belorussian Department of the Soviet Children's Fund:

"Come and look over the facility."

"What facility?"

"You'll see when you get here."

Writer Vladimir Lipskiy, chairman of the board of the Belorussian Department of the Soviet Children's Fund, and Lidiya Litvinovich, authorized physician of the Soviet Children's Fund for Belorussia, left for Gomel. N.G. Voytenkov, chairman of the Gomel Oblispolkom,

told them about the facility. "This" was listed as civil defense property: the civil defense courses.

The vehicle flew in the direction of Chernigov. About 20 km from Gomel, we turned onto an excellent road. A little later, a tall fence near the tree-lined Lake Kacha came into sight. For many years few people knew what went on beyond the fence. That is how it goes with civil defense. And even the courses for civil defense did not gather here. It was the usual rest camp for the oblast leadership.

There was a 12-flat apartment house and three more with eight flats each. The dosimeter showed that there were no signs of radiation. Everything was clean. And the air was clean in the pine forest.

Several days later, the first deputy chairman of the board of the Soviet Children's Fund, Sergey Dermodekhin, arrived in Gomel. The document was signed to transfer the facility and all its property to the children.

The decision has been made to create in Minsk the Soviet Children's Fund All-Union Radiological Children's Rehabilitation Center imeni V.I. Lenin. Its Gomel branch will be located at the complex at Lake Kacha. It will be able to receive 100 children. Very complicated medical equipment received from abroad has already been transferred to it.

On 9 February an agreement was signed between the Soviet Children's Fund and the International Association to Fight Childhood Leukemia (U.S.) on supplying this center with modern equipment and instruments.

Today it being discovered that the Gomel "secret" facility is not the only one. It was reported from Logozhskiy Rayon that there is also a civil defense installation there, which has nothing to do with civil defense. It is a rest camp for some capital department. They have reported from Begoml about closed dachas standing vacant in the winter.

I do not believe I am revealing any military secrets. All the more so, since a week ago ARGUMENTY I FAKTY published a list of populated areas where missile operating bases are located. We have yet to get an answer to the question about who disguised the heavenly nooks for the nomenklatura as civil defense installations. It has not been ruled out that they exist in all oblasts of the republic. And the sooner they follow the example of the Gomel leaders and transfer them to the children, the better. The rallies of many thousands of people that are now taking place in various cities of the country are submitting an unpaid bill of trust. And many have to pay for the special benefits with their nomenklatura special easy chairs. The Commission on Privileges created by the Congress of People's Deputies had made a clear decision: all supervisory workers must leave state dachas. One must assume that the leaders of other oblasts and republic departments will immediately follow the good initiative of the Gomel leaders.

Timofey Ivanovich Sergeychik of Cherven reports that timber management has a departmental hunting lodge near the village of Starye Prudy that could shelter a family quite well.

It is reported from Dokshitskiy Rayon that they are ready to accept 20 families from Krasnopolye. There are repaired home in the villages of Kozly, Volodki, Lito-vtsy, Yanushevo, Klepitsy, and Sloboda. The Begomlskiy Sovkhoz, the Sovkhoz imeni A.I. Chernysh, and the Vitunichi Sovkhoz expect machine operators, dairymaids, and agricultural specialists in February-March.

The chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Chkalov of Soligorskiy Rayon, Mikhail Zurok, invites five families from the disaster rayons. Inquiries can be made at telephone number 2-26-11.

Vladimir Petrenko reported from the Krasnyy Partizan Kolkhoz in Dobrushskiy Rayon that there are vacant houses.

A staff for working with migrants has been created in the Orel Komsomol Obkom. They are expected in Znamenskiy, Orlovskiy, Novosilskiy, and Mtsenskiy rayons. In Orlovskiy Rayon, 23 families have already arrived from Braginskiy Rayon. The address of the staff is: City of Orel, Ploshchad Lenina, 1, Komsomol Obkom. Telephone: 6-77-24 or 6-77-13.

As the staff of Operation Rescue receives new addresses, they will be published in the ZNAMYA YUNOSTI and CHYRVONAYA ZMENA newspapers, and in Gomel and Mogilev oblast newspapers.

Bryansk Oblast Refuses Chernobyl Aid

90UN1058A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian

No 7, 12-18 Feb 90 p 13

[Article by Eduard Poret: "Those Who Do Not Want to 'Yield'"]

[Text] The whole world extended a helping hand to Armenia, wounded by the earthquake, and to the Soviet people who suffered in various disasters. We began to treat any foreign aid as the natural response of a human heart. However, there still are people who openly try to obstruct any foreign aid. One such example was given to us by Yu.V. Zapadalov, the deputy chairman of the RSFSR Red Cross central committee:

In November of last year they declassified a number of areas in the country that had been hit by the Chernobyl disaster. After that the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies developed a program of emergency help for those who lived on the contaminated territories. They included Bryansk Oblast which, according to the program, should have received baby food, disposable syringes, personal radiation counters, and rare medical equipment.

Everything was going fine, in full compliance with the agreements, until a group of League experts came to the

oblast in January of this year. They were supposed to evaluate the situation and to coordinate their actions with the local authorities. There were scientists of good reputation, experts from the national Red Cross societies of Great Britain, Sweden, Japan, the FRG, and the Netherlands. But as it turned out, the experts could have stayed at home because nobody wanted to treat them as experts.

[Poret] Why not?

[Zapadalov] G.A. Podstrigich, the obispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] deputy chairman, told us that they do not need the hand-outs of some capitalist Western spies. And let them not even count on anything. Podstrigich based her position on some letter from the bosses of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Health. The letter seemed to prohibit any contacts and negotiations with foreigners. However, the letter was not shown to us and I think that it just did not exist.

Naturally, everything came to a standstill. To plan for and define the needs of the people in one or another type of aid we had to have information on the radioactive status of the disaster area. This means a description of the contaminated areas and territories and the levels of radiation. It was important to learn the number of victims and their breakdown by most sensitive categories: children, old people, and breast-feeding mothers. We did not get any such information. We were prevented from communicating freely with the people; our interpreter mistranslated the data which had been given to the foreign experts in hospitals and orphanages. The authorities were constantly trying to conceal something from us; they veiled our whole trip with a smoke screen of secrecy and suspicion. I still find it hard to believe that all this is possible in our time. Especially when we are talking about people's health—what kind of secrets can be there!

Three and a half years after the Chernobyl disaster we have to reexamine its consequences and the change, unfortunately, is for the worst. The failure to eliminate these consequences is described in the 24 November 1989 decision of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on additional measures aimed at improving the health care and the financial situation of the people who were exposed to radiation on the territory of Bryansk Oblast. The situation there is very disturbing: Food supplies come irregularly, medical equipment and medicines are absent.

We were most unfavorably impressed by everything that we saw during our trip. The social and everyday problems are obviously being totally ignored. The simplest sanitary and hygienic requirements are not complied with, there is almost no protection from radiation. Medical facilities are in a terrifying state; the central rayon hospital in the village of Krasnaya Gora has no hot or running water and no sewer plumbing. It horrifies you to see women giving birth on rusty iron tables.

Due to Gorbachev's policy foreign countries sincerely try to help us now. And to ignore this aid only because of authoritative ambitions and ideological dogmas means to go totally against the people's will. It is especially true because the government is at present incapable of fully financing all of its own programs.

The Red Cross, on the other hand, has a vast experience of fighting the aftermath of natural catastrophes and industrial disasters. The Russian Red Cross, for instance, purchased computers to create a data base for all the radiation victims in Bryansk Oblast and allocated R500,000 for their aid. We are sending there caviar, vegetables, and fruits. So far we try to distribute this food among the children and pregnant women. About R20,000 have been allocated to pay for mothers' and children's stay in sanatoria. Single old people and disabled persons receive medicine free of charge.

But I would like to ask the "fathers" of some cities and oblasts: Does not your conscience bother you when, because of your "scruples", no aid is extended to those who could have gotten it?

Return of Kremlin Churches Requested

90UN1333A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 13, 28 Mar 90 p 2

[Letter of appeal from representatives of the scientific and cultural community: "Church and Culture: On the Future of Our Churches"]

[Text] In February 1990, USSR People's Deputy Sergey Averintsev supported the letter of Anastasiya Ivanovna Tsvetayeva and other Moscovites in the USSR Supreme Soviet that requested the return of Moscow Kremlin Synod Church and a number of other very well-known capital churches and monasteries, on the establishment of church museums, and the wide-scale development of philanthropy and spiritual and moral enlightenment. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is publishing the appeal of several prominent representatives of the nation's scientific and cultural community who share this point of view on the fate of native monuments of religious culture.

The transfer of previously closed churches and monasteries to the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church has become graphic evidence of the democratization of life in the USSR that has begun during the years of perestroika. Cases of this type invariably find a broad positive response among the cultural community and are met with understanding among people of various convictions and national origins. Under these conditions, it seems completely natural to us to support the request of Moscow's Orthodox Christians for the return of the Moscow Kremlin Synod Church (to conduct holiday church services) and one of the greatest religious and national sacred places in Russia—the Pokrovskiy Synod (the Church of St. Vasiliy Blazhenny) on Red Square.

The revival of these wonderful churches located precisely in the very heart of the nation would have its own portentous and profoundly symbolic age-old significance.

In our opinion, it would be proper to render state assistance in the general return of all prominent monuments of religious culture to the church and to impart legal status to them as church museums (artistic collections, libraries) and educational and philanthropic institutions.

Such steps from the highest government authorities would be perceived both in our country and beyond its borders as a manifestation of the new political thinking and a symbol of respect for the rights of the faithful and of the further restructuring of relations between church and state.

USSR People's Deputy Ch. Aytmatov, editor-in-chief of *INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA* Magazine; I. Antonova, director of GMII [State Museum of Fine Arts] imeni A.S. Pushkin, vice president of the International Council of Museums, and academician of APN [Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, RSFSR]; Yu. Bondarev, first deputy chairman of the board of RSFSR SP [Union of Writers]; A. Vasnetsov, academician and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium; USSR People's Deputy V. Goldanskiy, academician; USSR People's Deputy S. Zalygin, editor-in-chief of *NOVYY MIR* Magazine; USSR People's Deputy Vyach. Ivanov, director of VGBIL [All-Union State Library of Foreign Literature]; V. Krupin, editor-in-chief of *MOSKVA* Magazine; USSR People's Deputy D. Likhachev, academician and chairman of the board of SFK [Council of Physical Culture]; N. Moiseyev, academician and chairman of the "Ecological Outlook" Committee; USSR People's Deputy V. Pokrovskiy, president of USSR AMN [Academy of Medical Sciences]; USSR People's Deputy V. Razumovskiy, vice president of USSR APN; USSR People's Deputy V. Rasputin; D. Sarabyanov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; G. Sviridov, composer; N. Tolstoy, academician; USSR People's Deputy B. Ugarov, president of USSR AKh [Academy of Arts]; and, S. Yamshchikov, member of the SFK Presidium Board.

Ukrainian Orthodox Church Synod Formed

90UN1131A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
10 Feb 90 p 4

[S. Volyanskiy and A. Trotsenko RATAU report: "A Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Is Formed"]

[Text] The first meeting of the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church took place on 8 February in Kiev. Following the meeting the metropolitan of Kiev and Galitskiy, the patriarchal exarch of all the Ukraine, Filaret, and members of the Synod met with representatives of the press, television and radio.

As is known, the metropolitan said, the archibishopric council of the Russian Orthodox Church met late in January in Moscow and adopted a provision on the exarchate of the Moscow patriarchate. In line with this document our exarchate now has another name—the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UPTs). Provisions were also adopted on the rights and activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, according to which it is able to create its own synod. It will elect an exarch for the Ukraine and archbishops, and will then submit proposals for confirmation by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Holy Synod.

The Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that has just been created is made up of five members. They will in turn choose all the bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Our church will now resolve all questions pertaining to Orthodox life in the republic independently, Metropolitan Filaret emphasized.

The Synod has the right to set up its own commissions and engage in activity to set up newspapers, journals and other religious literature. We believe that this will be very important for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which has broad canonical links with the Moscow Patriarchate and other patriarchates of the Orthodox Churches, and also with the autocephalous orthodox churches.

As is known, as a result of the agreement reached between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Roman Catholic Church a mixed quadripartite Orthodox-Catholic commission is being set up for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement to the religious situation that has deteriorated in some parts of the western Ukraine. This commission should include representatives of the Vatican and the Moscow Patriarchate, and also the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Catholics of the Eastern Rite. At the Synod meeting representatives were chosen from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. They included the Archbishop of Lvov, Iriney, and the Archpriest Aleksandr Shvets. The Metropolitan of Voronezh, Mefodiy, has already been chosen from the Moscow Patriarchate. The Vatican representative is to be selected soon.

We believe, the metropolitan said, that a commission should be set up to normalize relations between Orthodox Christians and Catholics of the Eastern Rite in the West Ukraine, working jointly with us. This will make it possible to resolve the problems that have arisen and controversial issues in a peaceful way, in accordance with the Constitution and Soviet laws. We have also set up subcommittees for the Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol, and Carpathian oblasts whose activity should be aimed at resolving controversial issues as quickly as possible.

I would like to remind you, Metropolitan Filaret continued, that in January, when we met in Moscow with a delegation of the Roman Catholic Church, the two sides condemned the violence and violent seizure of churches,

and appealed for a peaceful settlement of these questions. This was also confirmed by Pope John Paul II and the Archibishopic Council of our church since violence is at variance with the Christian spirit.

Responding to questions relating to the language for worship in the churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the metropolitan said that worship will be in two languages—Church Slavonic and Ukrainian. I personally believe, the exarch emphasized, that there should be a church in Kiev where divine service can be conducted in Ukrainian.

Making Ukrainian the official language, the metropolitan continued, has been reflected also in the training process for the religious seminaries in Kiev and Odessa, where now literature is also being taught in Ukrainian. Yet another seminary should be opened, with all teaching in Ukrainian.

Journalists were interested in the report that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church favors the creation of a memorial church in Kiev to honor the millennium of the Christianization of Rus.

Metropolitan Filaret also talked about the international links of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The Synod meeting, the exarch of the Ukraine reported, also discussed matters pertaining to the election of a new bishop and relocating the bishops within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the creation of a Ukrainian Orthodox Church newspaper, UKRAINSKIY PRAVOSLAVNIY VISNIK, which will be published in Ukrainian and Russian.

Catholic, Orthodox Communiqué Issued

90UN0196A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
6 Feb 90 p 4

[RATAU report: "For the Sake of Peace and Mutual Understanding Among Believers"]

[Text] As already reported in the press, as a result of an exchange of missives between Pimen, patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, and Pope John Paul II in the period of 12-17 January of this year talks were held in Moscow between representatives of those two churches. At those talks there was discussion of the issue of Eastern Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine and the situation which has arisen in regard to their relations with Orthodox believers. The delegation from the Russian Orthodox Church was headed by Filaret, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia and patriarchal exarch of all the Ukraine; the Roman Catholic Church delegation was headed by Cardinal Johann Willebrands, honored president of the Papal Council To Foster Christian Unity.

Concerned over the current situation, the members of the two delegations invited representatives of Eastern Rite Catholic and Orthodox congregations to come to Moscow.

Agreements were reached on ways of resolving conflicts which have recently arisen as a result of efforts by groups of Greco-Catholics to take over sanctuaries being used by the Orthodox Church at the former's own initiative.

A communiqué was issued detailing the outcome of the meeting between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox representatives. In the communiqué it was noted that both delegations had discussed in detail the situation of Orthodox believers and Eastern Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine and prospects for normalization of relations between them.

Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the process of normalization of church life in the Soviet Union, including that of Eastern Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine, following a period of lawlessness during which all believers suffered. The members of the delegations are convinced that Orthodox and Catholics should assist the efforts of Soviet society to build a genuinely law-governed state in which all citizens can freely express their religious beliefs.

This applies both to Eastern Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine, who should have a right to form their own church structures within the framework of the Roman Catholic Church, and to Orthodox believers under the Ukrainian Exarchate.

It is obvious that a solution to problems in relations between Eastern Rite Catholics and the Orthodox in the Western Ukraine should be found in a spirit of dialogue between churches. Both delegations expressed a desire to continue their contacts for the purpose of deepening and expanding the consensus achieved by them.

Expressing their concern over the situation in the Western Ukraine, representatives of both churches stated that problems of interchurch relations in that region do not have their origins in religious issues and resolutely declared that hatred and violence are incompatible with the Christian spirit and that furthermore they are to be condemned.

The delegations drafted resolutions concerning normalization of relations between believers. The following is the full text of those resolutions:

1. *Affirming our churches' adherence to the principles of religious freedom and recognizing that under a law-governed state those principles should be realized on the basis of law equally for all without discrimination, both parties deem it essential to achieve the most rapid normalization possible in the situation of Eastern Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine.*

2. *This normalization should turn a new page in the history of relations between Catholics and Orthodox in that region; the confrontation and mutual injustice of the past should be eliminated in a spirit of sincere forgiveness and conciliation and give way to cooperation and joint testimony for Jesus Christ, whom the Church is called to exalt.*

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

3. This normalization, to be carried out within the context of overall democratic transformations in the country, should guarantee Eastern Rite Catholics the right to religious activities guaranteed to all by the Soviet Constitution and Soviet legislation.

However, this right should not be exercised without consideration for the rights and legitimate interests of the Orthodox and other religious groups.

We feel that Christians in the USSR should make a contribution to common efforts aimed at creating a law-governed state.

4. In this connection it is extremely important to avoid all manner of illegal actions, especially those accompanied by violence. Such illegal actions, which are incompatible with the spirit of Christianity, should be condemned; furthermore, they are a hindrance to the registration of Eastern Rite Catholic parishes.

5. In addition, both parties feel that under existing laws Eastern Rite Catholic congregations have the right and the opportunity to register through legally established procedures.

6. Catholic congregations registered in this manner have a right on a par with congregations of other denominations to free, unlimited use of church buildings, as well as the right to build new churches and to lease or purchase real estate property.

7. Noting the fact that in a number of cases parish congregations have divided and each of the groups, both Orthodox and Catholic, have claimed the exclusive right to use a given church, we urge both groups to overcome their legal claims without hostility, for the sake of achieving fraternal concord in respect for people's free choice, without any pressure whatsoever.

8. In order to resolve practical matters which arise in the process of normalization of relations between the Orthodox and Eastern Rite Catholics mutual agreement was expressed on the need to establish a joint commission comprised of representatives of the Holy See, the Moscow Patriarchate and Orthodox and Catholics from the Western Ukraine. Each component of the commission should have one or at most two representatives. This commission should base its work on this present agreement and resolve disputes, guided by a spirit of Christian love and brotherly cooperation. It is urgently necessary to normalize the situation in churches occupied by Eastern Rite Catholics without the consent of their former congregations.

9. The community of Eastern Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine originated 400 years ago as an attempt to overcome the schism between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. That attempt did not produce the desired result. For centuries there have continued to exist differences which have been a source of conflict and suffering for both the Orthodox and for Catholics.

Remaining faithful to Christ's commandment that "all should be as one" and striving to carry out that commandment in our relationships, our two churches have entered into a new stage of dialogue, firmly convinced that it is not the method of union used in the past but rather dialogue which will help us together solve the problems which are the cause of our schism. Such dialogue has become possible due to the new approaches to the matter of Christian unity defined by the Second Vatican Council and a number of Orthodox Convocations.

The Catholics churches which were formed as a result of the unions of the past, a part of the Catholic Church, are guided in their relations to the Orthodox by the principles of the Second Vatican Council, which gives them an opportunity to be a constructive element in Orthodox-Catholic relations.

Both parties are firmly convinced that both today and in the future those relations should be free of any and all intent to proselytize and also free of mutual suspicion, for only in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation can both churches move successfully ahead along the path of dialogue.

10. Continuing and further developing efforts toward unity, there should be discussion of the matter of how to organize the hierarchical structure of Eastern Rite Catholics in the Western Ukraine so that it will not appear that one hierarchy is being juxtaposed against another, and in order to strive together to ensure that the mutual obligations proceeding from the blessed dialogue between our churches and from the new type of brotherly relations which have come about between us are fulfilled.

The agreement reached at the talks between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church were approved by Pope John Paul II on 25 January 1990 and by an archhierarchs' assembly of the Russian Orthodox Church at Svyato-Daniilov Monastery in Moscow on 30-31 January.

In addition the assembly considered a Statute on the Exarchates of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to this document the eparchies, parishes and monasteries in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR will canonically comprise the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate and will officially be called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Within the bounds of the exarchate supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority will belong to the exarchate synod.

Assessing the proposed statute on exarchates and the substantial autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a timely measure dictated by pastoral concern, the archhierarchs' assembly expressed the hope that it would serve to satisfy the national aspirations of Orthodox believers in the Ukraine. The broad rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will give believers an opportunity to construct their own church life in accordance with their own clerical and ethnic traditions and will help foster the development of that church's spiritual potential.

Ukrainian Catholic Aggression Against Orthodox Church Examined

*90UN0896A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 10, 12 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by V. Desyatnikov, special correspondent of RADYANSKA UKRAINA: "Conflict in God's House"]

[10 Jan 90, p 3]

[Text] 1. In the State of Tragic Confrontation

While telling about what had happened, this elderly man (I will not mention his name, because he asked me not to) could not hide his tears. Into what yawning gap are we falling? So many years have been devoted to serving God and people, to enlightening the parish in the spirit of love for one's neighbor, of tranquil mutual respect, and for what? All in vain? The people, who he had been living close by for many years, who he seemed to know better than himself, who he had baptized, brought to life, buried—those people crudely spat on his soul. Secretly, conspiratorially they converted from Orthodoxy to Greco-Catholicism, insidiously seized the Church, and even more—they brought rotten eggs and tomatoes to the temple to throw at their recent pastor.

For many years he had been a respectable man in the village and in the rayon. But now he hears behind his back, "Stalinist, KGB-ist, Antichrist, Communist". Even children run up to him in the street asking, "Holy Father, where is your pistol?" Who instructed them? Where is this barbarity from? In a Church of an old town of Sambor I was speaking to Father Volodimir Golod, decan. As an Orthodox priest he has served the parish for over forty years. I was told that at one time "forest people" tried to kill him for that, but failed. And now Father Volodimir, vigorous and corpulent is losing the parish again. He is afraid to leave the Church, because it may be seized.

Meanwhile, I. Zayets, deputy chairman of the City Executive Committee, was telling me that a real war is unfolding between the Orthodox and the Greco-Catholics, or to be precise, the Greco-Catholics and the Orthodox. Before the end of 1989, in the Staro-Sambirsky rayon, applications for the registration of former Orthodox and now Greco-Catholic communities came from Nedilna, Sosnivka, Bukova, Tarnava, Pjatnitsa, and other villages.

In Zolochiv, Decan Father Volodimir Lehky was telling about the methods used by emissaries of the Greco-Catholic Church. When "working" on ordinary believers, they promise attention and help, but do not forget to threaten. An ordinary peasant from the West Ukraine will not underestimate those threats, because usually he has had some experience. A great range of promises is used when Orthodox priests are being persuaded to convert to Catholicism. But those who are uncompromising, such as Father Volodimir, have a bad time. Someone calls his home at night, persuades and frightens him, douses the walls of his house with the

contents of a water-closet, and terrorizes his landlady. Orthodox temples are being seized in the daytime and at night, the keys being violently confiscated.

An incident in a village Zalissya, of the same Zolochiv rayon, has shocked everyone. The activists of the Greco-Catholic Church absolutely deny any direct correlation between the death of V. Bochalo and the capture of his Church, so I thoroughly investigated this case to learn what had actually happened.

An Orthodox priest, M. Nimak, who served in Zalissya, in the end of November proclaimed himself a disciple of Greco-Catholicism. Then, V. Bochalo began to take care of Zalissya as an Orthodox priest, coexisting with M. Nimak, though the latter did not have any legal right to serve in this temple. A kind of clerical diarchy was formed. Intending to go to Zalissya on December 10, V. Bochalo called M. Nimak on the phone to inquire if he by any chance was going there too. Nimak answered in the negative. But when V. Bochalo reached the Zalissya Church, the service was already in progress. V. Bochalo entered the Church, then came out, and at that moment he was surrounded by a crowd of believers influenced by M. Nimak. At once, V. Bochalo fell down in the yard of the Church and never rose again.

I am looking at a document: the public prosecutor's office decided to refuse to institute criminal proceedings due to lack of evidence. V. Bochalo had just gotten over an infarction and that day he was also seriously ill. That was proven.

But I still think the preliminary investigator was right in expressing the essence of the case: "Due to heart disease, he (V. Bochalo - V.D.) felt bad because of what he had seen and heard, and he fell on the ground near a car and died."

Meanwhile, in the village of Remeniv, Kamenets-Buzky rayon, Greco-Catholics burned Orthodox books. In many temples of Lvov, Orthodox service is not allowed.

Here are the roots of protest actions from the side of the Orthodox clergy and congregation which I observed. On December 26, a group of monks, priests, and believers from Pochayev, Ternopol oblast, occupied premises where Ju. Reshetilo, representative of the Religion Council of Lvov oblast, was working. In one of the rooms I saw a slogan which ran: "Galichany, do not allow the land which has been washed with the blood of Orthodox cossacks to be mocked!" They brought icons and a cross to the office of Ju. Reshetilo. The people who arrived were praying day and night.

I asked the monks what was the goal of this action.

"We are protesting against the burning conflict. We do not blame the Greco-Catholic Church itself, but only those who instigate one group of Christians against another. These people do not care about the fate of the congregation, they only pretend that they stand up for

legalizing the Greco-Catholic Church, but actually they are motivated by political ambitions. We are protesting against the inactivity of the authorities, who cannot secure legal rights."

Violent actions of extremist circles of Greco-Catholics and those who would be happy to make a political "profit", were strongly criticized by Iriney, Archbishop Lvovsky and Drogobitsky, as well as by Ukrainian Exarchate and the Sacred Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.

It was not very easy to meet with Ivan Gel, chairman of the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Greco- and Catholic Church. We were introduced to each other by Miroslav Soltis, who was said to head the leading group of the Preobrazhensky Cathedral, which had recently been confiscated from the Orthodox. Finally, I managed to get into the apartment of Gel, where, for some strange reason, there were twenty or even thirty people, whom I did not know. The lights were on, movie cameras were shining, numerous photocameras... However, our hour's talk went on successfully.

[Correspondent] Pane Gel, the Orthodox and the Greco-Catholics of the Ukraine are in a state of tragic confrontation. Where, your opinion, are its roots and how can these problems can be solved?"

[Gel] The problems really exist. They are not new ones, they are rooted in old and new history. The faith was just as the power wanted it to be. The Orthodox Church of Russia...

[Correspondent] Do you mean the Russian Orthodox Church?...

[Gel] The Orthodox Church of Russia has always been one of the Ministries, an obedient tool of social and national oppression. But let us speak about the West-Ukrainian lands, because they have come into the sphere of influence of the USSR. The Lvov Council of 1946, which declared the Greco-Catholic Church illegal, was illegal itself, and this has already been recognized by both state officials and the church.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, but I do not know of such recognitions.

[Gel] Read OGONYOK. A recent article about the Lvov Council. It tells everything. How the Council proceeded and who gave vodka to whom and for what.

[Correspondent] The article in the magazine was only a version of OGONYOK. This is not scientific research and in no way an official document.

[Gel] All right. In my opinion, the Council was unjust. For 43 years after it, there existed only the Russian Orthodox Church. Very many people were murdered, and some part of the population resigned themselves to this church. At last we received the opportunity to return to our former faith, but the noose is still around our neck.

[Correspondent] What do you mean by noose?

[Gel] Paragraph 6 of the Constitution, for instance. As well as the methods which are expected to be used to save our economy. I strongly doubt it can be cured with their help.

[Correspondent] I still object to your terminology.

[Gel] But it is true. What is the noose? Death. Ecological death is waiting for us, the cultural one has already come. And starvation death is waiting ahead too.

[Correspondent] Let us return to the beginning of our conversation.

[Gel] People have already had bitter experiences and do not believe the Greco-Catholic Church will exist for a long time. People say, that if there was confidence that perestroika would stay alive and that Gorbachev, whom they know, trust, and like, would not be replaced by someone else, then all the population of their village would at once convert to Greco-Catholicism. But one of them has five kids, another one has five too, and they are afraid for their children and themselves...

[Correspondent] Do you think the fear is the only reason?

[Gel] Not at all...

[Correspondent] There is ample proof of violence, extremism, etc. Here is my notebook with numerous alarming examples.

[Gel] I am not aware of such facts, but I believe that if you have them, they have really taken place. If they are real, it's a shame. I'll report them to Metropolitan Volodimir Sternyuk, the leader of the Greco-Catholics of the Ukraine. We cannot turn from a suppressed Church into a suppressing one. Where is the way out of this troublesome situation? The state should be watching quietly. Everything will be managed itself. The people will handle everything without any help.

Author's Note: In presenting this interview, I have intentionally omitted rude insults toward the Russian Orthodox Church, although Ivan Gel's speech was rich in them. The kindest of them, I guess, was "a cancer on the body of the people".

From the talk with V. Sternyuk, the leader of the Greco-Catholics of the Ukraine. Lvov, December 29, 1989.

[Correspondent] I came to see you because I am very anxious about the conflicts between the Orthodox and the Greco-Catholics. There have been facts of threats, violence, violation of the Soviet Law. Unfortunately, most of all—from the side of your congregation. What can you say on this account?

[Sternyuk] I am not almighty and cannot be responsible for all Greco-Catholics. Perhaps there have been single episodes of violation of the law. Does this put us in a bad light? No. The Soviet power has its criminals too.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, I don't think it sounds proper.

[Sternyuk] I want to say that we are often accused on the grounds of inaccurate, distorted facts. Take, for example, the incident with V. Bochalo, in Zolochiv.

[Correspondent] Pan Gel told me about that. Tomorrow I am leaving for Zolochiv to clear up the incident and I promise to tell everything in the newspaper.

[Sternyuk] I repeat: I blame any violation of the law.

[Correspondent] Why then don't you make a statement in the press, on the radio or TV and censure those who attack churches and threaten people?

[Sternyuk] I am not aware of any facts and cannot be guided by rumors. Much, I think, can be explained by impatience.

[Correspondent] At present, in many villages of the West Ukraine, the Orthodox and Catholics have to coexist, and what's more, to share the same worship building. Are there any religious obstacles to that?

[Sternyuk] In principle, there is the possibility to conduct services jointly, but separately. In Jerusalem, there is a church, where Christians of different sects have the right to pray at different hours.

[Correspondent] Do you think a dialogue between the Russian Orthodox and the Greco-Catholic Churches possible under present circumstances?

[Sternyuk] There have already been such suggestions. I guess it is necessary to start from the top. Let us listen attentively.

[Correspondent] As for me, I think this dialogue could be begun from the bottom, as well. It might be a useful addition to a possible dialogue between the Church authorities; it could help in solving the conflicts.

[Sternyuk] Attention should be given to this idea.

I noticed M. Nizkoguz, a priest from the village of Stara Sil of Starosambirsky rayon, at the Constituent Congress of Narodny Rukh for Perestroyka where he made a speech that was roughly falsifying historical events and had a shade of demagogic. While in the oblast, I learned that eight years ago he used to be an Orthodox priest in one of the rayons, and was transferred to Starosambirsky rayon because he had violated the valid Law about religious cults. As a sign of protest, he converted himself to Greco-Catholicism.

I met Father M. Nizkoguz before my talk with I. Gel and therefore thoroughly recorded all that he said. But that was, I guess, of no consequence, because after I compared the two recordings, I was impressed with the similarities in their speeches. The same words, the same opinions—about the Russian Orthodox Church as a ministry, about the noose around the neck and the same

interpretation of the noose as Article 6 of the Constitution, economy, ecology, etc. (See the interview with I. Gel). An argument about the suppressed Church which cannot suppress was mentioned too. What could that mean? However, answers to some of the questions did not have any parallels.

[Correspondent] At present, many Orthodox believers are converting to Catholicism. What is your personal attitude toward those who easily change their affiliation with one or another confession?

[Nizkoguz] In most cases, it is a normal event, because the Greco-Catholic Church has always been native to all Ukrainians, and our history confirms this fact.

Author's Note: After that, Father Nizkoguz refused to make an excursus to the history, because I reminded him of some facts of the long struggle of the Ukrainians against the Unia.

[12 Jan 90 p 3]

[Text] 2. Toward A Peaceful Solution

During my stay in Lvov, I visited several times the Preobrazhensky Church, recently occupied by the Greco-Catholics. One time I was accompanied by M. Soltis, whom I have already mentioned. M. Soltis was bitterly complaining that the press had invented some metal rods, with which members of the "occupying group" were allegedly armed. Look closely, he asked, is there any guard in the church? Is there anyone with rods? I attested that there was nobody of the sort. A service was going on. People were praying. Sacred Orthodox things were in their places. In its place was even the memorial plate, stating that G. Costelnik, the central character of the Lvov Council of 1946, had officiated in this church. No matter what the attitude of the Greco-Catholics toward this person is, they consider him a part of history which cannot be rewritten.

I have already given numerous illustrations of illegal and immoral actions on the Greco-Catholics' part. Take a two hundred meters walk from the Preobrazhensky Church, and you'll see in the public garden, near the Opera Theater, how the Unia supporters are struggling against Orthodoxy. Here is a stand with a large sheet of strong paper on it. There you can read a "Fantastic Story on the Lvov Theme", about the deeds of KGB Colonel Filaretov, who had directed his troops to Italy, organized the Council there, established the Orthodoxy, and sent the Catholics headed by the Pope to Siberia. How do you like the story?

Nearby you can see an even larger stand with "Best Christmas-and-New-Year Wishes of the Lvov Greco-Catholics", containing a large appeal: "Let us put the Russian Orthodox church on the state subsidy!" Under that - rude insults aimed at Orthodox ministers. "Let's cut off their access to the trough of money! Not a single ruble should reach the bottomless pockets of the grabbers and invaders! Such an economic act of the believers of

the revolutionary Greco-Catholic Lvov will serve as an example to all the rest. Let us turn Stalinist-and-Brezhnevist priests- Ceausescus out of our sacred places!"

Unfortunately, the authors of this savage appeal have not signed. Who are they? Maybe they are from the Committee for the protection of the Greco-Catholic Church? Their leader, I. Gel, has just told me about their desire for peaceful settlement of the conflict. Peace with the Church, at whose ministers he was flinging mud so lavishly. The manner is the same, and a natural question arises: is it possible to have a dialogue, ostensibly supported by Pan Gel, under the conditions of escalating violence, accusations, and defamation?

Now is just the time to say the following. Look. The Orthodox clergy is protesting against illegal actions of the Greco-Catholics. The protests are well-founded. But why aren't these protests always supported by the people? I know only a few situations in which the Orthodox congregation repulsed Greco-Catholic visitors, like it was in the village of V. Lenina. There are many Orthodox priests who live with the people and share their interests. But there exist such priests who have built "palaces" for themselves and keep themselves away from the masses. This is a problem! At the same time, M. Nizkoguz, whom I have already recalled, spends all his time with his countrymen. I remember how proud he was when showing the church he had made there, as well as his moderate house and a small self-made tractor, with which the holy father tills old women's plots of land. Is it any wonder that they will support him?

I have been trying to understand some of the "advocates" of the Greco-Catholic Church and it seems to me, I have already understood something. It seems to them, that in light of the current political atmosphere, (candidly speaking, a very unique atmosphere), under these turbulent conditions, these people, who have nothing else to lose, have decided that the wheel of history can be steered in the direction of separation or "independence". A direction different from that which had been long ago chosen by the Ukrainian people. However, I am not going to simplify the process by which the people chose that direction, the contradictions and diversities, painfulness and sometimes tragic conditions of making that choice, as well as the controversy of the outcome.

It is clear that the forces I am speaking about would like to change the situation, neither because they feel concern about the "people's interests", nor for the people's benefit, of course. Not only the international events, interpreted in an appropriate way, push those impatient reformers to the escapades of that sort, but what is happening nearby pushes them as well. They take into account such internal facts as passivity, mental apathy, and the confusion of some of the local authorities. They seem to be ready for everything without firing a shot. Why not lose one's balance and try?.. Imagine, several

proceedings have been instituted against people violating the valid Law about clerical worships. Has any one of them been tried in the oblast? No! Were the Orthodox believers defended anywhere? No!

Furthermore, in the same public garden, near the same "visual agitation", which I have already mentioned, there is something else. A few young people, for instance, quite openly sell posters, published in large editions and entitled: "Glory to the Heroes!" Under that title—another one in large letters: "The Heroes of the Ukraine". There are four of them. Who? Petlyura, Bandera, Chuprinka, and Konovalets. For open sale and purchase. Downtown. Well, if there are corresponding political forces, there should be heroes too. Why is nothing counterposed to them? Not somewhere there, behind the closed doors, at the meetings, conferences, plenums, etc., but here, among people, in the crowd. Isn't there anything to be said? Aren't there materials, documents, photographs, live witnesses of the deeds of those "heroes"? They are absent only in this garden. That is why the history is arbitrarily interpreted here; in other words, it is distorted, as is the truth. It is clear that bureaucratic agitation and propaganda here, in the excited crowd, won't do. Living and honest agitation and propaganda are necessary. Where are they?

How can we prevent further aggravation of the conflict between the Greco-Catholics and the Orthodox? Unfortunately, the clarification of the inter-church relations can no longer be under control of the local authorities. Religious hatred is being stirred up, and some "informal" organizations are, unfortunately, adding to it, among them in a few cases Rukh (though evidence exist that its members stand up for law and order, for instance, in Sambor). Speeches defending the Greco-Catholics are more and more often made under separatist slogans, and demands are put forward to withdraw from the USSR. The inactivity of the authorities is treated as a sign of their diffidence and provokes alternative forces for the escalation of their demands and illegal actions. The official statement of the Council on the Religion Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR about the order of the registration of the Greco-Catholic communities is considered a forced concession. Still new demands are claimed, in the first place to cancel the resolutions of the Lvov Council of 1946 and to return all temples, clerical property, and religion properties, without exception.

What can be said on this account? Any interference with the rights of the Greco-Catholics to profess their religion is impermissible and illegal. But the same is valid about the Orthodox, as well. Rights for some people, gained through interference with rights of other people, would be a violation of state, human, and God's laws. In this situation, only a dialogue, a sincere desire to solve all the problems at once, no matter how complicated they are, can be the only way out.

The history of the Greco-Catholic religion and Unia is complicated and contradictory; there are many sorrowful pages in it. Sorrowful from the point of view that honest Greco-Catholics still feel shame for them. But the Greco-Catholics of today should not be hostages for the past. A new page of their history is being opened, and it would be much more sorrowful if it began with actions which cause protests and contradict God's commandments. I should add that inter-church confrontation is one more blow against perestroika. Who benefits from it?

It is necessary to put an end to the confrontation. There is everything for it, except for good will, so far. Let it be!

Ukrainian Catholics Break Off Talks

90UN1317A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent S. Romanyuk: "The Bishop Protests"]

[Text] The first meeting of the Quadripartite Joint Commission on Normalization of Relations Between Eastern Orthodox Representatives and Greek Catholics of the Ukraine's western oblasts took place in Lvov. A joint statement was issued on the results of the talks. That is the official version.

But on the eve of the meeting, LENINSKA MOLOD published a unilateral statement of the Episcopate of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church and signed by seven bishops. It states in particular that negotiations were broken off at the moment when Bishop Vladimir Sternyuk quit them as a sign of protest. Therefore, the bishops consider any documents resulting from these negotiations to be invalid.

The Greco-Catholic Episcopacy is ready to return to the negotiations only in the event that the Moscow Patriarchy admits the illegality of the Lvov Church Synod of 1946 (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, January 5, 1990.) and the consequences resulting from it and that a total reorganization and rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church will occur.

The religious situation in the western portion of the Republic remains extremely tense.

Threat of 'Islamic Extremism' in USSR Downplayed

90US0641A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 7, 16 Feb 90 pp 9-10

[Article by Aleksandr Smirnov under the rubric "World in Motion": "Is There a Future?"]

[Excerpts] One of the paradoxes of our time, the time of the late 20th century, with all progress in science and technology and culture, is a noticeable activation of the religious factor and religious currents in politics. The events in the Near and Middle East, in the Muslim world

in general, bear vivid witness to this. In dozens of countries of Asia and Africa, there is an intensification of the penetration of the Islamic religion into sociopolitical life, the growth in the activity of fundamentalists, overthrowing the "imported" spiritual values and ideas, and demonstrating for the "strengthening of the faith," for the principles and orders of early Islam, the strict execution of the prescriptions of the Koran and sharia. The most uncompromising portion of the fundamentalists, the Islamic extremists, declare their main goal to be the establishment of Islamic power by any means, including open political and armed violence.

[passage omitted] To what extent do the Islamic extremists represent a danger to Soviet society? After all, our country is in many ways just as Eastern, Asiatic, as it is European. Without even realizing it, every minute we speak and write many words of Arabic, Turkic, or Persian origin. Our ancestors did not only fight against the Turks, but maintained with friendly and useful relations with them, along with the Iranians and Arabs, not to mention the peoples who came to be part of Russia. While Imam Shamil fought the Russians for many long years (his opposition was objectively prolonged by Nicholas I's senseless cruelties and most stupid methodology of waging war), his son was already a general of the Russian service. In the beginning of World War I, one of Russia's major cavalry formations was commanded by an Azerbaijani. In history there has not been only suppression of Muslims and the spread of Orthodoxy, but also the maintenance of good everyday relations with Muslim leaders, with elders and other leaders of the Russian Muslims. Any district chief, any intellectual, even the district police officer in Turkestan spoke the local language, and was on friendly terms with the "necessary people" of the Muslims. Unfortunately, Soviet authorities in a number of Muslim regions, primarily in Central Asia, did not execute the statutes of the Leninist appeal "To all the worker-Muslims of Russia and the East," which proclaimed "Order your national life freely and without hindrance. You have the right to this. Know that your rights, just as the rights of all peoples of Russia, are preserved by all the power of the revolution and its organs—the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Deputies."

The gross errors, the outrages committed by the local authorities under an obvious lack of desire to grasp the life and problems of the people, the nihilistic attitude toward religion were in many ways the causes for the broadly developed insurgent Muslim movement in Central Asia. The transition to the Leninist NEP, the capable actions of Mikhail Frunze and other, more farsighted Soviet workers in adjusting contact with the masses of believers, in the return of buildings of worship and portions of property to the Muslims ensured victory over the insurgents to a much greater degree than did military force. What happened later, under Stalin, is well known. The campaign against religion with the exploitation of the most coarse administrative methods continued right up to recent times.

Although a growth in the influence of [Sufiyskiye and Myuridkiye] associations has been observed in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus, there is no threat of an anti-government extremist movement on purely Islamic grounds. In order that one not emerge in the future, it is necessary to first of all resolve the socioeconomic difficulties associated with the [cotton] monoculture, and wide-scale unemployment, which have already reached dangerous levels. It is necessary to overcome the restrictive practice of a number of local leaders. After all, in many large villages and even cities, it is impossible for the Muslim believer to perform religious rites in accordance with the precepts of Islam in a lawful fashion. Soviet citizens' interest in the study of Arabic is not being satisfied. Last year, only 30 Soviet Muslims were able to complete a pilgrimage to the holy places of Islam, while at the same time, over 100 adherents of the Krishna cult newly-proclaimed in our country visited India.

During the days of the celebration of the Millennium of Russian Christianity, Soviet Muslims were promised approximately the same privileges given the Orthodox. Yet until now, the necessary decisions have been delayed. Nevertheless, no kind of dangerous symptoms of Islamic extremism have been observed in our Soviet East. Nor are there any in the Caucasus. Religion is not to blame in the clashes taking place there.

Yes, under the influence of the bloody tragedy in Baku, the death of the compatriots of Sheikh ul-Islam Pashazade, the spiritual leader of the Shiite Muslims of the Transcaucasus is for the time being taking a very harsh position. He has sent the Soviet leadership an epistle suffused with bitterness. But this is not Islamic extremism, but national emotions and feelings. With the normalization of the situation in Baku and in all Azerbaijan, which must clear the path for the repeal of the state of emergency, emotions and bitter feelings must, and we hope, will, yield their place to sense and calm.

If we speak of the Azerbaijani People's Front, the extremist wing of which is guilty in many acts of violence, then there is not among its active figures a single Muslim authority. Moreover, certain irresponsible individuals from this front, in nationalistic blindness, are threatening to break up not only the Soviet Transcaucasus, but the neighboring Islamic state, Iran. On the other hand, many imams and mullahs, and simple believers have actively attempted to impede the pogroms and murders. Certain Armenians found refuge in the mosques of Baku. In a number of cases, the mosques themselves suffered from the actions of the extremist elements. For example, the mosque in the city of Khachmas, according to press reports, was forcibly turned into the headquarters of the armed fighters, who pilfered from it a large sum of money collected as donations from Muslims.

And ever greater number of Muslims are involved in the work of overcoming the consequences of the national

internecine dissension, seeing that the Soviet Government is making great efforts not for a struggle against Islam in Azerbaijan, but for the sake of the restoration of peace and calm for all citizens of the Soviet republic and the entire Transcaucasus.

They understand that religious extremism brings destabilization both to the faithful and all the citizens of any country.

Pamyat Program To 'De-Zionize' Discussed

90UN0886C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 7 Feb 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "In Defense of Democracy"]

[Text] Pamyat is distributing its program of how to "de-Zionize" the country: "To bring the number of Jews and persons related to them down (!) to 0.69 percent at every level in state and public organizations...not to allow...not to accept...not to elect...to fire..." This strategic plan will, probably, be followed by a list of instructions on who should and how to "bring down" the number of Jews to the indicated level.

Our colleagues from other newspapers and magazines quite correctly gave the authors of this indecent project the name of "the Sharikovs". Our colleagues also want to know how they are going to put their ideas into practice—by putting yellow stars on people's backs or not—by just using the personnel files. We might add here that the files in question currently fill millions of filing cabinets. We would like to laugh together with our colleagues at the sight of the primitive terrorists or those who inspire them—unfortunately, the latter possess ranks and titles and participate in artistic unions.

But first let us separate grain from chaff. The grain, the essence, the core of this matter is the Black Hundred itself, with the idea of a pogrom being the extreme and the last attempt of an outdated system to keep power. The chaff, the wrapping in this case, is the idea of patriotism, the idea of Russia's revival, which is most disappointing. It is disappointing because our society has to revive many, many lost values, but nothing can be revived by the blood of other nationalities. The notion of Russia being put next to the notion of a pogrom plunges just as low as the latter and loses any meaning whatsoever. This kind of Russia—the evil, police empire, with its Black Hundred mercenaries, armed with knives and brass-knuckles—is a thing of the past, thank God.

How many hundreds or thousands were deceived by the "patriot" lure?

The readers call us: "Tell me please, will the pogroms only be in Moscow and Leningrad, or in Kiev also?" "Tell us, where can we evacuate our family?" "Can I give you my personal papers for safekeeping?" You feel ashamed listening to these humble questions. You feel ashamed answering them! But how can one comfort those people if the procurators, the police, the gorkoms

[city party committees], and the raykoms [rayon party committees] are waiting for "facts". That is what they so shamelessly tell us: "Give us the facts." To think that the crime consists of an actual pogrom is illiterate and immoral. Meanwhile the crime has been committed already: it was the call for a pogrom together with its "theoretical" foundation. That means that the criminal court should try the theoreticians, and the terrorists, and the party and state officials who cynically present the Black Hundred slogans as "pluralism".

Last Sunday hundreds of thousands of Muscovites marched along the city streets carrying democratic slogans. One of them read: No!—to chauvinism, racism, Pamyat and other scum! We hope that the strength of this rally showed how the forces stand.

Note From the Editor

It is true: We have not seen anything like that yet. The people of our city came out into the streets in hundreds of thousands to express their support for the course of the renovation and democratization of our society. They came to show their concern caused by the conservative, extremist, chauvinist, and nationalist forces that are

expanding in the country, and by their obvious merging. Such were the main ideas of the slogans and of the speeches at the meeting. Among those who spoke at the meeting were the people's deputies, members of the government, representatives of religious institutions, the military, scientists, and writers. They expressed different opinions, some of them debatable, which is quite natural for a mass forum. However, no extremes and no passions could diminish the importance of this unprecedented event, a proof of the huge political activity of the awakened people. The unanimous wish of hundreds of thousands of people to defend the perestroyka and democracy served as its main theme. And that made it all the more strange and upsetting for us, in the LITER-ATURNAYA GAZETA, to read the TASS information which to us seemed done too hastily.

Its authors, evidently, focused their attention on separate mishaps of this mass, truly popular display of people's will and failed to see its creative and constructive basis. Whether it was desired or not, unfortunately, it played into the hands of forces against which the meeting was directed.

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